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WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP: CAN WOMEN HAVE IT ALL?

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Women in Leadership Positions:
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Introductory Remarks
by
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Recent years have seen an unprecedented rise of women in politics. In fact, we are currently witnessing a record-number of female world leaders. In Europe, eight countries have either female prime ministers or presidents.[1] Most notably, in Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel was elected for a third term, and in France and Italy, the first minority women were appointed to be ministers in the cabinet in 2012 (by Francois Hollande) and 2013 (by Enrico Letta). In Latin America and the Caribbean, countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Trinidad and Tobago, and in Africa, countries such as Liberia and Senegal, had female political leaders in 2014. In the US, several women ran in the Senate and House elections in 2012, and many view Hillary Clinton as a likely contender in the US presidential elections in 2016. In higher education, women in media and the business world have likewise slowly made inroads into assuming leadership positions. However, when we look at income distribution, pay schemes, and job security, gender differences are still pronounced. In terms of human rights, cultural perceptions and family tasks, stark differences can also be noted. Women are more often employed in precarious and insecure jobs, and the gender pay gap still plagues most OECD countries. Moreover, a recent study conducted by the European Union shows that 33 percent of women in the 28 EU member states have experienced physical and/or sexual violence since the age of 15—that corresponds to 62 million women.[2]

Advancement into leadership positions is clearly not a linear process, in spite of the progress noted above. Which factors contribute to the rise of women who attain positions of influence and power, and what is holding women back? How can this process best be conceptualized? What difference does diversity make and what is the situation of women in other parts of the world?

The theme of this conference was inspired by a debate that began last year with the much acclaimed publication of Sheryl Sandberg's *Lean In: Women, Work and the Will to Lead* (2013) which quickly became a bestseller in the United States.[3] In this book, Sheryl Sandberg, the Chief Operating Officer of Facebook, who is ranked on *Fortune's* list of the 50 most powerful women in business and one of *Times'* 100 Most Influential People In The World, argues that women unintentionally hold themselves back in their careers, and she insists that women have to demonstrate determination and perseverance to attain leadership positions in the corporate world. In her book, she describes specific steps women can take to combine professional achievement with personal fulfillment and demonstrates how men can benefit by supporting women in the workplace and at home. But is individual persistence enough? Is career advancement primarily even an issue of individual choice and perseverance or do other factors come into play shaping choices and equal opportunities?

Responding to Sandberg's argument, Anne-Marie Slaughter, a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, who herself has rich leadership experience as Chief Policy Advisor for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, objected to the "lean in" metaphor. From her perspective, it is not the individual mindset, nor

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1. Countries in Europe with female leaders (prime ministers or presidents) at the beginning of 2014 were: Denmark, Germany, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Slovenia, http://www.filibustercartoons.com/charts_rest_female-leaders.php

2. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2014). "Violence Against Women: An EU-Wide Survey (2010-2012)" http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-vaw-survey-main-results_en.pdf (accessed April 2, 2014).

3. Sheryl Sandberg (2013). *Lean In: Women, Work, and the Will to Lead*. New York: Knopf.

the persistence of women, but rather the broader question of our present social infrastructure that is hindering, or enabling women to pursue a career, especially with a family. Women face a more complex life world, one in which a woman's decision to accept and succeed in leadership positions involves partners as well as children.[4] More often than not broader considerations about dependent others influence women's choices and societal conditions play a major role in shaping the outcome of these decisions. "Lean in" was not enough, Anne-Marie Slaughter argued, reframing the debate as a social issue, as well as an intergenerational issue.

The debate quickly spread into European countries as well where Sheryl Sandberg's book became available in French, German, and Spanish translations, and Anne-Marie Slaughter presented her counter-arguments in European newspaper articles, TV interviews and social media. The controversy, both in the US and in European countries, showed that there were different answers to the catchy prescription to "lean in." The controversy inspired us in the preparation for this conference to take a closer look at the question of why women cannot have it all, or if they can, how choices are shaped and outcomes are molded by realities beyond individual control. As it became clear throughout the conference, "leaning in" was not a passe-partout, a passkey that fits all locks, on the road to leadership. "Can women have it all?"—the question guiding our inquiry—thus became an invitation to explore the transformations that are taking place nationally and globally at the beginning of the 21st century. Reframing the issues at stake, e.g. looking into different ways of advancing and succeeding in leadership, and exploring ways in which gender relations can be changed more deliberatively through political action and public policy, featured prominently in our discussion.

Max Weber, the brilliant German sociologist and political economist, who is the name-giver for the Chair in German and European Politics and this conference series at the Deutsches Haus at NYU, did not pay much attention to women in public office or political leadership. Weber, born in 1864 in the Prussian city of Erfurt and educated in Berlin as well as in Heidelberg, is considered to be the founding father of the disciplines of sociology and political science alike, as he analyzed with great care modern social institutions, cultural patterns, and processes that shaped the path to modernity and made democracy viable. Generations of political scientists followed his lead and to this day he is considered to be the most influential social scientist in Europe. But in his analysis, women are mostly absent, albeit briefly mentioned as part of the modern order. In fact, Weber laid the theoretical groundwork for the generic distinction between the public and the private spheres and ascribed women to the realm of the household, or private sphere. Sexual love, along with the "true" economic interests and social drives for power is, according to Weber, among the most fundamental and universal components of the actual course of interpersonal behavior. Modern societies, based on rational alertness, self-control and methodical planning of life, were threatened by the peculiar irrationality of the sexual act. Sexuality, so Weber contended, underwent an evolution in actual life as a result of rationalization, the key to modernity, inasmuch as it could be turned into a productive force for economic development through sublimation.

Intellectual history and political theory, as well as the young discipline of psychology, have tackled these assumptions, but generations of scholars followed Weber's lead in reproducing the gendered construction of male and female as "public" and "private", leaving women out in the analysis of the public sphere. Fortunately, these lacunae of mainstream political science have largely been corrected and a new generation of feminist scholars boldly addressed these blind spots in recent decades, exploring and illuminating new avenues of studying the significance of gender and gender relations for modern democracies. Some of these innovative scholars joined us for this two-day conference.

While Max Weber's contribution to understanding the construction of gender imbalances in modern societies in his otherwise remarkable scholarship is scant, one of the almost forgotten preconditions for Weber's lasting popularity was that his scholarly work - laid out in several volumes of detailed, systematic analysis – was greatly enhanced, if not made possible, because he enjoyed the support of an equally brilliant mind, that of his wife, Marianne Weber. She took on the arduous task of editing his often unreadable notes into publishable manu-

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4. Anne-Marie Slaughter (2012). "Why Women Still Can't Have It All," *The Atlantic*, July/August. See also her statements and speeches: http://www.ted.com/talks/anne_marie_slaughter_can_we_all_have_it_all?utm_source=newsletter_daily&utm_campaign=daily&utm_medium=email&utm_content=button__2014-03-12

scripts, which she continued intensively after her husbands' early death in 1920 when she prepared ten volumes of his work for publication.

Marianne Weber was not only a well-published sociologist herself, writing on women, love, marriage, and divorce, but she was also an early women's rights activist, who, during the Webers' visit in New York in 1904, met famous American women's rights activists, such as Jane Addams and Florence Kelley.[5] Alas, she, too, had to make choices about career and family, choices that still resonate today. After her sister-in-law's sudden death in the 1920s, Marianne raised her four children, but she never attained an academic position for herself. Marianne Weber died in Heidelberg in 1954.

As historian Joan Scott has argued, modern capitalist societies that distinguished between the "public" and the "private" spheres constructed a gendered conception of these two different realms. Political philosophers, such as Sheila Benhabib and Nancy Fraser have shown how these spheres are valued differently, creating a hierarchical order of the (public) masculine domain over the (private) feminine domain, or, other words, the world of politics over the world of the household and family.[6] To deconstruct, or unveil, these gender hierarchies has been a key topic in democratic political theories for some time and scholars such as Carol Gilligan (who presented at the conference) have called for a reframing of the conversation about gender as a conversation about democracy vs. patriarchy. Resisting the perpetual reconstruction of patriarchal divisions on the level of education and allowing for the individuation of girls and boys would be, according to Gilligan, the key to building a democratic society grounded in "voice" rather than in "violence". [7]

Conditions in the new economy of the globalized world, as well as changing demographics have resulted in an altered reality of work and employment.[8] The flexibility of employment, for example, resulted in new patterns of qualification and pay, and brought about unpredictable changes. New contradictions and challenges arise, especially for younger generations finding their path into employment and adulthood, producing new conflicts between partners and, at times, hard choices in combining work and family requirements. In the US, sociologist Kathleen Gerson (who presented at the conference) shows for example, how new generations of American women and men have experienced growing up amid changing gender and family patterns and how they are responding to new work-family conflicts. [9] The rise of "breadwinner moms", who now comprise 40% of US households, two-thirds of whom are not married, is but one indicator of these fundamental changes taking place (see Gerson).[10]

What emerges from these studies is a somewhat troubling and inconclusive picture of a clash between changing aspirations and realities on one hand, and persistent traditional institutions on the other. Consequently, the organization of work and family life has become a key topic in recent scholarship. The ways in which we organize our household shape our education, our children, our careers, and our outlook on life. They also determine the productivity of our economies. New family patterns and gender arrangements moreover challenge

5. See "*Marianne Weber (1870-1954): A Woman-Centered Sociology*," Patricia M. Lengermann and Jill Niebrugge-Brantley. *The Women Founders: Sociology and Social Theory*, 1830-1930 : A Text/Reader. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1998. Theresa Wobbe (2004). "Elective Affinities: Georg Simmel and Marianne Weber on Gender and Modernity." *Engendering the Social: Feminist Encounters with Sociological Theory*. eds. Barbara L. Marshall and Anne Witz. Maidenhead, England: Open University Press. pp 54–68.

6. Joan Wallach Scott (1999). *Gender and the Politics of History*, New York: Columbia University Press.

7. Carol Gilligan (2009). *The Deepening Darkness: Patriarchy, Resistance, and Democracy's Future*, Cambridge University Press (with co-author David A.J. Richards).

8.   For the changing concepts of gender in the context of economic developments over time see e. g. Mary Nolan (2012). *The Transatlantic Century. Europe and America 1890-2010*, Cambridge University Press.

9. See Kathleen Gerson (2011). *The Unfinished Revolution: Coming of Age in a New Era of Gender, Work, and Family*, New York: Oxford University Press.

10. In Germany, the changing life course and the challenges for gender arrangements have been documented as well. See Jutta Allmendinger (2009). *Frauen auf dem Sprung. Wie junge Frauen heute leben wollen*, München: Pantheon.

traditional assumptions about the division of labor between women and men. New policies that support an equal share of work, inside and outside the home, should be embedded in states and communities, and not only viewed as an issue of individual organization and perseverance.

To be sure, the increasing diversity of societies in the 21st century adds to the complex picture of gender differences and the advancement (or not) of women into leadership positions. Few countries have established policies of affirmative action based on race and gender. In most countries, ethnic diversity is not even accounted for in official statistics, and immigrant women (and men) are often excluded, or marginalized in reflections about societal goals. Yet, minority women have gained voice and representation, sometimes with the paradox result that their advancement is more welcomed than that of minority men, as Amanda Garrett argues in her article about minority women in France.

Women have come a long way in their struggle for the realization of equal civil, social and political rights. Sometimes other social movements supported their advancement, such as the labor movement in Europe, or, like in the US, the civil rights movement. However, the fight against discrimination and low pay, for civil and political rights, and for policies supporting the changing gender arrangements regarding work and care for families continue to this day. While recent scholarship has highlighted the importance of agency and self-representation, the aim of this conference was to explore potential for changing the gender imbalance in politics and the public sphere.

Despite the progress made by women to advance in public office and political positions, women are still underrepresented in leadership positions today. However there are great variations between different countries. In the Scandinavian countries of Europe, women have almost achieved equal parliamentary representation, while the situation is more dismal in Southern Europe. Continental European countries, such as Germany, take a middle ground. In the US, women have made some progress in the corporate world and in politics, but their representation in government is still low. In other regions of the world, as well as in key international institutions, the situation is even more complex.

What can be done to increase the share of women leaders in politics, the business world and in public life, and which concepts prove to be viable? Several years ago, a group of scholars addressed the lower representation of women in politics in a conference at Harvard University in 1998 (of which the author of this article was a part), asking if political liberalism, the great innovative political force, had "failed" women in Europe and the United States. [11] Liberalism, with its emphasis on equality in law and advancement in education, held great promise for women on the path to modernity. But was the liberal approach sufficient to affect advancement in politics? Various strategies, such as "all women`s lists" in the British Labour Party, parité in France, and party quota introduced in Scandinavian countries, Germany and some other countries show the impatience with theories of laissez-faire and clearly reflect the growing influence of women as actors, aiming to change the rules of the game. After all, politics shapes public policies and holds the potential for changing social institutions. These strategies, often first introduced by parties left of center, reflected a growing sense of responsibility for gender equality in public offices and institutions in Western democracies. Deliberative decisions to promote women's advancement have shown some results with more women now in public office than ever, but change is coming slowly.

In the US, only 17.9 percent of members in the House and 20 percent of the Senators are women (women of color make up only 4.5 percent in the House). [12] Even though the situation is slightly more balanced on the state and local levels, women in the US still fight an uphill battle in terms of equal political representation in key institutions.

In national parliaments across Europe, slightly less than one in four members of parliament are women (24 percent). Sweden, the Netherlands and Finland are the only EU countries with more than 40 percent women

11. See: Jytte Klausen and Charles S. Maier (eds.): *Has Liberalism Failed Women? Assuring Equal Representation in Europe and the United States*, New York: Palgrave 2001.
12. http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-government

in parliament. In Germany, 36 percent of representatives in the Bundestag are women, slightly above the EU average. In regional and local assemblies there is considerable variation between countries in the level of female representation but there is a general correlation with the situation at the national level. Notable exceptions are France and Latvia where the gender balance is significantly lower at national level than at regional/local level.

Interestingly, representation in the European parliament is often higher than at the national level. In fact, the European Union has established policy recommendations to increase the representation of women in leadership. Yet, at the European level, the members of the European Parliament comprise 31 percent women and 69 percent men. This is a better balance than in national parliaments but progress towards gender equality has stagnated and there has been little change since the 1999 European parliament elections.

The situation in the corporate world, where the deliberate introduction of quota regulations, for example, is still a very controversial topic, remains likewise difficult. Across Europe women lead less than three percent of the largest publicly listed companies and the boards of these companies comprise 89 percent men and just 11 percent women. The example of Norway, where women now account for 43 percent of the board members of large companies, shows how legislation to enforce gender equality can quickly turn this situation around. Amongst the largest publicly listed companies in the EU Member States, 38 percent have no women on the board and only 28 percent have more than one. This means that during the 2010-2012 financial crisis, monetary policy was largely in the hands of men. The governors of all central banks across Europe are men. The key decision-making bodies comprise 83 percent men and just 17 percent women with little change following banking reforms after the eurozone and financial crisis. In the US, women currently hold 4.6 percent of Fortune 500 CEO positions and 4.6 percent of Fortune 1000 CEO positions.[13]

Against this backdrop, the conference aimed to address underlying causes and consequences of the uneven share of women's representation in public offices. Do women just have to "lean in", as Sheryl Sandberg contends? Or do we have to consider transformations of institutions and the social infrastructure, as Anne-Marie Slaughter has argued? What is the significance of changing men's roles? What difference does it make when more women are in leadership? Will politics be more "humane", or peaceful, and will perceptions, aspirations and the agenda of governments change over time? Which changes are necessary to develop more equity in gender relations? During the conference, speakers from different disciplines, including sociology, psychology, law and political science, approached these questions and explored if and when women can have an equal share of power and what needs to be done to move towards greater gender equity. While the focus was mainly on OECD-countries of Europe and the United States, presentations also covered women's issues in the Middle East and in international organizations.

The conference was held in April 2014 at the Deutsches Haus at New York University in cooperation with the Max Weber Chair at the Center for European and Mediterranean Studies. Aside from NYU, the German Academic Exchange Service, DAAD, generously supported the conference. The conference organizers would like to thank the Deutsches Haus who made this event possible, its staff and the director, Juliane Camfield, and the Center for European and Mediterranean Studies at NYU, most notably its director Larry Wolf and the staff as well as the Max Weber Chair assistant, Hannah Puckett, who provided invaluable organizational support in organizing the conference and preparing this publication.

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New York, May 2014

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13. http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/ceos-women-fortune-100

Women in Finance: Prototypes or Stereotypes?
by
Irene Finel-Honigman

Blythe Masters, one of the last of the top women bankers on Wall Street prior to 2008, resigned from JPMorgan in April 2014 after 27 years with the bank to pursue a career in a "less pressured and stressful workplace". Despite having left the financial derivatives sector well before the crisis of 2008, "the ardently held view in the clammier corners of the internet and in a bizarre book on Ms. Masters claims that 'never since the famous Eve in the Garden of Eden has any woman had so much influence on the destiny of men'" ("Masters withdraws from line of fire", *Financial Times*, April 5/6 2014). Joining the ranks of Sallie Krawcheck, former Chief Financial Officer at Citi, Erin Calahan, former Chief Financial Officer at Lehman, and Zoe Cruz, former co-president at Morgan Stanley, this description of Masters' departure exposes the conflicting forces facing women in finance. In a global environment where financial power is revered, feared and condemned, women in finance present a dual dynamic: women and power intersecting with women and money. Within the context of economic history and popular culture, this article will explore the complex and paradoxical relationship between women and finance and how women in the top echelons of Wall Street were among the first to be fired in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.

Throughout literature women's association with finance as usurer, banker, money dealer or market speculator is uniformly condemnatory and pernicious. Are women in finance more susceptible to temptation and sin? Does their inherent sexual power dangerously increase if they also gain control of finance? Because they are considered to be property, a possession, when women transgress into ownership do they threaten the established order? Why has the negative image of women and money dominated through the ages and why has it still not found resolution in the financial workplaces of the twenty-first century?

American television and movies reflect and influence global social trends; therefore, the representation of female detectives, political operatives, politicians, and attorneys are not merely subjects of entertainment but paradigmatic of power and gender dynamics. Popular culture corroborates and accentuates the paradox that when women achieve equality with or command men, they have to accept a series of tradeoffs. Beauty, intellectual abilities or leadership positions have to be counterbalanced by emotional and/or social dysfunction. In American, as well as in French and Danish, detective shows, women protagonists, unlike their male counterparts, are endowed with super model looks, but social and/or emotional dysfunction, for example: the American shows "Law and Order", "The Killing", and "Killer Women"; the Danish show "The Bridge"; and the French show "Engrenages". Political dramas or soap operas revert to the whore-Madonna dichotomy with an added dash of absolute power: in "Scandal", Olivia Pope DC power broker and fixer stands in contrast to the psychotic female VP, the obsessive, hysterical, and repressed First Lady. In both the British and American versions of "House of Cards", the protagonist's wife is the power behind the throne, Lady Macbeth. Women lawyers are given more latitude in looks, body type and character, but they still make sacrifices, look for love in all the wrong places, and accept tradeoffs; for example in "The Good Wife", "Boston Legal", and "Ally McBeal".

Women bankers barely flicker across the big or the small screen: Demi Moore, in "Margin Call", is so Botoxed and wound up that she seems barely human. In Oliver Stone's "Wall Street" (1987) and "Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps" (2010), women are relegated to wives, daughters, and mistresses. "Wolf of Wall Street" (2013) does present tough women traders as part of the dregs of the "bucket shop" culture of the late 1980s, but they are acknowledged for mere minutes in a three-hour spectacle of bimbos, neglected wives and prostitutes. Yet on Wall Street and across the financial world, discrimination is no longer overt. It is much more latent, subtle and subversive.

A New Paradigm (Or Not?)

On the surface, this is a new era full of hope. For the first time in history, major Central Banks and multinationals are headed by highly respected, credentialed and experienced women. However, a closer examination reveals a disturbing trend: Janet Yellin, Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve, was nominated only as second choice after Larry Summers dropped his candidacy; Christine Lagarde, head of the IMF was chosen as an emergency replacement after Dominique Strauss-Kahn's leadership imploded in a notorious sex scandal; Kanit Flug at the Bank of Israel, was the last choice after all other male candidates were disqualified or dropped out; Nemat Shafik, a former IMF official, was named Deputy Governor of the Bank of England a few weeks after new Governor Marc Carney publically remarked on the "paucity of senior women bankers" ("High-flyer parachutes in to help the Old Lady of Threadneedle St", *Financial Times*, March 22/23, 2014).

In emerging economies the position of women in economic development is far more complex and dependent on political, societal and theological norms and/or barriers. Once former Marxist and socialist regimes move toward a market economy women from elite, educated backgrounds are encouraged to study economics, science and to enter banking and finance. Governors of the Central Banks in Russia (Elvira Nabiullina) and Malaysia (Zeti Akhtar Aziz) are highly qualified economists and bankers. India's largest private sector bank ICICI appointed Chanda Kochhar as CEO in December 2008 as part of an elite cadre of female bankers in charge of domestic and major foreign banks, including HSBC, JPMorgan, and UBS. Two of the four deputy governors at the Central Bank of India are women. Since 2012 Xiaoxia Sun, a career bureaucrat since 1982, has headed the Finance Division in the Ministry of Finance in China. Women hold key positions in foreign banks in Hong Kong and mainland China (for example, Kathryn Shih at UBS; Jing Ulrich at JP Morgan; Mignonne Cheng at BNP Paribas; and Anita Fung at HSBC), however they do not become CEOs of the top Chinese banks ("Top 20 Women in Finance", *Finance Asia*, August 4, 2011). In World Bank Surveys from 2008 to 2011 entitled "Leading Businesswomen in the Arab World" the same names recur among highly educated, Western trained, prominent women in banking, holding companies, stock exchange, and financial institutions. However women in top positions are all part of a very small group of wealthy foreign educated members of ruling families, who are granted the protection and contacts that allow them to function outside of societal and religious restrictions. In Latin America, religion and culture have kept in place traditional biases against women in finance.

In emerging markets women often serve as intermediaries between rural barter economies and urban finance through micro-credit associations, tontines and community-based banks. As in early 20th century Western countries, women are not allowed to open or hold a bank account or credit card in their name nor can they be the sole signatory in any financial transaction unless authorized by a male relative. Outside of the affluent, urban demographic across the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia very few women use formal bank credit to finance small businesses, depending rather on family or personal savings. They fall into the trap of all disenfranchised groups in relation to formal financial networks: because they cannot offer collateral and do not have a credit history, banks refuse to grant them credit.

Women and Money: Fear and Fascination

"My pride, not my principle, my money, not my virtue kept me honest,"
(Defoe, Moll Flanders 1772)

In most societies it is presumed that women are responsible for household finances, but any relationship to money, outside of the home is socially reprehensible or forced upon them due to the death of or abandonment by the male figure. There is an inherent paradox between the competing stereotypes of women as spendthrif—for example, the joke that husbands earn while their wives spend—and provident—that women are also those who save, manage, and protect household assets.

The move from feudal to market economies depends on a merchant class run by shopkeepers, often a couple working together. Yet across cultures, women dealing in monetary operations and transactions are uniformly

depicted as old, ugly, deformed, and somehow cursed by nature, or as sirens, crones, or prostitutes who must be curbed and ostracized. When Raskolnikov, hero of *Crime and Punishment* commits his act of murder, Dostoevsky grants him the possibility of redemption by portraying the victim, Alyona Ivanova, a repulsive old woman usurer, as so despicable that her murder can be absolved. Women figure into European mercantile literature, novellas and plays by the 1550s, but their functions are as keepers of household finances. Although women are not creators of profit or investors, they are endowed with knowledge of the value of money, goods, and the ability to wrangle money out of men. The role of dowry is essential to the social contract. Yet although women contribute money to their marriage, since Merovingian times they can neither control, invest nor remove it from the marriage; the dowry given by the father belongs to the husband.

In the vast output of French and English 18th century pornographic literature, money is a sub-genre where the woman functions as a commodity, trader and seller of her person, and is directly associated with prostitution. The female protagonist starts as an innocent young girl sold for "fifty guineas peremptory for the liberty of attempting me and a hundred more at the complete gratification of his desires" (Cleland 1748-1749: 17). In *Moll Flanders* (1722), Daniel Defoe depicts the protagonist's pursuit of social advancement through economic terminology: "dues," "shares," "commodities," and "prices." Moll Flanders' adventures, including her numerous marriages, are defined as transactions in which she is evaluated strictly in terms of the profit that she can generate for her marriage partner.

Defoe was inspired by women's involvement in financial schemes in France and England: for example, women such as Alexandre de Tencin, mother of d'Alembert speculated in the Mississippi Bubble in 1720, and Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, the Duchess of Rutland and Marlborough, and "thirty five ladies (out of the eighty-eight names) on Lord Sunderland's list for the Second Money Subscription" (Chancellor 1999) speculated in the South Sea Bubble of 1718. A ditty by Edward Ward, "South Sea Ballad," describes how in Change Alley, "Our greatest Ladies hither come…Oft pawn their Jewels for a Sum… Young Harlots, too, from Drury Lane… To fool away the Gold they gain by their obscene Debauches," (Chancellor 1999). In seventeenth and eighteenth century literature, female protagonists are also archetypes of a fluid, mobile servant class that indirectly emancipated women by allowing them to engage in business transactions. Strong willed and shrewd, young women defraud, cajole or transact in order to gain financial independence without the benefit of a father or husband. Even for virtuous heroines in the Victorian era, the female body is an object of negotiations. Jo in Little Women like the heroine of O. Henry's *Gift of the Magi* sell their hair, the only commodity in which they can transact within the norms of society.

In France women were not legally entitled to have a bank account, to vote or to have control over their inheritance or dowry until 1946. Until the 1920s, women in England had to have a male signature in order to access their finances, open accounts or dispose of property, unless designated as sole heir or widow with full legal rights. In Switzerland the laws only changed in the 1970s. In contrast, while Colonial America imposed strict moral codes on the behavior of women, the rigorous geographic, physical and economic demands of colonial life allowed women by necessity to take on commercial and transactional functions: "Women held loan and deposit accounts in many northeastern banks in the early national period. They also owned significant amounts of corporate stock and other financial securities" (Wright, 2000). In the thirteen colonies, and later in the Western territories, women often lived in isolated rural areas overseeing large properties, which required a variety of skills including knowledge of revenues and costs (Ulrich, 2000). However once women attained a higher social rank, they had to adhere to established rules of conduct for middle and upper class women. American and European female novelists like Jane Austin, Louisa May Alcott, and George Sand granted their heroines an interest in dowries and their husband's business interests, but never would they venture into the world of making money. In Zola's *L'Argent* (1891), women lurking in the corridors of the Exchange, trying to engage in stock speculation, were judged as grotesque and amoral. By 1864, US ladies' publications warned of women ruined by engaging in speculative activities.

Later, Margaret Mitchell's portrayal of Scarlett O'Hara in the American classic, *Gone With the Wind* (1936), describes her transformation from Southern belle on the plantation, emblematic of a pre-economic Eden, into a crass and wily businesswoman as wife of lumber merchant Frank Kennedy in post-Civil War Atlanta. Tough

and able to buy and sell as well as any man, she betrayed the ethos of Southern womanhood epitomized by the philanthropic, sickly, and economically dependent Melanie. On Wall Street in 1870 a major breakthrough occurred when two attractive, independent, respectable sisters opened the first women run brokerage firm. Tennessee Claflin and Victoria Woodhull, named the "Bewitching Brokers" caused a near riot at their new offices as men came to gawk or admire. They were only taken seriously because they were under the patronage of Cornelius Vanderbilt, but they were admired by Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, which gave them both credibility and credence. However the venture lasted about five years and did not set a trend. After all, "Wall Street was a man's world; women were considered by nature to be ill suited to its rigors, lacking in the brains, emotional equanimity, and masculine reserve that the life of the speculator demanded" (Fraser 2005).

The next exception was the Quaker heiress Hettie Howland Robinson Green, who conservatively invested in railroads, real estate, and US greenback dollar holdings, increasing her inherited US$7 million fortune in 1864 to almost $200 million at her death in 1916. Notoriously stingy and increasingly paranoid, she worked out of Seaboard National Bank, refusing to deal with other bankers. Although she was respected at the time, participating in JP Morgan's New York City loan in 1907, she entered financial lore as the "Witch of Wall Street" (Finel-Honigman, 2010).

Despite both the massive loss of manpower and the entry of women into the work force after World War I, banking and financial professions remained a male bastion. In America, between 1880 and 1920 the proportion of women in the workforce rose 50 percent, yet finance was not an appropriate profession unlike medicine, law, academia or journalism. Despite women's immense progress in positions of political leadership throughout Europe in the 20th century—for example, Margaret Thatcher, Angela Merkel, and Christine Lagarde—women very rarely attained top positions in financial institutions. In the 1980s, Japan's top investment banks—Nomura, Daiwa, and Yamaichi—relegated educated women to lower administrative ranks: clerks, secretaries, and assistants. Yet Nomura employed nearly two thousand housewives as sales staff to sell government issued bonds and other safe fixed interest securities to housewives in the suburbs. It was acceptable for women to sell securities, earn small commissions, and increase the client base without actually integrating them within the structure of these institutions (Ferris 1984). Even in egalitarian Iceland, women bankers were only promoted to CEO positions after the financial meltdown as the top banks were nationalized and restructured. As of 2014 the only female CEO of a top global bank is Ana Botin heir to the Spanish Santander banking dynasty.

As the caustic *Financial Times* businesswomen commentator "Mrs. Moneypenny" stated on the choice of women to resolve Iceland's crisis,
> "Of course there are plenty of women in banking, especially retail banking. I suspect half the work force of Britain's retail banks is female. A career as a bank teller is one that sits supportively with family life. But women in charge of a bank? There are very few." (*Financial Times*, Mrs Moneypenny, 25/26 October, 2008.)

The US Breaks the Mold

From the late 1960s to 2008 opportunities for women bankers and brokers in the United States increased steadily, the trend seemingly irreversible. In 1967, Muriel Siebert, a middle class Jewish woman trained at Bache and Co. asked for a loan to buy a seat on the New York Stock Exchange. Bucking discrimination, indifference and hostility from Bernard Lasker, then Chairman of the NYSE, Muriel Siebert became the first woman among 1,365 men to have a seat and the only female who owned a brokerage house on the New York Stock Exchange, (*Wall Street Journal* Interview, November 2007). In 1972, Juanita Kreps became the first woman Director of the NYSE. In 1977, Siebert was appointed New York State Superintendant of Banking.

Between 1972 and 1975, a socio-cultural shift occurred on Wall Street as a generation of women lawyers, MBAs, and PhDs in economics arrived in the work place. For the first time women demanded, and were offered, positions on trading floors, and in account departments, correspondent banking, and client relations. As graduates of top schools, they were unwilling to settle for executive secretary, marketing or human resourc-

es positions. If US commercial banks and foreign bank subsidiaries were more flexible, traditional prejudices at old-line investment firms changed very slowly. In the 1980s when Lazard Frères decided to hire a second woman banker, a senior partner, assuming that the first one was therefore being fired, had to be told that "This would be a second woman." Glanville's response was "I thought the EEO meant we only had to have one," (Cohan 2007).

Siebert, honored in 1992, said, "Firms are doing what they have to do legally. But women are coming into Wall Street in large numbers and they are still not making partner are not getting into the positions that lead to the executive suite" (*NYTimes* obit, August 26, 2013). Prominent women remain the anomaly rather than the rule, as in the case of Abbey Joseph Cohen, Managing Director at Goldman Sachs. As a specialist in mathematical economic modeling and investment strategy, she began her career at the Federal Reserve, joined the investment bank Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1982, and after its collapse joined Goldman Sachs in 1990. Ranked as the number one analyst by Institutional Investor in 1997, she gained global renown and media exposure. Yet, despite having a Harvard case study devoted to her career, Cohen was not selected as Chairman, CEO or Vice Chair at Goldman.

The Traders Take Charge

Significantly, the forward movement of women intersected with a major shift in banking culture. By the mid 1980s in the US and the UK, traditional client-centered banking gave way to aggressive competition for shareholder profits led by trading operations and new products. Michael Lewis' *Liar's Poker* (1989) and Tom Wolfe's *Bonfire of the Vanities* (1987) describe a new breed of bond salesmen, foreign exchange traders and deal-makers without a single woman among the "Masters of the Universe". Wall Street culture was split between the traditional ethos of gentlemen bankers and young, hyper-ambitious workaholic traders who thrived on high risk-high yield operations. As trading rooms became lead profit centers, women rising through the ranks adapted rather than transformed this testosterone fueled environment. Women's tenure in trading positions and even in more traditional sectors began to edge downward. Even as they advanced, the environment became toxic as more senior women filed lawsuits against the financial sector that addressed deeper prejudices and stereotypes based on discrimination in promotion and bonuses. The lawsuit brought by six senior bankers at Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein in 2006 cited "instances of lewd behavior toward the women, entertainment of clients at a strip club and repeated examples of scaled-back opportunities for women after they returned from maternity leave" ("Six Women at Dresdner File Bias Suit", *New York Times*, January 10, 2006).

In the United Kingdom, women were first allowed to trade on the London Stock Exchange in 1973 and the first woman bank director was appointed in 1982. Appointed as Head of the London Stock Exchange in 2001, Clara Fuse was the only woman to head the world's oldest and most prestigious exchange in its 235-year history. However, despite these prominent success stories, women are directors of only a fraction of the FTSE-100 firms and are not at the head of any of the British SIFIs.

The Magic Twenty Percent

In 2003 U.S. Banker magazine celebrated top women bankers in order "to pay tribute to women executives whose outstanding corporate performances were underscored by how they used their social and professional capital to bring about change." The women honored in 2006 and 2007 included Jessica Palmer, head of Fixed Income Capital Markets group at Wells Fargo and former head of International Investment Banking at Citigroup; Sallie Krawcheck, Chief Financial Officer at Citigroup; and Heidi Miller, Chief Executive Officer of Treasury and Security at JP Morgan Chase. According to US Banker, just before the 2008 financial crisis HSBC USA, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and ING had the largest number of women in senior management positions. But within one year all of these banks depended on bailouts, were forced to divest, merge and radically cut down on costs and staff.

The first group of leaders to be demoted and summarily dismissed were Zoe Cruz at Morgan Stanley; Erin

Callan, Chief Financial Officer at Lehman; and Sallie Krawcheck, Chief Financial Officer at Citigroup. Krawcheck described her environment: "most [women] at Citicorp are treated as a 'condiment' rather than a 'main course'" ("When Citi Lost Sallie" *NY Times*, November 16, 2008). In 2012 and 2013, when the London arm of JP Morgan's Chief Investment Office lost $6.2 billion through complex derivative transactions, Ina Drew, Chief Investment Officer, after a 25 year career at the bank was summarily asked to resign. In 2014 among the top 20 US banks, the only female CEO is Beth Mooney, head of Keycorp in Texas.

In 2013 Goldman Sachs appointed 280 new managing directors, but only 20% were women. Through its "Women's Network" in 2013, the New York Stock Exchange set a goal to occupy 20% of boards of directors by 2020 (at present there are 10.5% of women on Boards of Directors of global companies). In the United States women comprise on average about 35% of MBA and graduate students of finance, yet the number and goal remains stuck at 20% participation in the top echelons. Like their male counterparts, women in management shared the blame for bad decisions, lax risk management, hubris and taking reckless positions. But it is striking that the percentage of women demoted and dismissed was so much greater. The causes are myriad but the reasons given in 2008 are still relevant: "They lack the networks of their male counterparts… The real problem is that the proverbial glass ceiling is self-reinforcing. The traits that a woman must develop to duke it out on the trading floor will come back to haunt her as she ascends to the ranks of management" ("The Perilous Rise and Perhaps Inevitable Fall of Zoe Cruz, Only the Men Survive", *New York Times Magazine*, May 5, 2008).

A lack of support by Boards of Directors, who have kept on or transferred CEOs in major global banks such as JP Morgan, HSBC, UBS, and Bank of America, and a lack of internal support in vast global organizations are all contributing factors as well.

In March 2014 after her dismissal by Citicorp and, subsequently, Bank of America, Sallie Krawcheck bought the first women's financial networking group "85 Broads", originally set up by veterans of Goldman Sachs and named after its former address. She hopes to expand the membership and increase networking, and mentoring opportunities. Sadly this well-meaning project reads like an old feminist tract of the 1980s ("Banker's 'Broad' Industry Effort", *Wall Street Journal*, January 31, 2014). The real challenges are to find out why financial culture and the boards of directors of financial institutions are not more supportive of women leaders, whether post-crisis reforms or a return to more traditional retail and corporate banking can provide new opportunities, and whether brilliant young women graduates with finance, economics and MBA backgrounds can be assured that they can pursue a long term career in banking rather than a short stint until the next crisis. Each of the senior women who were forced out in 2008 was young enough that they could have provided outstanding service for at least another decade. In the meantime, the controversy and stereotypes continue to proliferate. As Anne-Marie Slaughter ("Why Women Still Can't Have It All", 2012) wrote:

"Women will have succeeded when there's no longer a need for women's groups" (*Wall Street Journal*, January 31, 2014).

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An Easy Concession or Meaningful Representation? Minority Women in French Politics.
by
Amanda Garrett

For a country with such a long and distinguished history of immigration and an open immigrant incorporation regime, France stands out amongst its European counterparts for failing to better integrate her vast minority population into the formal political apparatus. In fact, until after the 2002 Presidential elections visible minorities represented roughly 0% of the national political elite although they made up nearly 12% of the total population. As politicians began gradually to include more minorities on their party lists or in appointed positions an interesting pattern emerged: minority women were swiftly overshadowing minority men as the face of diversity in French politics. This paper takes an initial look into the causes and consequences of this trend for the representation of minority populations in France. First, this paper discusses the context of immigration and minority integration in France. Second, it addresses the pathways (and barriers) to minority political participation and contextualizes the significant rise to power for minority women. Third, I will propose that women's rise to power has been anything but accidental and is the deliberate consequence of two political peculiarities of the French system, namely gender parity laws and a Republican assimilationist ideology that obviates the formal recognition of minorities. Finally, this paper will suggest that although the increase in visible minority women has not translated directly into an increase in substantive representation of minorities, this may be an intended consequence of a system cognizant of the need to diversify politics, but institutionally and ideologically unprepared to do so.

Who is the French Minority Today?

It is important to recognize that France has a history of immigration that dates back much further than the post WWII waves that have garnered so much attention in recent years. For example, just like many of her neighbors across Europe, France began its large-scale industrialization towards the end of the 19th century[14], which heralded significant changes in the nature of the working class populations as older industries and trades began to decline. This industrialization was defining new social and political classes and reshaping society, where new industries, particularly concentrated in the suburbs of Paris and other large cities, were demanding an ever-increasing amount of unskilled labor. The increased need for a manual and relatively low-skilled workforce to man the factories meant that labor would need to be recruited not only from the vast process of internal rural-urban migration within France, but also from neighboring European countries like Italy, Portugal, Poland and eventually outside Europe to her former colonies in North Africa.

According to the census in 1999, 4,310,000 of France's residents, or 7.4% of the population, had been born outside of the country and more than 1.5 million immigrants had become naturalized in the previous decade. The main sending countries were originally Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Italy and Spain and Portugal, although this would slowly start to include larger patterns of immigration from Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (see Table 1)[15]. By 2008, the French national institute of statistics (INSEE) was able to estimate that here were 11.8 million foreign-born immigrants and their descendants (only 2nd generation) living in France, making up roughly 19% of the total population[16].

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14. Lewis, Mary. 2007. *The Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universalism in France, 1918-1940*. Stanford University Press.
15. As of 2004, the Institut Montaigne estimated that there were 6 million (10%) people of North African descent, 2 million (3.5%) Blacks, and 1 million (1.5%) Asians in France, which includes people of immigrant descent.
16. Borrel and L'Hommeau, 2010, INSEE

Table 1. Stock of French Immigration Population by Country of Origin

Population in %	1975	1982	1990	2010
Portugal	16.9	15.8	14.4	10.8
Spain	15.2	11.7	9.5	4.6
Italy	17.2	14.1	11.6	5.7
Other, Europe	17.9	15.7	14.9	4.3
Algeria	14.3	14.8	13.3	13.3
Morocco	6.6	9.1	11	12.2
Tunisia	4.7	5	5	4.4
Other, Africa	2.4	4.3	6.6	12.8
Turkey	1.9	3	4	4.5
Cambodia, Vietnam	0.7	3	3.7	3.0
Other, Asian	1	2	3.7	6.8
Other	1.3	1.6	2.3	
Total Population (x 1,000)	52, 599	54, 296	56, 652	
Immigrant Total (x 1, 000)	3, 887	4, 037	4, 166	5,433

Source: INSEE, Census Data

Probably the most notable segment of this minority population today in France is the country's ever-expanding Muslim population[17]. Between 1990 and 2007 the estimated Muslim population in France rose from 2.5 million to 5 million, making them today roughly one tenth of the population, and Islam the country's second largest religion[18]. Muslims, predominantly from France's former North African colonies, arrived in France in significant numbers in the 1960s to meet (temporary) labor demands, and although France officially ended labor recruitment practices in the 1970s, the Muslim population has continued to rise. High birth rates, illegal immigration and large-scale family reunification all contribute to the increasing presence of the Muslim community in France. Immigration to France continues, although not on the massive scale once experienced, and makes up for about 25% of the nation's current demographic growth, which otherwise suffers from very low birth rates[19].

Just as the continuing influx of new migrants puts pressure on the government of France to provide a certain standard of economic, political and social comfort, the reality of their permanence has put continued strain on the French approach to minority and immigrant incorporation. The descendants of earlier waves of temporary immigration are now in their second and third generations—most of whom are citizens[20]—and have begun to collide more dramatically with the national model of minority integration than their first generation forefathers[21]. The seeming disparity between France's outlook towards minority integration and the needs and

17. Open Society Institute. 2009. 'Muslims in Europe: A Report on 11 EU Cities', At Home in Europe Project. Open Society Foundation, New York

18. Source INSEE; Open Societies Institute 2009

19. Laurence, Jonathan, and Justin Vaïsse. 2006. *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France*. Brookings Institution Press

20. France's policy of jus soli citizenship permits not only ease of naturalization for immigrants, but also highly accessible citizenship for their children born on French soil.

21. Hollifield, James Frank. 1992. *Immigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe.*

demands of her minority population have served to alienate immigrant and minority populations, and have often been cited as the key barriers to adequate upward social, economic and political mobility[22].

According to Yasmin Soysal's national model paradigm, the most aggregate understanding of the French national model is that of a statist mode of incorporation. The statist approach presupposes that the state and its subsequent bureaucratic structures are chiefly responsible for initiating and executing policy measures related to integration. With the state as the focal point of decision-making processes and the crucial impetus behind policy implementation, the French model represents a clear top-down incorporation mechanism with individual and group input or interests occupying a subordinate role[23]. With respect to the state's ability to wield direct control over immigrant integration, the state maintains certain policy instruments to reinforce the direct link between state power and the individual's access to French institutions[24].

As a result, this state-centric policy process obviates and even discourages intermediary structures representing the collective action or organization of immigrants or minority groups, a feature that has been widely criticized for limiting the articulation of minority-specific expression and participation[25]. Demonstrating ambivalence toward collective categorizations, the French model defines and concomitantly incorporates migrants as individuals rather than in terms of their collective identity (i.e as Moroccan, Muslim, etc.), rejecting the concept of *communauté* (groupings or community based on ethnic or religious affiliations). The Haut Conseil à *l'Intégration*, which was created in 1989 to synthesize the actions of various ministries, clearly articulates this official policy preference for the notion of the individual in a report published in 1991: "The French conception of integration adheres to a logic of equality and not to a logic of minorities"[26]. Predictably then, religious and ethnic minorities are not officially or legally acknowledged by the state[27]. Of course, being equal in name and in practice are often two very distinct realities, and this hesitancy to address the possibility that integration requires responses that are differentiated according to group-specific needs has proven one of the most widely criticized caveats of the French system.

This centralized and individualistic institutional organization of the French model reflects a much longer ideological tradition of civic Republicanism[28]. The notion of French assimilation, which stresses equality and uniformity, is a philosophical product of the French Revolution and generally associated with the homogenizing aspirations of Jacobin-Republicanism[29]. According to this Jacobin-Republican assimilationist tradition, the state should exist as a centralized and assimilationist body whose primary goal is to transform "peasants into

Harvard University Press

22. Joppke, Christian. 'Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe.' *West European Politics* 30.1 (2007): 1-22.

23. Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu. 1994. *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*. University of Chicago Press, pg 33

24. Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*, pg 75

25. Castles, Stephen. 1995. 'How Nation-states Respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity.' Journal of *Ethnic and Migration Studies* 21 (3): 293–308

26. "La conception française de l'intégration doit obéir à une logique d'égalité et non à une logique de minorités". Schnapper, Dominique. 1994. "*L'Europe Des Immigrés* (Paris: F. Bourin 1992); Martin Bulmer-Edwards and Martin Schain (eds.)'The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe', Special Edition Of." *West European Politics* 17 (2)

27. Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*, pg 58

28. Bousetta, Hassan. 'Citizenship and political participation in France and the Netherlands: reflections on two local cases.' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 23.2 (1997): 215-231; Bloemraad, Irene, Anna Korteweg, and Gökçe Yurdakul. 'Citizenship and immigration: multiculturalism, assimilation, and challenges to the nation-state.' *Sociology* 34.1 (2008): 153

29. Rosanvallon, Pierre. 1992. *Le Sacre Du Citoyen: Histoire Du Suffrage Universel En France*. Cambridge Univ Press.

Frenchmen"[30] by eliminating their regional, ethnic, linguistic, and especially religious identities[31]. The policy and rhetoric of the state has openly rejected the concept of communautarisme (communitarianism), in favor of inclusiveness, equality and universalism, with emphasis on the importance of the national community, in which membership can be secured by a voluntary commitment to the values of the Republic[32]. Therefore, the goal of the state is to facilitate the formation of a citizenry who will be "French at heart" or "Français par le cœur"[33].

Although the assimilation and integration of earlier waves of internal European migration was not without difficulty, adapting to a new language, new values and a new society did eventually take place. For this migratory influx, problems of socio-economic inequality and political exclusion were somewhat tempered by the foundational programs of the national model working over successive generations. For example, in keeping with the republican notion of social mobility, institutions like the army, trade unions, and the school were by far the most important vehicles for integration for new migrants, where foreign populations were swiftly transformed into Frenchmen in the zero-sum game of assimilation. But soon enough these institutions would lose their assimilatory power and force a change in the way subsequent generations of immigrants could become Frenchmen. First, the end of mandatory conscription in France would put an end to the military as a means of incorporating foreigners; immigrants were no longer forced to train side-by-side with Frenchmen for a common national goal. This would soon be followed by successive national economic declines from the 1930s to 70s and the political failures associated with economic organizations, namely the Communist party (PCF) and their trade union (CGT), which were traditional allies of immigrant workers[34].

With a system intent on equalizing the treatment of and opportunities for minority populations, without ever recognizing their minority status, the result was an outcome of integration that adhered to a confounding dual logic. On the one hand, problems of inequality and inclusion—social, economic or political—should be mediated by the structures of social mobility, equal opportunity and jus soli citizenship laws that quickly accept newcomers into the system and set them on equal footing with the native population. Yet on the other hand, the overemphasis on universal treatment has the problematic tendency to overlook problems, the sources of which stem from conditions specific to the very minority groups the French state cannot recognize. It is for this reason that the French system qualifies as highly politically, socially and economically inclusive on paper, while staggeringly exclusive in practice[35]. This reality is evident in the manner in which minorities have forged – or failed to forge – a place for themselves in the political system over time.

Minorities in French Politics: A Unique Pathway for Women

The evolution of minority and immigrant political participation in France reflects a shift from immigrant-specific participatory mechanisms to more concerted efforts at general integration into mainstream political venues, albeit not without considerable difficulty. In the early years, many new immigrants were not yet eligible to benefit from formal voting rights[36], which meant that the immigrants were left only to rely on alternative

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30. Weber, Eugen. 1976. *Peasants Into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914*. Stanford University Press

31. France's policy of *Laïcité*, of strict protection of the state from religious influence, has been particularly contentious with respect to integrating her large Muslim population. Schnapper. 2002. *La Démocratie Providentielle: Essai Sur L'égalité Contemporaine*. Gallimard, pg 200

32. Ireland, Patrick R. 2000. "Reaping What They Sow: Institutions and Immigrant Political Participation in Western Europe." *Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics*: 233–282, pg 237

33. Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Vol. 21. Cambridge Univ Press, pg 107

34. Ireland, Patrick Richard. 1994. *The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland*. Harvard University Press

35. Dancygier, Rafaela M. 2010. *Immigration and Conflict in Europe*. Cambridge University Press

36. Only French citizens (or occasionally migrants form French colonies) could claim the right to vote or hold

venues for political participation[37]. One of the first opportunities for immigrant participation was eagerly facilitated by the institutions of the Left, in particular the Communist Party and its trade union, the CFDT (Confédération française démocratique du travail)[38]. In 1972 it was the Communist left which first discussed expanding voting rights to foreign workers and in 1975 fought for them to stand in elections on work committees and hold office in the bodies of trade unions. On many occasions, the political left happily adopted issues of importance to the French immigrant community and channeled their demands through the ranks of the party as if the mission were their own. This allowed the political left to piggyback on some pre-existing immigrant momentum to petition and lobby the national government for leftist reforms on the one hand, and earn to the support of the immigrant community for championing their cause on the other. With immigrant membership so potentially valuable to the mobilization potential of the left, immigrant membership in the PCF would reach 25,000 by the 1970s. From the late 1960s to early 1980s, this marriage with the political left was often the only way for immigrant communities to exercise political leverage and express demands officially to the state[39].

However, with the drastic decline in union membership and political sway in the era of deindustrialization and the birth of the second generation who were notably less interested in the working class politics of their parents, minority political participation would take on an entirely new form[40]. More specifically, minority populations would find themselves largely alienated by mainstream politics and frustrated about their inability to forge for themselves a pathway to minority representation and equality either as citizens of the Republic or among the ranks of the political elite. The second generation could no longer be integrated into mainstream politics on the basis of their group status (as immigrants or as working class) as their first generation parents had before them, but they also found it difficult to participate as individuals in a society that penalized them inherently for their minority background and perceived failure to assimilate. The result would be widespread minority alienation from political life, both top down and bottom up. On the one hand minorities themselves would find little place in mainstream politics with few parties willing to speak openly on their behalf and often retreated from formal participation. On the other hand, although the jus soli citizenship regime provides very few legal barriers to minority political participation or access to holding political office, the ranks of French political representation are notoriously closed to outsiders and filled with members of the French elite, making it nearly impossible for minorities to penetrate.

The result was not only comparably low political participation rates amongst French minority populations compared with French "natives"[41], but also a near total absence of minorities from the institutions of formal political representation[42]. In fact, as late as 2002 there were no visible minorities holding offices on the French national political scene, so although visible minorities in France are estimated to be about 12% of the total population, they represented exactly 0% of the political elite. What helped facilitate the slow insertion of minorities into formal political life in France was the very near win of Jean-Marie le Pen of the extreme right-wing

office, until naturalized.

37. Kepel, Gilles. 1991. *Les Banlieues de L'Islam*. Editions du Seuil

38. Ireland, Patrick Richard, *The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland*.

39. Garbaye, Romain. 2006. *Getting into Local Power: The Politics of Ethnic Minorities in British and French Cities*. Vol. 23. Wiley-Blackwell.

40. Lapeyronnie, Didier. 1987. 'Assimilation, Mobilisation Et Action Collective Chez Les Jeunes De La Seconde Génération De L'immigration Maghrébine.' *Revue Française De Sociologie*: 287–318.

41. Using data from the European Social Survey Rounds 3, 4 and 5, I have created a composite score for "institutional participation" including the following variables: voting, contacting politicians, membership in political parties, volunteer service, working for a political party or organization, and wearing a political badge. According to this data the mean score for number of activities in which one participates is 1.2 for "natives" and .8 for "immigrants and minorities".

42. Tiberj, Vincent, and Sylvian Brouard. 2005. *Français Comme Les Autres? Enquête Sur Les Citoyens D'origine Maghrébine, Africaine Et Turque*. Paris: Presses de Sciences-Po

National Front party in the 2002 Presidential elections. This sudden fear of openly anti-immigrant politicians controlling top political posts motivated many minorities to mobilize politically on a much greater scale than before. In turn, this increased political mobilization of previously marginalized minority populations attracted the attention of strategically minded political actors, who would now be forced to consider France's large (and growing) minority population in terms of their electoral potential. It seemed now that these previously invisible minorities were now a force to be harnessed for electoral success, something over which parties would have to compete and an electorate to which they would have to make specific and meaningful appeals.

The effects of the 2002 Presidential elections were immediate. By the 2007 Presidential elections, politicians were beginning to populate their party lists with more minority candidates than ever before. Most notably, it was the Presidential victor, Nicolas Sarkozy of the conservative UMP party, who made the significant move of appointing the first visible minorities to his Cabinet, declaring: "The diversity at the bottom of the country must be illustrated by diversity at the head of the country. This is not a choice, this is an obligation."[43] What was even more notable about these minority appointments was that they were all women, which meant that minority women would now outnumber minority men in positions of political power[44]. These "Sarkozettes" included three women from North African and African descent, holding significant posts as the Minister of Urban Affairs, the Minister of Justice, and the Minister of Human Rights. With the first significant appointment of minorities to a French Cabinet, Sarkozy was hailed as something of a saint for diversity in France.

The trend of appointing not only more minorities, but minority women to positions of political power in France would continue under Sarkozy's successor, François Hollande in the 2012 Presidential elections. For example, in the run up to the elections, the Socialist Party announced that it would reserve 22 spots on its electoral list for "candidates from ethnically diverse backgrounds" and they formally endorsed 6 of those candidates, most of whom were women[45]. Once Hollande was elected to office he too appointed a number of minority women to his Cabinet - including two of North African descent and one of Caribbean descent - to the posts of Minister of Justice, Minister of French language and Expatriates, and Minister of Women's Rights. Once again minority women would be catapulted to the forefront of French "diversity" politics, carrying a higher number of top ranking political positions relative to minority men[46]. What is clear from these trends is that not only have previously invisible minorities become more visible in French politics since 2002, but that minority women in particular have climbed the ranks of the political elite with greater speed than their male counterparts. So the question remains, why have minority women made more strides than men in terms of gaining access to formal political power? Why have they become the face of diversity in French politics?

A Peculiar French System

When answering this question, there are two peculiarities of the French system that can likely help explain the uneven mobility of minority men and women in recent French political life: the institutional inducement of gender parity laws and France's troubled history of minority recognition[47].

First, France is one of a few countries in the world that has instituted gender parity laws in the creation of political party lists, whereby electoral lists must be composed of 50% women candidates. While gender parity in party lists does not always translate into parity in actual representative bodies, these gender parity laws tend to implicitly encourage politicians to appoint a greater number of female political representatives to the Cabinet than they might otherwise be willing to do, as many try to get as close to parity as possible when assigning minister posts. If the gender parity laws help explain why higher numbers of women are appointed to party

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43. http://www.thepatrioticvanguard.com/spip.php?article5690 (accessed May 5, 2014)

44. One seat in the National Assembly of 577 went to a minority male in 2007

45. http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2012/article/2011/11/30/legislatives-la-diversite-progresse-peu-au-ps_1611347_1471069.html (accessed May 5, 2014)

46. In 2012, 9 out of 577 National Assembly seats went to visible minorities.

47. Matland, Richard E. 'Enhancing women's political participation: legislative recruitment and electoral systems.' *Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers* (2005): 93-111.

lists or governments posts, it cannot explain why minority women in particular are benefiting from such institutional inducements.

To help explain this trend it is worth considering a second peculiarity of the French system, namely the prohibition against recognizing ethnic or religious minority groups in the public or official realm. Therefore, nominating ethnic women for election helps parties satisfy gender parity requirements, while also allowing them to accomplish another more covert electoral strategy: making appeals to ethnic diversity in the politically safest way possible. More specifically, this second dimension of non-recognition of ethnic minority status stems from France's long tradition of Republican universalism and is deeply ingrained in the country's national model of minority integration. The implications of this prohibition seep not only into policymaking towards minorities, which cannot be targeted to them directly, but it also means that mention of minorities is strictly forbidden in official political rhetoric as it is deemed anathema to the assimilationist ideals of the Republican model. Any attempt by politicians to engage in affirmative action towards ethnic minorities is prohibited as a matter of adhering to French republican ideology, including making appeals to the minority status or characteristics of either their voters or candidates in order to garner support.

Of course, politicians know that France's large and growing minority population is highly electorally significant and winning their support can be a lucrative strategy now and in the long run. Politicians on both sides of the political spectrum know that although it is impossible to recognize minorities officially, not doing so can be politically disastrous. This is particularly true when politicians have to capture districts that are very competitive and where minorities are a decisive voter, or if the majority constituency is a minority population. One way in which politicians can balance the need to capture minority support with the formal restrictions against appealing directly to minorities is simply to facilitate increased levels of descriptive representation of visible minorities. By including visible minorities on party lists or in appointed posts, the hope is that their visibility will be enough to signal the party's support of minority-specific interests and can thus capture minority voters.

Minority women, as opposed to minority men, are particularly well suited to this role of politically strategic visible minorities, where the ideal minority candidate should be able to appeal to a number of divergent sentiments in French society. On the one hand, the political actors should be visible minorities so that they can appeal to minority voters by virtue of their descriptive characteristics; however on the other hand, they should not be so "visible" as minorities that they alienate non-minority voters. Surveys of French opinion towards ethnic minorities demonstrate that minority women are uniquely qualified to fulfill these requirements. In particular, surveys have shown that minority women tend to be viewed as more assimilable[48], less culturally threatening, and generally better integrated than minority men. Empirically speaking, minority and immigrant women do tend to be viewed as better integrated into the workforce than men (albeit at the lower sectors). They also appear to take better advantage of social programs and get involved more in everyday life in their communities (i.e. they tend to hold more local leadership positions), and they are never the face of "bad integration" in France by participating heavily in riots or petty criminality[49]. They are also often viewed as victims of their own cultural identities by the French public, so surveys show that French are more sympathetic to minority women than they might be to minority men.

The one notable exception to this status as highly assimilated, of course, is Muslim women who wear the hijab or the niqab. Beginning largely with the affair du foulard (headscarf affair) in 2004, French policymakers and their constituents concerned ostensibly about matters of minority integration began to view Muslim women wearing the veil as a physical symbol of female repression, inequality, and religiosity, all of which directly challenged the French Republican notions of equality and secularism. French women wearing the headscarf, it was argued, would be unable to properly become French, and more dangerously, would impose their religious beliefs on those around them (in schools or at work) by virtue of manifesting physical signs of their religious

48. Tribalat, Michèle. 1996. *De l'immigration à l'assimilation: enquête sur les populations d'origine étrangère en France*. INED

49. De Wenden, Catherine. 2005. 'Reflections 'à Chaud' on the French Suburban Crisis.' SSRC Riots in France

identity. Muslim women were, therefore, posed a threat not only to themselves, but also to the values of the nation, a fact that parties like the National Front were particularly keen to latch onto. Although never officially targeted towards Muslims, ultimately the affair du foulard spurred a heated national political debate ending in a legal restriction against wearing any overtly religious symbols (i.e. the headscarf) in public schools or workplaces, which was then followed on a ban of the niqab (full face veil) in 2011. However, while the very public political debate about the headscarf has made Muslim women come to stand for a larger clash between minority populations and French society, in reality, laws restricting religious symbols highlight a much more nuanced trajectory of Muslim integration. The laws served the purpose of forcing many Muslim women to choose between integrating into the socio-economic structure (i.e. going to school, getting a job) or maintaining their religious identity. As a result many Muslim women left their jobs in the public sector and took their daughters out of public education in favor of generally poorly regarded religious schools; Attacks on their religious identity essentially forced many women and girls to retreat from becoming "French". The debate about the headscarf indicates not that veiled women symbolize poorly assimilated minorities (as the political discussions have indicated), but rather that in a quest to secure the national values of secularism the French government has discounted – and in many cases derailed - the integration progress Muslim women have made in the public sphere.

Even as veiled women continue to be used as symbols of poor integration in political debates, the reality of their active participation in diverse socio-economic spheres and their absence from more destructive activities helps perpetuate minority women's reputation as sympathetic political players. As a result, nominating (unveiled) ethnic women for election or appointed posts not only helps parties to meet gender parity requirements, but also allows politicians to engage in "positive discrimination, French style". Politicians may make appeals to ethnic minority voters or engage in diversity politics without ever explicitly compromising the official policy of assimilationist Republicanism. Minority women, in particular, allow politicians to be even more strategic about their appeals to diversity by putting forth candidates who are more likely to meet the necessary visibility benchmarks to attract minority voters without also alienating other segments of their voting base who might be more sensitive to assimilationist ideologies. Minority women are, therefore, visible enough to capture minority votes, but assimilated (or non-threatening) enough to satisfy non-minority voters. But what does this increase in the representation of minority women mean for policy outcomes or interest representation?

An Easy Concession or Substantive Representation?

Although the appearance of visible minorities on the political scene is a relatively recent phenomenon in France and provides few data points to analyze, the impact of minority women in the political sphere appears to still be one of purely descriptive significance, rather than true substantive representation. The increased presence of visible minorities in French politics is undoubtedly a step in the right direction, particularly in a country where open discussions of diversity and minority status are difficult to entertain in the public sphere. Descriptive representation of minorities can, at a minimum, begin to create expectations for a political apparatus that reflects the demographic make-up of the country more accurately. However, there is little evidence to suggest that these improvements in descriptive representation have had any meaningful effect on the trajectory of actual policy outcomes benefitting minority populations[50].

Under the current Hollande Presidency, the three female minority Ministers have yet to help initiate policies or reforms to affect minority communities, nor do they have proven track records of political activism as most are relatively new to positions of legislative influence. The one exception is Hollande's Minister of Justice, Christiane Taubira, who had previously worked as a Deputy in the National Assembly and is best known for her work in passing what is known as the "Loi Taubira", which officially recognizes the Atlantic Slave Trade as a crime against humanity in 2001. It is still unclear what lasting effects Hollande's minority appointments will

50. Bird, Karen. 'The political representation of visible minorities in electoral democracies: a comparison of France, Denmark, and Canada.' *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 11.4 (2005): 425-465

have on minority interests in France going forward.

The role of minority women in influencing substantive policy outcomes in Sarkozy's administration, however, was much less ambiguous. Within 18 months of their appointments all three of the Sarkozettes had been removed from their posts in the Cabinet for clashing with Sarkozy and the path of the UMP. The Minister of Justice, Rachida Dati, was unable to secure a working relationship with the magistrates with whom she worked and in an effort to tighten their investigative powers she only further alienated her subordinates such that Sarkozy had to effectively take over her responsibilities. Senegalese-born Rama Yade who was appointed the Minister of Human Rights quickly fell out of favor with Sarkozy after she criticized his invitation to Libyan representatives for a state visit, citing their gross human rights abuses. She was eventually moved to the Ministry of Sports in a cabinet reshuffle. Finally, there was the Minister of Urban Affairs, Fadela Amara, born of Muslim Algerian parents and who was once an outspoken French feminist and former president of the organization Ni Putes Ni Soumis ("Neither Whores Nor Doormats"). Amara was arguably the most well positioned to enact policies of impact for minority populations. Her main job was to devise a "Marshall plan" for France's troubled city suburbs in which many minorities live, but she found herself rapidly sidelined in the legislative process by her peers and unable to push the reforms any further. Any proposal to revamp the impoverished suburbs was ultimately tabled for lack of proper support or funding. As all three minority women were phased out of their Cabinet positions, the president of the Representative Council for Black Associations remarked "This is a sad day for diversity. [It is] a heavy symbol for all French from visible minorities"[51].

This initial attempt at diversifying the top ranks of the political system in France reveals a system still inadequately equipped to accommodate a significant reshuffling of internal political dynamics, particularly when it comes to accommodating the specific interests of minority populations. Although it would be unfair to condemn these diversity appointments as futile, as they are certainly a step in the right direction, the swiftness with which the political fervor for such appointments was forgotten suggests an interesting institutional dynamic. Specifically, it appears that the very factors motivating the appointment of female minority politicians to power - namely their position as visible, but not-too-visible minorities - are the same factors that may hinder these same minority women from paving the path to significant substantive policy in the first place[52].

As minority women are chosen for positions in the political system, particularly for top positions, to serve the dual purpose of appeasing the necessity to diversify the representative body while not posing a threat to the ideal of Republican assimilation, they are positioned as the face of French diversity specifically for their ability not to rock the boat once in office. This may be the result of three possible phenomena. First, if minority women are chosen to represent French diversity in politics over minority men because they are descriptive minorities, but deemed to be better assimilated so as not to alienate other voters, it is possible they are not well-positioned to represent the majority of ethnic minorities in France in the first place. In fact, a number of those women appointed to positions of power do come from privileged socio-economic and educational backgrounds, not from the disadvantaged neighborhoods of the banlieues where many minorities live in France. The few who do hail from the banlieues have become exceptional examples of the triumphs of the Republican model of upward social mobility and hardly represent the majority of cases. Their connections to and legitimacy within the minorities of the banlieues can be tenuous at best. To the extent that their backgrounds distance them from the minority populations whose votes they are meant to capture or on whose behalf they are meant to speak, minority women will find it hard to represent their interests meaningfully in politics.

Second, and very closely related is simply that maintaining a strong ethnic identity in the public sphere is highly frowned upon in the French system, where policymakers or public officers of ethnic minority backgrounds often go out of their way to proclaim their "Frenchness" above all else. Those who make it to the highest echelons of public office are likely those who have best been able to eschew their minority identity in

51. http://www.thepatrioticvanguard.com/spip.php?article5690 (accessed May 5, 2014)
52. Bird, Karen. "The political representation of women and ethnic minorities in established democracies: A framework for comparative research." Academy for Migration Studies in Denmark, Aalborg University 11 (2003).

favor of being French. Therefore, while they may still be visible minorities, they are chosen specifically for their intent not to act as visible minorities.

Third, the very position of a political appointee would be unlikely to afford these minority Cabinet members the free reign to act or speak outside the accepted party position. Although these minority women have been led directly to top ranking government positions within these two administrations, their status as political appointees requires their close allegiance to the party or politician under whose authority they have been nominated. To the extent that working on behalf of minority interests is restricted by official party objectives, Cabinet ministers may find themselves unable to act autonomously. This was certainly the case with the Sarkozettes, whose short-lived tenure in office was abruptly ended due, in large part, to their inability to uphold a unified front with the UMP ruling party. Closely related to this theme is also the limitations placed on policymakers, regardless of background, against enacting policy that is targeted towards any group of people, including ethnic or religious minorities. The lack of minority-specific policy is an accepted feature of official French politics and policymakers have found ways around this by enacting policies targeted at geographic zones in which minorities might be overrepresented. Therefore the lack of minority-specific policies from minority politicians should not itself be an indicator of failed substantive representation. Rather, their actions must be viewed against the benchmark of more general policies targeted to problem areas or regions in which minorities would be more likely to benefit.

The Future of Minorities in French Politics

While the relatively recent increase in the inclusion of visible minorities in elected bodies in France might not guarantee policies that are more sensitive to or representative of minority interests, their absence from politics would certainly point to a deficiency in the system. Most obviously the political underrepresentation of visible minorities should be treated as an indicator of particular dysfunctions within the political and electoral system of France, in particular a system that is highly elitist and has an ideological outlook that precludes the recognition of minorities in the public sphere. Nevertheless, French politicians are cognizant of the necessity of attracting minority voters and have sought to take gradual steps towards diversifying the face of their party by slowly incorporating visible minorities into party lists or appointed posts. Although still significantly underrepresented relative to their proportion of the general population, including visible minorities in political office signals a step in a new direction for French politics.

One notable feature of this increased inclusion, however, is that minority women tend to be outpacing minority men at the top echelons of French political representation. The discussion here has attempted to highlight not only why this is likely the case, namely their dual role as highly assimilated yet still visible minorities, but also to explore the consequences of this unique trajectory of political integration. First, the presence of more minorities in politics (regardless of gender) sends a strong message in terms of descriptive representation, and may have residual effects in terms of encouraging other minorities to vote or otherwise participate where they may not have done so before. Similarly, although all politicians must be wary of working within the restrictions against group-targeted policies, it is possible that an increase in descriptive representation of minorities will also encourage a shift in substantive representation or in the policy discussions that address the needs of this population.

Second, the strategies of minority inclusion that have tended to favor minority women over minority men in French politics implies a much more ambiguous impact of visible minorities in the future of political life. On the one hand, the very characteristics that have made minority women so appealing to French politicians as not-too-visible minorities may also mean they are less likely to gain the legitimacy of their targeted demographic or less likely to be able to speak on their behalf. On the other hand, their ability to assimilate more easily into the mainstream political elite will help increase their legitimacy amongst their political peers and better serve them should they be able to represent the interests of minority voters. In sum, minority women in France have been given a unique opportunity to pave the pathway for more widespread political participation of minority populations in a system that is otherwise resistant to the explicit inclusion of minorities as such. In the future they will help to build the bridge between an historically elitist political system and a growing (and

increasingly alienated) minority population. They have the power to initiate critical change in the accepted debates surrounding minority integration, disadvantage and inequality in a way that has not yet taken place in France.

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Women in Politics: What Difference Does it Make?
by
Christine Landfried

On March 20, 2014 the German TV channel ZDF reported during its news "heute" on the summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the European Union at Brussels on the crisis in Ukraine. Several journalists were standing around Chancellor Angela Merkel, holding their microphones and asking questions. When all of a sudden the microphone of the journalist of the Georgian TV Channel 1 fell down, it was Chancellor Angela Merkel who would immediately pick up the microphone and give it to the Georgian journalist. "Having style even in times of crisis" was the comment of the ZDF reporter.

On April 22, 2014 Justice Sonia Sotomayor stood up in the Supreme Court of the United States. She took the unusual step of reading aloud parts of her dissenting opinion from the bench. The majority of the Supreme Court had decided to uphold a constitutional amendment in Michigan banning "race-sensitive admission policies".[53] Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined in her dissent by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, emphasized that "race does matter" and that it is the task of the judiciary "to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination. As members of the judiciary… we ought not sit back and wish away, rather than confront, the racial inequality that exists in our society."[54]

These two examples show like in a snapshot that women in politics and women in the judiciary – having an enormous impact on politics when it comes to Constitutional Court judges—do make a difference of style and a difference of contents. It is quite unlikely that a male chancellor would have picked up the microphone. And women, including the first Latina Supreme Court Justice, are standing up against discrimination, in this case against discrimination of racial minorities.

It is the hypothesis of this contribution that women in politics do make a difference with regard to political culture and to political contents on the condition that there is a sufficient number of women in leadership who are able to realize effectively a different approach to politics and policies. Thus, the dependent variable is the difference that women in political leadership are making for political culture and for political contents. This difference is explained by the representation of women in parliaments as the independent variable.

The reason to expect that there is a relationship between representation of women in parliaments and governments on the one hand and political culture and contents on the other hand is the "interaction of experience and thought." This interaction results "in a different voice" that women—who have different life experiences from men—are contributing to politics.[55] And of course experience does not only influence thought, but behavior and action as well.

Equality in this contribution is understood "as a question of social life" including not only the "right to be free from discrimination." Equality also "concerns the organization of our basic institutions, and so will implicate questions of social structure and distributive justice."[56] My central normative assumption is that the female difference in politics can benefit the collective interest and be transformed into a potential for a richer social life for both the sexes. The conditions for the unfolding of this positive potential of female difference are political

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53. 572 U.S. __ (2014) at 2. Justice Sotomayor uses the term "race-sensitive admission policies" instead of "affirmative action" as it does describe more precisely the issue at stake being a rule that institutions of higher education can consider race in admissions in "only a very limited way in an effort to create a diverse student body." 572 U. S. __ (2014) at 2, footnote 2.
54. 572 U. S. __ (2014) at 46.
55. Carol Gilligan, *In a different voice. Psychological Theory and Women's Development 2* (1993).
56. Reva B. Siegel, Equality's Frontiers: How Congress's Section 5 Power Can Secure Transformative Equality (as Justice Ginsburg Illustrates in Coleman). 122 *The Yale Law Journal Online* 267–274, 270 (2013).

actors who are interested in the positive potential of female difference and deal with it in a democratic and communicative way.[57]

My argument will be presented in four steps: First, the development of the representation of women in politics will be described. Second, it will be investigated what difference women in politics do make for political culture. Third, I will present comparative data showing the impact that women in politics do have on political contents. And fourth, proposals for activating the positive potential of female difference will be discussed.

I. Women in Politics: the Development of Representation

There has been progress in the representation of women in politics. Most visibly, for example, Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel is an important and, in my view, positive role model for women in politics. Hillary Clinton, the former Secretary of State of the United States, is another prominent example. In Europe there are now five female Ministers of Defense, a policy field that is traditionally occupied by men: Ursula von der Leyen in Germany since 2013; Roberta Pinotti in Italy since 2013; Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert in the Netherlands since 2012; Ine Marie Eriksen Soreide in Norway since 2013; and Karin Enström in Sweden since 2012. Besides such well-known examples of outstanding women in political leadership, there are today more women in political parties, governments and parliaments than there used to be a decade ago. Let us take for example the representation of women in parliaments.[58] In 2013 women comprised 21.8% of national parliaments worldwide, and 35.9% of the European Parliament (graph 1).[59] These data demonstrate that change has taken place and more women are in politics. Yet, men are still ruling the world. [60]

Graph 1: The proportion of women in the European Parliament and in National Parliaments Worldwide

Source: European Commission (2013). Database: Women & Men in Decision Making and Inter-Parliamentary Union (2013). Statistical Archive: Women in National Parliaments.

The following graph shows data related to women's representation in the European Parliament and the national parliaments of EU Member States (graph 2).[61]

57. Christine Landfried, *The Concept of Difference*, 15–45, 31 (Kolja Raube, Annika Sattler eds., 2011).
58. I want to thank Florian Pollehn for doing graphs 1 and 2 as well as the graphs in the appendix.
59. For comparison: In 2013 there were18.8% women in the House of Representatives of the United States.
60. Sheryl Sandberg with Nell Scovell, *Lean In. Women, Work, and the Will to Lead* 5 (2013).
61. Cf. graphs a–d in the appendix A for women's representation in selected national parliaments of Member States of the EU from the Center (France and Germany), from the North (Finland and Sweden), from the

Graph 2: The proportion of women in the European Parliament and in National Parliaments of the EU Member States (Single/Lower House)

Again, with the exception of the northern countries like Finland and Sweden, women are not adequately represented in the national parliaments of EU Member States. This is a distressing situation, as there is empirical evidence suggesting that "increasing female representation in national parliaments fosters political involvement of women."[62]

II. Women in Politics: What Difference Does it Make for Political Culture?

According to empirical research[63] the difference that women are contributing to political culture concerns another understanding of time, of communication, and a more encompassing and complex approach towards social problems.

The data from my own empirical research are interviews that I have conducted with the members of the first German Länder government in which women had a majority. This was the Senate of Berlin, elected in March 1989 with eight female and five male senators. I had the opportunity to interview the eight female and four male senators as well as mayor Walter Momper (SPD).[64] The case study suggests that women and men have different political styles.

1. Female difference with regard to time

My interviews with the members of the Länder government indicate that the women generally plead for a shorter length of meetings and also in reality are usually brief. Eight female senators and three male senators answered that women are not only in favor of short meetings, but also carry out shorter meetings once they are in power. Only one male senator disagreed. A female senator mentioned that being brief might also be dangerous for women because, in politics, talking at length is often equated with competence. Thus, as long as women

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East (Czech Republic and Slovakia) and from the South of Europe (Greece and Italy).

62. Marc Bühlmann and Lisa Schädel, Representation Matters: The Impact of Descriptive Women's Representation on the Political Involvement of Women, *48 Representation* 101–114, 109 (2012).

63. Birgit Meyer, Amerika, hast Du es besser? Zur politischen Partizipation von Frauen in den USA, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, May 17, 35–45 (1996).

64. Christine Landfried, *Folgenforschung. Zur Übertragung der Chaostheorie auf die Sozialwissenschaften* (1996).

in politics are in a minority, their attempts to change the rules might be to their disadvantage. She gave me an example. A male senator had described a problem for 25 minutes. The next speaker was a female senator who wanted to add a relevant point to the discussion. This senator only spoke for 10 minutes. Then a male senator spoke for 25 minutes without offering any new argument or information. My interview partner was convinced that the male colleagues believed that the female senator had shown incompetence in the field because of her short speech![65]

While nearly all senators agreed that women have the skill to be brief, it is contested whether or not women do have a more long-term perspective in policymaking. My interviews show a divided opinion on this topic: three female and two male senators agree with the opinion that women do have a more long-term perspective than men and three female and two male senators disagree. One female senator explained what it means that women do have a more long-term perspective: "If I want to be successful with a certain legislative project and I know that it will take six to eight years until it will be passed, then I start the legislative project nonetheless and do not care that I will probably not be a senator anymore once the project is realized. A man would never do this."[66]

To sum it up, according to the results of my interviews, opinion is divided with regard to a more long-term perspective of women in policy-making. Nevertheless, five senators out of twelve interviewed comply with the assumption that women take into account more than men the long-term impact of political decisions on the development of society.[67] These five senators have a perception of the female difference with regard to time that is similar to what Lani Guinier has observed in a law school environment.[68] She has noticed that contemporary legal education emphasizes "quick thinking and strategic guessing – the ability to figure out what the person who asks the question wants rather than taking time for reflection, research, and synthesis to determine the best answer to the question itself."[69] The "process of arriving at solutions"[70] and applying the legal methods seems to be more important in law school than really finding solutions to problems. Yet these methods of thinking and teaching create a learning environment at law schools that is hostile to women and their understanding of the legal profession. For example, women are often not the first to raise their hand in the classroom but are willing to participate only if they are convinced that their contribution is relevant. As Guinier put it, "They perceive the Socratic classroom not as a game to win, but rather as a conversation to synthesize information."[71] Likewise, I would argue that even if the opinion of twelve senators about women having a long-term perspective in politics is divided, it is plausible that women, because of their different life experience, take into consideration the inter-generational sustainability in political decisions more than men.

This is consistent with research conducted by Kathlene Lyn, Susan E. Clarke and Barbara A. Fox. First, they observed that women members of the Colorado House of Representatives in 1989 sponsored more innovative bills than men (74% versus 48%), as opposed to simply updating existing laws. And second, that "when a new innovative bill failed to pass, as about three-fourths did in 1989, women were significantly more likely than men to carry the bill again in the following years... Women's persistence in reintroducing innovative legislation

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65. Id. at 65.

66. Id. at 66.

67. Id. at 67 for the answers to my question whether women do have a more long-term perspective in political decisions taking into account the inter-generational sustainability: Three female and two male senators answered "yes, this is exactly how it is"; three female and two male senators answered "it is not specifically female to respect long-term perspectives". One female senator answered "this would be my vision," and one female senator did not answer this question.

68. Lani Guinier, Keynote Address to the Max Weber Chair Conference 2014 'Women in Leadership', April 3, 2014 (personal notes).

69. Lani Guinier, Lessons and challenges of becoming gentlemen, 24 *N.Y.U. Review of Law & Social Change* 1–16, 8 (1998).

70. Id.

71. Id. at 7.

grows out of their longer-range view of the process. For them, final success is not measured by one year or even one term in office."[72]

2. Female difference with regard to communication

Even empirical studies that do not find a different style of female leadership in general demonstrate that women in leadership exhibit a different style of communication than men, relying more upon facts, cooperation, persuasion and motivation.[73] With the exception of one male senator, all the interviewees answered that on the condition that there is a sufficient number of women in politics, style and political communication are changing. Among the twelve interviewees, ten senators hold the opinion that women in politics have a more communicative style, do their work more by motivation than by command, prefer teamwork and are better at listening.[74] Nine senators asserted that the female politicians rely more on facts and expertise, without putting on a show ("Schaulaufen").[75] Putting on a show and getting attention at all costs is seen as a typical male behavior.

3. Female difference with regard to complexity

Scholars have argued that women have a "constant eye to maintaining relational order and connection" and take a more complex or a more "encompassing view"[76] of social problems. According to my research a few senators believe that the female politicians indeed take into consideration a multitude of perspectives and integrate public and private concerns. Three female and two male senators hold the opinion that when women in politics analyze a problem, they take into consideration the social environment with which the specific problem is connected. Women are judged by these senators to be more sensitive to the complexity of reality and the consequences of political decisions.[77] One of the consequences of taking into account the complexity of a situation or of a problem is the insight that effective leadership and communication starts with acknowledging the existence of different perspectives.[78] Another consequence of seriously paying attention to a situation in its entirety is the female approach not to strictly divide between the private and the public at the workplace. According to an observation of Sheryl Sandberg, showing emotions at the workplace and rejecting a strict separation between the private and the public make us better, not worse leaders.[79]

III. Women in Politics: What Difference Does it Make for Political Contents?

The difference that women are contributing to political contents is their special focus on legislation that builds up the structural conditions that enable women to be equal participants in social life. In this research area there do exist country studies, especially for northern European countries. For example, the results of an analysis on "Women in Swedish local elected assemblies 1970–2010 and gender equality in outcomes" are the following: "Having a high number of women elected, does affect conditions for women citizens, making them more equal to men in terms of factors such as income levels, full-time vs. part-time employment, and distribution of parental leave between mothers and fathers, even when controlling for party ideology and modernization at the

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72. Kathleen Lyn, *Susan E. Clarke and Barbara A. Fox* 31–38, 34 (Debra L. Dodson ed., 1991).
73. Birgit Meyer, *Frauen im Männerbund. Politikerinnen in Führungspositionen von der Nachkriegszeit bis heute* 346 (1997).
74. Lani Guinier finds the same female characteristics with regard to communication in law schools. Supra note 17, at 15.
75. Landfried, supra note 12, at 63.
76. Gilligan, supra note 3, at XIV and 4.
77. Landfried, supra note 12, at 65.
78. Sandberg, supra note 8, at 79.
79. Id. at 89.

municipal level."[80]

However, comparative studies investigating "how the proportion of women in elected assemblies relates to outcomes in the everyday lives of citizens are scarce…"[81] This is why I have analyzed the impact of the percentage of women in parliaments on childcare coverage and on paternity leave in European countries. Paternity leave as a special parental leave for fathers has been established in many European countries and is a meaningful indicator for equality in social life. The data show a surprisingly clear and robust positive correlation between women in parliaments and childcare coverage as well as paternity leave in European countries (table 1).[82]

Table 1: Correlation between

– women in parliament and child care coverage (2005–2011 for 29 European countries)
– women in parliament and paternity leave (2000–2011 for 22 European countries)[83]

	(1) Childcare coverage, age 3- schooling	(2) Childcare coverage, age 3- schooling	(3) Paid paternity leave in weeks	(4) Paid paternity leave in weeks
Women in parliament (t-1)	**0.101***		**0.0591***	
	(3.35)		**(3.37)**	
Women in parliament (t-4)		**0.0878***		**0.0718***
		(3.70)		**(3.87)**
Female legislators, senior officials, managers (t-1)	-0.0600		0.0199	
	(-1.08)		(0.47)	
Female legislators, senior officials, managers (t-4)		-0.0764		0.0492
		(-1.13)		(1.75)
Constant	12.91**	13.61*	-1.322	-2.341*
	(2.66)	(2.34)	(-0.77)	(-2.30)
Observations	159	158	240	235
R-squared	0.985	0.985	0.877	0.867
t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001				

Sources: World Bank world development indicators; Eurostat gender equality data; OECD family database.

In the first column the correlation coefficient for women in parliaments (t-1) is positive and statistically significant. More precisely the coefficient shows that over the whole period 1% more women in parliament goes together with an increase of childcare coverage of about 0.1%. Column two shows that the result is also robust

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80. Lena Wängnerud and Anders Sundell, "Do politics matter? Women in Swedish Local Elected Assemblies 1970–2010 and Gender Equality in Outcomes," 4 *European Political Science Review* 97–120, 97 (2012).

81. Id. at 98.

82. I want to thank Oliver Strijbis for doing the regression analysis of table 1 and graphs 3–5.

83. Prais-Winsten regressions with correlated panels corrected standard errors. Lagged dependent variables are included.

if we lag the independent variable by four instead of one year. With regard to paternity leave we find similar results. Here again, we find a positive and significant correlation of women in parliament and paid paternity leave. The coefficient in column three shows over the whole period that 1% more women in parliament correlates with an increase of about 0.06% of paid paternity leave in weeks. As column four shows, the result holds true if we lag the independent variable by four years.[84]

For illustration, country comparisons for 28 European countries that demonstrate the correlation between women in parliaments and childcare coverage are shown. Outliers like Iceland and Sweden are labeled, and the other countries are listed in appendix B. The graph shows that the correlation between women in parliaments and childcare coverage is not due to country clusters, but is normally distributed among countries. For Sweden the change in childcare coverage in relation to the change of the representation of women in parliament is below average because Sweden already has had a very high percentage of women in parliament, so any further changes of the representation of women are not decisive for equality politics anymore.

Graph 3: Percentage of women in Parliaments (t-1) and change in childcare coverage in 28 European countries, 2009.

Sources: World Bank world development indicators; Eurostat income and living conditions data.

The following graph replicates graph 3 with a four-year time lag for women in parliament. It clearly shows that our results are robust and independent of the time lag.

Graph 4: Percentage of women in Parliaments (t-4) and change in childcare coverage in 29 European countries, 2009.

84. The model contains lagged dependent variables in order to control for time dependent autoregression.

Sources: World Bank world development indicators; Eurostat income and living conditions data. In this graph we have 29 countries because the necessary data for the time lag 't-4' do exist for the Slovak Republic, while these do not exist for 't-1' in graph 3.

Graph 5 illustrates the relationship between women in parliament and paid paternity leave across countries. As demonstrated with the regression analysis (table 1), we find a positive relationship between the representation of women and weeks in paid paternity leave. Outliers are again labeled while the other countries are listed in appendix B. Although outliers do have some effect on the relationship, it is shown that our results are not due to country clustering.

Graph 5: Percentage of women in Parliaments (mean) and change in paternity leave in 22 European countries, 2000-2010

Sources: World Bank world development indicators; OECD family database. The Czech Republic and Greece have almost identical values. Hence, only 21 data points are visible.

It is the result of the analysis that women in politics do make a difference in a double sense: Women are changing political culture and they are changing political contents. This double female difference fosters a long-term political perspective, a complex and communicative approach towards politics, and greater equality in social life between women and men. Thus, the female approach towards politics has potentials to resolve the problems in the 21st century, because we need complexity and not simplicity, we need long-term solutions and not short-sightedness and we need equal participation of women and men in politics and not a world ruled primarily by men.

However, it is also a result of this analysis that the representation of women in parliaments is inadequate and far from equal. In addition, women have to cope with a lot of difficulties once they want to combine family life with a position in politics. And there are still many prejudices with regard to the professional competence of women. Justice Sonia Sotomayor was asked in an interview in Berlin in May 2014 whether it was more difficult for a Latina or for a woman to make a career. She answered that it was clearly more difficult to get to the top being a woman. As a black man or as a Hispanic man you can manage to overcome the stereotypes about your competence if you have enough self-confidence. But for a woman, no matter how much self-confidence she has, there are certain prejudices that she cannot overcome.[85]

IV. Women in Politics: Proposals for Activating the Positive Potential of Difference

The empirical evidence of women making a difference in politics on the one hand and the explanatory power of the representation of women in parliaments for this difference on the other hand give reason to suggest the following four proposals.

1. Effective and redistributive quota

In democratic political systems we need an effective redistributive quota, not just an appeal for more women in politics, in order to reach an adequate representation of 50% women in parliaments and governments. Only when women "wield power in sufficient numbers will we create a society that genuinely works for all women."[86]

2. Social infrastructure that allows for equal participation of women in politics

We have to build up the social infrastructure that allows women to effectively participate in politics. Besides having equality-sensitive family policies[87] like childcare coverage and paternity leave, it is necessary to cope with what Anne-Marie Slaughter calls "mundane" issues. Such issues are for example "the conflicts between school schedules and work schedules,"[88] and have to be addressed.

3. Working time regulations for a more balanced life

We have to establish regulations that enable women and men to have more time for friends, partners, parents and children. It must become possible to integrate different parts of life.[89] Similarly it is the result of a recent survey among young women and men that both women (62%) and men (50%) want a more balanced life between family and work.[90] Therefore the reduction of the regular workday, as well as working time models

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85. "Sonia Sotomayor, A Portrait by Verena Mayer," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 13, 2014.

86. Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Why Women Still Can't Have it All," *The Atlantic* 85–102, 89 (July, August 2012).

87. Following Sonia Sotomayor's term cf. footnote 1.

88. Slaughter, supra note 34, at 90.

89. Id. at 100.

90. Jutta Allmendinger and Julia Haarbrücker, "Lebensentwürfe heute. Wie junge Frauen und Männer in Deutschland leben wollen." Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Discussion Paper P 2013–002, 27 and table 6 on page 61 (2013).

that can be adapted to fit different circumstances in different phases of life, would make sense.[91]

4. More female journalists reporting about women in politics

Not only should more women have political power, but also media reporting about women in politics should not be left to men alone. What is true for the clichés of women in business that are reproduced in media coverage and has been described so precisely by Naomi Wolf[92] is also true for the "male-dominated" media coverage of women in politics. The media coverage of Chancellor Angela Merkel alone gives hundreds of examples of these clichés that are invalidating the way in which women enrich politics.

It is the aim of these proposals that the difference women are making in politics can be transformed into a potential for benefitting the collective interest of the society. This potential derives from the female approach to practice on the one hand a communicative and problem-solving style in politics and on the other hand to engage for effective social justice. Yet, until we reach equal participation of women in politics as a condition to profit from this double female difference, enabling women and men to lead a more authentic and encompassing life, there is still a long way to go. The need remains for women in leadership to lean in and stand up.

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91. Id. at 51.
92. Naomi Wolf, The Girl Can't Help It, Blog-Entry, *Project Syndicate* (December 31, 2013).

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World Bank, World Development Indicators.

Appendix A

Graph a: The proportion of women in the European Parliament and in the National Parliaments of France and Germany (Single/Lower House)

Graph b: The proportion of women in the European Parliament and in the National Parliaments of Finland and Sweden (Single/Lower House)

Graph c: The proportion of women in the European Parliament and in the National Parliaments of Czech Republic and Slovakia (Single/Lower House)

Source: European Commission (2013). Database: Women & Men in Decision Making.

Graph d: The proportion of women in the European Parliament and in National Parliaments of Greece and Italy (Single/Lower House)


Source: European Commission (2013). Database: Women & Men in Decision Making.

Appendix B

Definition of women in Parliament: Percentage of women in national Parliaments, in a single or lower chamber.

Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SG.GEN.PARL.ZS

Definition of childcare:

Percentage of children age 3-schooling in childcare.

Eurostat Gender Equality data: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/ employment_social_policy_equality/equality/indicators_gender

Definition of paternity leave:

Number of paid weeks reserved to the exclusive use of fathers within parental leave.

OECD Family database: http://www.oecd.org/gender/data/lengthofmaternitypaternity parentalleave.htm

In graph 3 the following 28 countries are included:

Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.

In graph 4 the 28 countries of graph 7 and in addition the Slovak Republic are included.

In graph 5 the following 22 countries are included:

Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.

Women's Transnational Advocacy in the European Union: Empowering Leaders, Organizations, or Publics.
by
Sabine Lang

Introduction

The European Union harbors a reputation as being one of the more gender friendly governance bodies of the early 21st century. With the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999, gender equality policy was established as a mainstreaming strategy to be included in all European Union decision-making (Abels/Mushaben 2011; Kantola 2010; van der Vleuten 2007). Equality directives for labor markets and work/life balance, inclusion of gender equality norms in accession negotiations with new member states, the recent establishment of the European Institute for Gender Equality in Vilnius as well as the decision to require member states to establish quotas for women on corporate boards of 2013 speak to some success of putting gender on the EU agenda. There are a few publicly known 'faces' of this success, such as Anna Diamantopoulou, who from 1999 to 2004 was EU Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, and Viviane Reding, the current Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship and the promoter of a controversial quota directive. Yet women's institutional leadership did not materialize in a vacuum and the measures these women leaders initiated were not conceived strictly within the confines of the EU Commission or Parliament. Instead, their success can be attributed to European transnational women's advocacy networks (TAN) in which different constellations of feminist actors from inside and outside EU institutions joined forces to achieve policy goals. Theorizing the role of these advocacy networks in policy generation and success has become one of the challenges of recent feminist research (Zippel 2006; Roth 2007; Montoya 2008; Lang 2009; Ahrens 2011; Knappe/Lang 2014). A first wave of studies classified the 'types' of actors involved in these networks as velvet triangles in which EU level femocrats, feminist academics and experts, as well as women's movement activists collaborate (Woodward 2001 and 2003; also Locher 2007). The velvet triangle concept emphasized the way in which routinized interaction among institutional and civil society actors in the European gender arena provides frequent formal and informal contexts for deliberation, for developing strategic alliances and ultimately for more inclusive decision-making. In contrast to the notion of an 'iron triangle' in which politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups monopolize political power behind closed doors (Lowi 1979), the velvet triangle suggests a more open and transparent exercise of power among feminist institutional and non-institutional political actors. A central feature of this soft communicative power is biographical, as members of velvet triangles often share parts of their professional biographies. They might have moved from movement activism into academia and then on into the Brussels bureaucracy, or they might be on the board of a women's NGO after serving in the EU Directorate for Employment, Social Affairs, and Inclusion. They tend to be critical towards closed corporatist political processes and instead prefer to work within networks of trusted relationships that allow for developing pragmatic alliances across institutional affiliations and positional power. The strength of the velvet triangle concept was that it—quite early in the EU policy network debate—identified women leaders performing a "patterned dance of needy bureaucrats, dedicated activists and eager academics" (Woodward 2003: 76).

The velvet triangle concept has been path-breaking in mapping the exchange-based relationships between different actors in EU policy making; yet it has also been challenged. One, the triangulation frame has been assessed as too static and limiting for policy network analysis. Some have argued for an expansion of the existing policy triangle of bureaucrats, movement actors, and academics to include other reference points such as the media (Godemont/Motmans 2006) or professionalized gender consultancy firms. Others question the stability that the velvet triangle invokes and argue that women's policy networks are spatially and temporally unbounded, leading in effect to much broader—and thus more unruly—networks, more aptly called "women's cooperative constellations" (Holli 2008) or "women's fields of advocacy" (Bereni 2011). Yet others have sharpened the distinction between actors participating in formal and informal policy networks (Ahrens 2011),

highlighting the difference between official and regularized forms of interaction and loose, unofficial and irregular networking occasions among women's equality actors in the EU. Finally, researchers have pointed to the power asymmetries in and between TAN and their effects on policy influence (Montoya 2008).

I would like to add to this debate by asking two questions: first, what form of women's organizing does European Union governance empower and, second, to what degree do these women's organizations in turn empower women's publics? I am thus attempting to expand a focus on personalized leadership by introducing issue leadership and public leadership as crucial features of a leadership culture. The argument I develop is that women's TAN, while contributing much to issue leadership in European affairs, do less well on generating broad European publics on gender affairs. While feminist research in recent years has emphasized the collaborative structure of successful networks (Mazur/McBride 2008) and the central role of insider-outsider coalitions in pursuing an equality agenda (Banaszak 2010), what has remained somewhat un(der)explored is the organizational form and the ties that bind its actors. Yet organizational structure influences rules, norms, and behavior, and thus ultimately collective action. It is the connection between organizational form and the perceived and real scope of action of movements that is at the center of this exploration of the role of European NGO networks and their public leadership.

Empowering European Women's NGOs

The European Union, as most states and other transnational governance bodies, is a relative newcomer to the idea of interacting with civil society and European publics. Yet the 'advocacy void' created by weak European political parties (Aspinwall 1998: 197), as well as the formal policy process that is based on 'soft law' and convincing rather than regulating, have made civil society involvement imperative. It is "precisely the promotion of such informal practices and norms" where civic actors are "most influential" (Checkel 1999: 554). NGOs are seen as key transmitters of soft law into society. They are thus perceived to be messengers for the institution's norm entrepreneurship and are supposed to distribute information and normative direction to constituencies. At the same time, their claims and identities are based on being aggregates of active citizen voice; therefore they can be seen as a proxy for European publics (Lang 2009 and 2013). The European Commission enables cooperation between EU institutions and the non-governmental sector in order to foster a "more participatory democracy both within the European Union and beyond" (European Commission 2000). NGOs are constructed as public interlocutors since they "reach the poorest and most disadvantaged and … provide a voice for those not sufficiently heard through other channels'" (ibid.). By empowering European NGO networks, the Commission intends to foster the formation of European publics.

Yet these far reaching NGO empowerment claims stand in tension with the challenges that the nongovernmental sector faces as it situates itself between grassroots involvement and transnational presence, between highly professionalized expertise and community outreach, and between insider status and outsider voice. Currently, women's NGOs in the European Union face these particular challenges in more pronounced ways than NGOs in other EU policy sectors. They operate with fewer resources than advocacy organizations in most other fields; they work in intersectionally complex policy environments; and they are confronted with increasing "gender fatigue" by politicians, bureaucrats, and by European societies at large (Foundation Women in Europe 2010). And, more generally, even though the political opportunity structure of European Union governance empowers formally organized NGOs and molds what I have called earlier an "NGOized movement structure" (Lang 1997), the conditions of this organizational empowerment are shaped by economic, legal, and institutional incentives and constraints. EU institutions tend to reward institutional communication skills and consultation and prefer organized over loosely networked activists. For example women's projects cannot apply for EU funds if they are not incorporated legally, most likely as a charitable organization. If they seek policy influence nationally or transnationally, they are better positioned if they can formally represent specific women's interests and are legitimized spokeswomen for networks or groups. European governance thus empowers actors who prefer organization, formal process, and division of labor between horizontal and vertical

units.[93] Formally organized public interest representation within the EU relies overwhelmingly on confederated structures; that is, on associations of associations that generally do not even admit individuals as members. But even in more informal contexts women's activists gain recognition primarily by exhibiting expertise and institutional communication skills rather than principled normative positions and public advocacy skills (Greenwood 2007).

These trends have been most visible in the laboratory of Eastern European countries where the women's movement's civic infrastructures in the 1990s developed parallel to European integration, culminating in the large accession round of 2004. In Poland, about 300 women's groups that were mostly created in the 1990s were ignored by state actors until EU accession negotiations demanded the creation of a national council of women's organizations as an advisory body for gender matters in the negotiations (Choluj 2003). Access to EU funds after 2000 strengthened the position and political agency of Polish women's NGOs, solidified institutional structures and opened up transnational cooperation (Regulska/Grabowska 2008), while at the same time favoring large and well organized women's NGOs over smaller groups without matching funds and limited grant writing skills and capacities (Roth 2007: 473; also Graff 2009). Among feminist academics and movement actors, this has been fueling renewed debates about the consequences of European governance for women's movement building and politicization strategies (Fodor 2006; Kantola/Outshoorn 2007; Squires 2007). The most pressing question is whether or not the monopolization of power in the EU and the specific form of inclusion of women's advocacy ultimately does centrally contribute to the narrowing in scope and fervor of feminist empowerment.

Empowering Publics

Counteracting these formal, institutional, and economic constraints are new means of communication that make transnational co-operation and mobilization easier and potentially more effective than ever before. E-mail alerts, web based campaigns, interactive social media, as well as internal communication networks, allow for faster information and mobilization across European feminist hubs. This section attempts to clarify whether and how women's NGO networks in the EU make use of the enhanced communication environment and to what degree they empower women's publics.

First it should be noted that the European Union, while being the largest 'donor agency' in Europe, does not provide extensive funds to women's NGOs to actively promote gender issues. A small glimpse into the political economy of EU funding might illustrate this point: From 2001 to 2005, the EU financed the 5th Community Action Program for the implementation of gender equality with a total of 50 million Euros. The main objectives of this framework strategy on gender equality were to raise awareness, to improve analysis and evaluation and to develop the "capacity for players to promote gender equality" (EC 2001). Yet on the list of funded actors, NGOs serve as number 5 after a host of institutional actors, namely 1. Member states (that is to say governments of member states); 2. Local and regional authorities; 3. Bodies promoting gender equality and 4. Social partners (Council 2001)[94]. The final report on the 5th framework states that in the category "raising awareness" only 7% and in the category "transnational cooperation" only 25% of these funds went to NGOs (EC 2008). In effect, the majority of funds for raising awareness about gender were made available to government actors (30%) and social partners, i.e. business and large welfare associations (22%).

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93. This is not just the case for women's NGOs within the EU governance system. Several case studies support the claim that, across policy arenas, the EU system privileges NGOs with a permanent office in Brussels, with a professional staff and vertical integration structures, while excluding or marginalizing NGOs that favor protest oriented means and challenge norms and communicative conventions engrained in Brussels culture (see f.e. Joachim/Locher 2009; Dembinski 2009; Warleigh 2004).

94. The Council decided in 2004 to extend the 5th framework into 2006 in order to accommodate the accession of the 10 new member states. The budget was increased to 61.5 million EURO.

**Graph 1: Distribution of grants for
awareness raising under 5th EU Community
Program for Gender Equality (2001-2006)**

Source: European Commission 2008; working document SEC(2008) 2365.

This bias towards institutional funding continued in the recent program cycle called 'Progress' from 2007 to 2012. 'Progress' reserved a total of 433 billion Euros in spending for sustainable development goals and projects, including research programs, education, and social and labor market policy initiatives. Within these parameters, 'Progress' merged several key programs of the Social Agenda of the EU in order to achieve synergistic effects and to mainstream gender equality. The program part that explicitly funded activities related to gender equality stayed about the same in yearly funds as in the 5th Community Action Program, and the program design, as well as the kinds of activities it promoted, continued to cater to institutional actors such as governments, universities, and unions (Progress 2007).

Thus, women's TAN in the EU cannot count on extensive means for empowerment of publics through institutional funding. What presents itself as a low-cost alternative are organization and empowerment via the web. On the web, organizations compete for attention and informational leverage as well as for attention for their campaigns and for support by their constituencies. The web is a potential means for women's NGOs to inform, engage, and activate constituencies. European women's networks today tend to spend more time and energy on updating a website than on printing brochures or other publicity materials. We can assume that empowerment politics can be gauged adequately via web-based analysis. Launching campaigns, getting constituents to sign letters, integrating a national campaign with local actions, or joining protests – these are all initiatives that will leave a footprint on the web. If the initiating action is not itself web-based, it will most certainly be reported on the web.

Assessing empowerment of publics means gauging two communicative dimensions of European women's networks. The first dimension captures network density and thus speaks to the communicative linkages between network members horizontally and vertically, among national platforms as well as from the local, regional, national to the transnational level. The second dimension speaks to the levels of outreach into wider constituencies and the potential for activation of site visitors for specific actions of the network (see also Bennett/Lang/Segerberg 2014). In this last section of the working paper, I will suggest ways to research these two dimensions of empowerment, which I call organizational empowerment and public empowerment.

We can assume that the links a network or an organization provides to other NGOs or networks speaks to organizational empowerment in that it articulates proximity of mission and common identity. Links show "how a group presents its position in the world to others" (Ferree/Pudrovska 253; also Park/Thelwall 2003). Richard Rogers and his Amsterdam-based network research group formulate their research approach based on the idea that organizations link "selectively", as opposed to just randomly, to others. They distinguish between: only linking to your friends and acquaintances (social networking); linking to authoritative bodies (reputational networking); linking to their own kind of organizations (self-referential networking); linking to potential funders

(aspirational networking); and linking to their targets (critical networking). Organizations of course tend to link to more than one type (Rogers 2004: vii). Thus selective linking provides indicators on the level and depth of empowerment of a network. I will illustrate the level of a network's organizational empowerment by analyzing how the European Women's Lobby (EWL), the umbrella organizations of EU centered women's NGOs in member states, networks with its national affiliates. We can map this network with the assistance of the issuecrawler, a software developed by Richard Rogers from the University of Amsterdam, that allows us to visualize web-based networking among groups, organizations, and institutions (at http://www.govcom.org). The crawls pick up links between actors and can be manipulated according to: the depth of sites within the web presence of an organization; the number of starting points, that is site origins; and the iterations, or how far the network analysis stretches into a given network sphere. Actors appear on the network map if they are co-linked to; that is, if at least two other actors in the network sphere link to it. Network diagrams also show the direction of main linkages (the arrows), the relative strength of a linked actor (size of dot) as well as its broadly defined institutional form (f.e. URL suffixes such as .gov, .org, or national suffixes in different colors). The destination URL marks the actor that is at the center of linkages and we see who links to it and who it links to.

Figure 1: How the issuecrawler works

The following sites were identified as starting points for EWL and national member platforms:

http://www.bgrf.org	Bulgaria
http://www.celem.org	Spain
http://www.cnfl.lu	Luxembourg
http://www.czlobby.cz	Czech Republic
http://www.desfemmes.fr	France
http://www.enu.ee	Estonia
http://www.frauenrat.de	Germany
http://www.frauenring.at	Austria
http://www.gender.sk	Slovakia
http://www.kvinderaadet.dk	Denmark
http://www.lygus.lt/mic	Lithuania
http://www.mcwo.net	Malta

http://www.medinstgenderstudies.org	Cyprus
http://www.mzl.org.mk	FRMacedonia
http://www.nawo.org.uk	UK
http://www.nederlandsevrouwenraad.nl	Netherlands
http://www.neww.org.pl	Poland
http://www.noierdek.hu	Hungary
http://www.nwci.ie	Ireland
http://www.nytkis.org	Finland
http://www.plataformamulheres.org.pt	Portugal
http://www.sverigeskvinnolobby.a.se	Sweden
http://www.vrouwenraad.be	Belgium
http://www.womenlobby.org	EU
http://www.zenskaloby.sk	Slovakia
http://www.zenska-mreza.hr	Croatia
http://www.zls.si	Slovenia

The crawl was set at 1 iteration and 2 levels depth. The issuecrawler performed a co-link analysis of all the starting points that 'crawled out' from the original website URLs and captured those sites that linked back to at least two of the original starting sites. The issuecrawler checked two levels deep in every site

Figure 1: EWL and its national members

The most obvious result is that while EWL stays in the center of this network, meaning many network members link back to it, most of the original starting points of the EWL national member network drop out of the picture. They might link out to other sites, but are not linked back to the core group. This tells us that the national members of EWL are not solidly in touch with each other: They do not reference each other's work, do not participate much in joint campaigns not moderated by EWL, and do not draw mobilization capital out of showing their 'networked' status with these other NGOs. The only original network member besides EWL as the umbrella organization that stays in the network is the Slovakian coordinator NGO, which is linked to by two other network members.

The issuecrawler also delivers an actor ranking (of the core network and its periphery, by site). This shows the

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dominance of EWL, followed by strong UN-based linkages and then mostly European based issue networks and funders such as Boell and Filia. In Rogers' terms, we see first and foremost reputational networking, followed by self-referential and aspirational networking.

ACTOR RANKING
1 - womenlobby.org - 21
2 - un.org - 13
3 - unwomen.org - 8
4 - unifem.org - 8
5 - boell.de - 5
6 - un-instraw.org - 5
7 - awid.org - 5
8 - wave-network.org - 5
9 - afem-europa.org - 4
10 - epacvaw.org - 4
11 - asylumaid.org.uk - 4
12 - wide-network.org - 4
13 - 5050democracy.eu - 4
14 - filia-frauenstiftung.de - 4
15 - europa.eu - 3
16 - profem.cz - 3
17 - amazone.be - 3
18 - diestandard.at - 3
19 - rawa.org - 3
20 - ec.europa.eu - 2
21 - endfgm.eu - 2
22 - un-gear.eu - 2
23 - igvm-iefh.belgium.be - 2
24 - boell.pl - 2
25 - endpoverty.eu - 2
26 - ukfeminista.org.uk - 2
27 - mtas.es - 2
28 - zenstud.hr - 2
29 - mnadvocates.org - 2
30 - zenskaloby.wordpress.com - 2
31 - terre-des-femmes.de - 2
32 - kvinfo.dk - 2
33 - bupl.dk – 2

From the inlink rankings we can also detect a relative inward orientation of European networks. Of all the inlinks only six go beyond Europe; and five of these are UN links. This finding supports what Ferree/Pudrovska have stated in their linguistic analysis of websites:

"Although 'gender' is associated with both 'policy' and 'equality' in all three regions, 'politics' is one of the top collocations for 'women' only in Europe, 'development' is missing as a collocation for both 'women' and 'feminist' only in Europe, and 'rights' does not associate with gender' in Europe either, again suggesting that Europe stands a bit aside from the north-south axis for framing transnational identity. The prominence of 'Europe/European' in the top collocations on the Europe-based sites also suggests a distinctive, intraregional identity (organized around gender-equality policy) that is not seen in the U.S. or global South Web sites. (Ferree/Pudrovska 2006: 260).

Finally, the majority of the suffixes we see on the map are .org properties, thus reflecting a network with roots in the NGO world, as well as in EU based institutions, but less connectivity into national.gov world or busi-

ness. Of all national ties, three German sites, two Belgium sites and two UK sites take the lead. Other larger countries such as France and Italy are absent from the network.

Network maps identify authority and organizational empowerment within the network (those nods with the highest degree of co-linking) lying strictly within EWL. A few of its members interact with EWL, but most do not and, even more importantly, most do not interact with each other. But we can also identify a lack of transnationalization beyond Europe and only limited transdiscursivity within the network.

Web-based footprints also provide evidence of the degree to which European women's networks empower wider publics. The following data has been collected within a project that investigates the politics of issue advocacy in the areas of gender, trade justice, and climate change networks on the Brussels level and on the national state level in the UK and Germany.[95] The data is based on a close inspection and coding of websites within a given network. Websites were coded for their communicative properties in four categories: (1) one-way information, (2) interactive information, (3) highly-structured action and (4) co-produced action.[96] The four categories contain 6-8 sub-categories respectively. The first two categories include various kinds of information that is (1) either simply provided on the website or (2) that engages the visitors of the website in an interactive dialog through forums or other interactive features. The third and the fourth category define forms of actions that are available to join on the websites. Highly-structured actions (3) are organized from within an NGO and interested citizens can join, for example as volunteers or by signing a petition. Co-produced actions (4) are actions that require stronger engagement from website visitors and at the same time can be organized and done more independently of the NGO. We assert that with combining these four communicative outreach categories, we can assess the degree to which specific NGOs in a network engage, activate, and thus empower their publics.

I will present only one piece of the analysis here:

Table 1

Transnational and national public engagement

	One-way information score	Interactive information score	Highly structured actions score	Co-produced actions score	Score for highly structured targets	Score for co-produced targets	Overall targets score
■ UK Women's TAN	0,59	0,31	0,39	0,13	0,24	0,03	0,13
▪ UK Women's NAN	0,47	0,29	0,33	0,18	0,2	0,1	0,15
■ German Women's TAN	0,43	0,25	0,21	0,13	0,08	0,03	0,06
▪ German Women's NAN	0,50	0,21	0,21	0,18	0,07	0,04	0,06

This table compares empowerment features of German and UK transnational networks (their respective EWL

95. This project is based on a collaboration with Lance Bennett (University of Washington), Alexandra Segerberg (Stockholm University) and Henrike Knappe (University of Essen) with research assistance from Anna Bohm (UW), Binh Vong (UW) and Michael Barthel (UW).
96. The coding scheme was developed in cooperation with Lance Bennett and Alex Segerberg.

member TAN) and national women's networks (NAN), drawn from the coding of more than 200 websites. A first finding is that all NGOs in the networks engage more in more informational outreach than in actual interaction. With their constituencies In Germany interactive information is less frequent than in the UK; constituents are less frequently asked to respond to information provided by the NGO. Only 21% of German NAN and TAN encourages audiences to engage in actions that they have pre-structured, such as a petition that they have drafted or a campaign that they have organized. Overall, the level of co-produced action is low across both national and transnational women's NGOs, with the national levels providing slightly more opportunities than the transnational level. Striking is also the low level of targeted actions or campaigns, with the UK NGOs being more active still than German NGOs.

The level of public engagement that national, as well as transnationally oriented, women's NGOs exhibit in the UK and Germany is surprisingly low. It might reflect the initially stated focus on institutional advocacy, but will certainly not provide the kind of empowerment that gender issues need, particularly in this time of crisis with the European integration project (see Lang/Sauer 2014).

Conclusion

The road signs directing women's empowerment across Europe seem to be pointing in the direction of institutional and organizational empowerment. Incentives to participate in institutional governance by far outweigh public empowerment. In their comparative work on NGOs in the United Nations and European Union system, Jutta Joachim and Birgit Locher articulate the potentially deradicalizing consequences of becoming institutional insiders: "NGOs rely on personal contacts and alliances with like-minded states for access, prefer lobbying strategies to symbolic or polarizing action, and make consensual proposals backed up by scientific expertise instead of engaging in radical criticism" (Joachim/Locher 2009: 171).

The focus of EU women's advocacy networks in the EU on institutional governance diminishes the capacity to create politicized feminist publics. At the same time, this lack of public mobilization capacity at times endangers the forceful pursuit of institutional gender agendas. Since participation of women's NGOs in EU governance is organized around institutional needs and defined by institutional priorities, it will be employed only selectively. Several studies have pointed to a tendency within the European Union since about 2005 to subsume and sidetrack gender equality issues under the broader markers of mainstreaming and diversity. Maria Stratigaki has analyzed the replacement of enforceable Community Action Programs with a Road Map that lacks resources and remains vague (Stratigaki 2005). Jane Jenson has pointed out how the European Employment Strategy has slowly altered equality from a central pillar to a footnote (Jenson 2007). In both cases, NGOized women's advocacy networks have not been able to protect feminist agendas. European feminist publics have empowered some leaders as well as a fair number of professionalized organizations, yet their task to empower women's publics needs considerably more attention.

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Lean In—a Global Perspective
by
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The *Lean In* Phenomenon

In December 2010, Sheryl Sandberg, Chief Operating Officer at Facebook, was invited to give a 15-minute TedTalk on "Why We Have Too Few Women Leaders" and to offer specific recommendations on what can be done to increase the number of women in power. After shining the spotlight on the miniscule number of women holding executive positions in corporations around the world—less than 3 percent of CEOs are female[97]—Sandberg passionately urged women to forget about their "likeability," to abandon gender stereotypes, to seek out strong mentors, and to confidently and unapologetically advance their (corporate) careers. In short, she advised women to "lean in" and lead.

And so it began. Sandberg's call on women to lean in became a smashing success in the United States, spawning its own industry of roundtable discussions, professional coaches, career circles, and networking events for women. Sandberg quickly turned her *TedTalk* into a book titled *Lean In: Women, Work and the Will to Lead*,[98] which, at the time of writing, has been on the *New York Times* Top Ten Bestseller list for 65 straight weeks.[99] Lean In's success is both entirely predictable and utterly surprising. Sandberg's recommendations are unthreateningly neoliberal, perfectly mainstream and completely unoriginal. They reflect to a large degree Americans' belief that one's professional success lies in one's own hands and that self-confidence and hard work will be eventually rewarded with steady professional advancement. By the same token, many women feel comfortable embracing *Lean In* because Sandberg, with her unthreatening, bubbly persona, encourages women to be unapologetically ambitious while insisting that both professional and personal success are achievable and equally desirable. A bra-burning feminist Sandberg is not. Most importantly, however, by making women responsible for their own success, the consequences of a deeply gendered social and economic system, entrenched structures of inequality and a sexist corporate culture that cause women to "lean back," out of frustration, resignation, or sheer exhaustion, need not be explicitly challenged. The message seems to be, if women overcame their "internal barriers,"[100] behaved like alpha men and leaned in more they could succeed in business just as they can.[101] What's not to like?

Against the backdrop of its commercial success, *Lean In* triggered a passionate public debate about whether or not women can truly "have it all" or whether even suggesting that women could "have it all"—and all at the same time—reflected a lack of understanding of our societal reality and the compounding social and professional pressures everyday working women/working mothers are facing. Particularly so if their background is not as comfortable as that of the billionaire Sandberg's who has a supportive partner, works in the hip environment of Facebook and had a nursery built next to her office. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Professor of International Affairs at Princeton, President of the New American Foundation and former Head of Policy Planning at the

97. McKinsey & Company, *Women Matter 2013. Gender Diversity in Top Management: Moving Corporate Culture, Moving Boundaries*. p. 8 file:///Users/sylviamaier/Desktop/WomenMatter%202013%20Report%20(1). pdf, accessed 14 May 2014.

98. Sheryl Sandberg, *Lean In: Women, Work and the Will to Lead* (New York: Knopf, 2013).

99. *New York Times* Bestseller List, http://www.nytimes.com/best-sellers-books/2014-06-22/hardcover-non-fiction/list.html, accessed 16 June 2014.

100. Bryce Covert, 'Lean In, Trickle Down: The False Promise of Sandberg's Theory of Change,' *Forbes* 2 February 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/brycecovert/2013/02/25/lean-in-trickle-down-the-false-promise-of-sheryl-sandbergs-theory-of-change/, accessed 28 June 2014.

101. Sandberg's exhortation inspired Dr May Al Dabbagh, a faculty member at NYU Abu Dhabi who writes prolifically on women's leadership in the Gulf countries and the mother of a young son to quip, "If I leaned in any more, I'd topple over."

United States State Department as well as married mother of two teenage sons, made precisely that point. In the June 2012 issue of *The Atlantic* magazine she wrote an article titled 'Why Women Still Can't Have It All,' in which she argued that women cannot have it all, "not today, not with the way America's economy and society are currently structured," and that they should stop trying or pretending that they can. Instead, she said, women should either accept that personal and professional success may come sequentially or, make a (sometimes undeniably hard) choice about their priorities.[102] Black feminist thinkers, such as bell hooks, called Sandberg's a "faux feminism," highlighting the deep class and ethnocentric biases underlying her recommendations. In particular, hooks challenged Sandberg's sweeping assumptions about professional women's experiences and the obstacles—or opportunities—they encounter as they navigate their career pathways as essentialist and universalistic, and not reflective of the experiences of women (and men) of color in the still predominantly white corporate environment of North America.[103]

This leads to the inevitable question, to what degree are Sandberg's recommendations transferable to the world outside privileged, hip, white upper/upper-middle class corporate America? Can they be applied elsewhere in the world?

Beyond Leaning In

In what follows, I intend to add a global dimension to the vibrant debate on "leaning in." I suggest that Sandberg's belief that "if more women lean in, we can change the power structure of our world and expand opportunities for all"[104] indicates a lack of awareness of specific social and cultural patterns in large parts of the Middle East, North Africa (MENA) and South Asia that are impeding women's professional advancement.[105] These include a deeply patriarchal societal organization, profoundly unequal gender roles, and a way of conducting business largely based on personal relationships called wasta—"pull" or "connections." These patterns amplify "universal" structural obstacles to women's professional success inherent in a male-gendered corporate architecture and create a complex web of structures of disempowerment that cannot be overcome simply by women assertively leaning in. To be sure, assertiveness and self-confidence as well as a strong work ethic are necessary ingredients to professional success almost anywhere in the world. Likewise, government or private sector policies such as guaranteed parental leave time, support for on-site childcare facilities, flexible work hours and telecommuting facilitate women's efforts to maintain a healthy work-life balance. But these policies are not sufficient. I suggest that in addition to the indispensable attitudinal and macro-structural changes, the strategic establishment of women-only and mixed-gender cross-sector and cross-generational mentoring initiatives as well as "women power networks" is a crucially important way for professional women to counter-balance the power of male wasta networks, to mainstream gender diversity in traditional corporate environments and to increase the number of women in positions of leadership.

To illustrate my argument, I will turn to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and, in particular, the recently launched and already successful Dubai-based mentoring initiative, REACH. I have selected the UAE for my analysis because the Emirates rank among the most highly developed countries in the world. The levels of education and income of the country's 800,000 citizens surpass that of the United States and Western Europe and Dubai is the glittering Near Eastern hub for the global finance, IT and alternative energy industries. Although they are absolute Islamic monarchs, the Emirates' political leaders are decisively pro-Western and aggressively promote higher education, economic development and global integration. [106]

102. Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'Why Women Still Can't Have It All,' *The Atlantic* 13 June 2012, http://www. theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/why-women-still-cant-have-it-all/309020/, accessed 12 June 2014.

103. Bell, Hooks, 'Dig Deep: Beyond Lean In,' http://thefeministwire.com/2013/10/17973/, accessed 31 October 2013.

104. Sandberg, *Lean In*, p. 171.

105. See also Marzena Zukowska, ''Leaning In' And 'Pulling Up': Women's Economic Equality in the Middle East,' *Forbes* (29 January 2014).

106. May Al Dabbagh and Stephen Brannon, eds., "Growing Aspirations: Supporting Women's Entrepreneurship in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf." (Dubai: Dubai School of Government, 2010).

Unusual for the traditional Gulf region in which women's presence in the public sphere is often discouraged, four women, Sheikha Lubna Al Qasimi, Her Excellency Madame Fatima Al Jaber, Her Excellency Reem Al Hashimi, and Dr. Sheika Al Maskari are among the most prominent and respected leaders in the UAE and are regularly listed as the most powerful women in the Arab world. Madame Al Jaber and Dr. Al Maskari are billionaire business tycoons whereas Sheikha Lubna and Her Excellency Reem Al Hashimi hold high-ranking positions in the Emirati government, Sheikha Lubna as Minister for Foreign Trade and Madame Reem Al Hashimi as Minister of State, among her other positions. They are as popular as Hillary Clinton is in the United States and are role models for a generation of young Emirati women—and rightfully so. While none of the women is able to openly advocate the expansion of women's rights and gender equality—that would be culturally unacceptable—all have been demonstrating by their own actions the indispensability of hard work, tenacity and of leaning in. Additionally, they have advocated the self-empowerment of women through education and entrepreneurship facilitation, such as through Madame Al Jaber's Al Bashayer investment service for women investors, and have encouraged and facilitated the establishment of women's power networks in the private sector, primarily through the Chambers of Commerce, the Abu Dhabi Business Women's Council and the International Business Women's Group. Dr. Al Maskari has also supported women's empowerment abroad through her extensive philanthropic initiatives. That is to say, while none of these leaders are openly advocating women's rights, they are quietly trying to open doors for women professionals and to create fora for other women leaders, though less exalted than they, to "reach over and down to pull up."

H.E. Sheikha Lubna Al Qasimi

H.E. Madame Fatima Al Jaber

H.E. Dr. Sheika Al Maskari

H.E. Madame Reem Al Hashimi

And reaching over, down and up is sorely needed to facilitate women's professional success in the UAE. A puzzle remains as to why the highly developed, Western-oriented UAE has the third highest female university

attendance rate (after Kuwait and Qatar) at more than 60 percent (Figure 1) yet the second lowest female labor market participation rate at 20 percent (after Saudi Arabia) among the Middle East and Gulf states (Figure 2). Equally problematic is that 89 percent of Emirati women work in the public sector and only 11 percent in the private sector (Figure 3), a number the Emirati government is actively trying to increase in order to speed up the Emiratization of its workforce, improve the skills-base of its citizenry and reduce public sector expenses. What is holding Emirati women back and what is being done about it? What are the women in the Emirates themselves doing to close this gap?

Highly Educated Yet Underemployed: Women in the United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is the undisputed leader in the realization of women's rights in the Middle East and Gulf States, ranking first among Arab countries and 41 of 186 surveyed countries globally, according to the 2013 UNDP Gender Inequality Index.[107] Following the visionary leadership of the founding father of the UAE, the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, gender equality is implicitly, if not explicitly, enshrined in the Emirati Constitution and, over the course of the last two decades, the government has shown a serious commitment to building the capacities of Emirati women to enable their full and effective participation in government, the private sector and the public sphere, and aggressively promoting an agenda for women's empowerment.[108] According to the UAE Ministry of Higher Education, 93 percent of Emirati women are now literate, 56 percent of secondary students and a staggering 71 percent of university graduates are women, although there are minor variations among the individual emirates.[109] As of 2013, 4 members of the Cabinet are female as are 8 out of 40 members of the Federal National Council. Emirati women serve as ambassadors (currently, 3), judges (currently, 3), public prosecutors (currently, 2), as military officers, and in the police force. Sixty-six percent of the public sector work force is female,[110] and, while continuing to dominate traditionally female professions, such as medicine, nursing, and education, female graduates have also firmly established themselves in business, IT, law, and the media. Fifty-six percent of STEM graduates are women.[111] Furthermore, more than 14,500 Emirati women run their own businesses[112] and control more than three billion USD in investments in fields ranging from resource extraction to tourism.[113]

Figure 1: University Attendance Rates of Females in the Middle East and Gulf States

107. UNDP, Human Development Report 2013, http://hdr.undp.org/en/data, accessed 10 June 2014.

108. United Arab Emirates, Women in the United Arab Emirates: A Portrait of Progress. http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session3/AE/UPR_UAE_ANNEX3_E.pdf, accessed 16 June 2014. See also http://www.uaeinteract.com/news/default3.asp?ID=313 for more information on current developments and specific empowerment projects and initiatives, and May Al Dabbagh, and Stephen Brannon, eds. Growing Aspirations: Supporting Women's Entrepreneurship in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. (Dubai: Dubai School of Government, 2010).

109. Government of Dubai Knowledge and Human Development Authority, The Education Landscape in Dubai 2012, p. 9. http://www.khda.gov.ae/CMS/WebParts/TextEditor/Documents/HELandscape2012_English.pdf, accessed 3 April 2014.

110. "Women," http://www.uaeinteract.com/society/women.asp, accessed 12 June 2014.

111. "Women," http://www.uaeinteract.com/society/women.asp, accessed 12 June 2014.

112. "Women," http://www.uaeinteract.com/society/women.asp, accessed 12 June 2014.

113. United Arab Emirates, Women in the United Arab Emirates: A Portrait of Progress. p. 8.

University attendance in the Middle East

SOURCE: U.N. Statistics Division

Yet, obviously, serious challenges remain. As mentioned above, even though Emirati women surpass men at all levels of education, their participation in the official labor market keeps stagnating around 20 percent, according to current World Bank data.

Figure 2: Labor Market Participation Rates of Females and Males in the Gulf States

| Country	Labor Market Participation Male Nationals (%)	Labor Market Participation Female Nationals (%)
Bahrain	68%	33%
Kuwait	61%	30%
Oman*	45%	20%
Qatar	65%	35%
Saudi Arabia	63%	16%
United Arab Emirates	58%	20%
OECD Average	69%	51%

Figure 3: Employment Rates of Females in the Public and Private Sectors in the Gulf States

Country	% of Female Nationals Employed in the Public Sector	% of Female Nationals Employed in the Private Sector
Bahrain	50%	50%
Kuwait*	94%	6%
Oman	65%	35%
Qatar	88%	12%
Saudi Arabia	63%	37%
UAE	89%	11%

The numbers on the Emirates are broadly in line with regional trends that show that countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, which includes the Gulf States, as well as in South Asia have disproportionately low female employment rates (Figure 4).[114] Again, what is holding women back?

Figure 4: Labor Force Participation Rates of Females and Males by Global Region

Source: World Bank Gender dataset based on ILO Key Indicators of the Labour Market.

Source: OECD, Gender Inequality and Entrepreneurship in the Middle East and North Africa. A Statistical Portrait. December 2013. p. 9.

Challenges to Emirati Women's Professional Advancement and Success

A 2010 symposium on the state of Emirati women's empowerment, convened by Her Highness Sheikha Fatima Bint Mubarak, Chairwoman of the UAE General Women's Union and Supreme Chairperson of the Family Development Foundation, identified five general factors: (1) social pressure by husbands and family to prioritize motherhood and family responsibilities; (2) sex discrimination by employers; (3) lack of support to balance work and family, such as childcare, flexible hours or part-time work, and gender-segregated work spaces; (4) a widespread preference to hire cheaper or "more ideal" (unmarried, child-free, possibly non-Muslim) workers from abroad; and (5) a lack of awareness by women of their labor rights.[115]

A "by invitation-only" workshop titled Realizing Potential: Emirati Women at the Forefront of Social Change, organized in April 2012 at the NYU Abu Dhabi Campus by New York University's Center of Global Affairs (CGA) by the author of this paper and two CGA colleagues yielded more specific insights. Thirty participants, comprising senior and junior professional women from government/civil service, higher education, and the private sector, identified in intensive workshop breakout and discussion sessions the most significant challenges that still hinder women's full and equal participation in all spheres of Emirati public life. In addition to a few business sector-specific challenges, there was a clear agreement on eight cross-sector concerns:[116]

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114. Daria Solovieva, "After University, Arab Women Struggle to Find Work," Al Fanar Media http://www. al-fanarmedia.org/2013/04/after-university-arab-women-struggle-to-find-work/, accessed 14 May 2014.

115. See also Badreya Al Jenaibi, Emilie Rutledge, Wadha Al Nuaimi, and Suaad Al Oraimi, The Comprehensive Study on The Issues, Needs and Priorities of Women in Abu Dhabi. A Report for the General Secretariat of the Executive Council (Abu Dhabi: United Arab Emirates University, 2011).

116. See also Nick Forster, Aisha Al Ali Ebrahim, and Nadia Alma Ibrahim, "An Exploratory Study of Work-Life Balance and Work-Family Conflicts in the United Arab Emirates," Skyline Business Journal IX/1 (2013-14), pp. 34-42. Fatma M. Abdullah, Emirati Women: Conceptions of Education and Employment. Dissertation. Graduate College, University of Arizona (2005).

(1) The powerful role of culture and tradition in maintaining gender stereotypes[117]
(2) Difficulty in achieving a work-life balance[118]
(3) Inadequate maternity leave policies and childcare facilities
(4) Lack of marketable skills
(5) Lack of self-confidence among women
(6) Lack of solidarity among women
(7) Lack of mentoring and mentoring initiatives
(8) Lack of formalized, cross-sector networks of professional women to share information and personal experiences to counter-balance male wasta networks.

Despite the undeniably positive trend towards women's education and participation in the labor market[119] the consensus was that entrenched socio-cultural factors lie at the root of Emirati women being "overeducated and underemployed" and that levels of job satisfaction among younger, less well-educated and less well-paid Emirati women are low. [120] Chief among these socio-cultural factors is the prevalent image of women as wives, mothers and caregivers which results in inadequate maternity leave policies, a paucity of high-quality childcare facilities and, thus, for many women, the extraordinary difficulty of balancing career and family obligations. A general lack of self-confidence among women that they "can do the job and do it well" was also named as a key factor. Additional factors were widespread stereotypes about what constitute "proper", i.e. gender-appropriate, professions for women and a lack of sufficient positions in these fields, the absence of gender-segregated workspaces, a lack of career advancement opportunities for married women with children, and a general preference by women for scarce public sector jobs because of their higher prestige, better work hours and higher salaries.[121] Additionally, a lack of marketable skills, especially in science, technology, mathematics and engineering, has been identified as a particular obstacle to women's breaking into the prestigious and well-paid fields of banking, finance, and engineering. Most important for the purpose of this paper, a key factor cited was the paucity of opportunities to communicate and share information among women in different sectors and a perception that helping other women advance would be seen in a negative light. Specifically, all participants identified networking and mentoring as both a key priority and a key challenge (Figure 5). In light of the lack of cross-sector mentoring networks all participants agreed that the creation of such a cross-sector network comprising both junior and senior professionals, female and male, would be highly desirable.

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117. Fiona Farrell, "Voices on Emiratization: The Impact of Emirati Culture on the Workforce Participation of National Women in the UAE Private Banking Sector," *Journal of Islamic Law and Culture* 10/2 (2008), pp. 107-165.

118. Hanifa Itani, Yusuf M. Sidani, and Imad Baalbaki, "United Arab Emirates Female Entrepreneurs: Motivations and Frustrations," *Equality, Diversity and Inclusion: An International Journal* 30/5 (2011), pp. 409-424.

119. Linzi Kemp, "Progress in Female Education and Employment in the United Arab Emirates Towards Millennium Development Goal (3): Gender Equality," *Foresight* 15/4 (2013), p. 265.

120. Musa Shallal, "Job Satisfaction Among Women in the United Arab Emirates," *Journal of International Women's Studies* 12/3 (2011), pp. 114-134.

121. For an insightful interview with Emirati educator, Dr. Behjat Al Yousef, on how to get Emirati women into the labor market, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ND8e1Yt_28.

Figure 5: Access to a Mentor in Selected Gulf States, By Gender

Access to a Mentor in GCC Countries, by Gender

Among adults aged 15 and older

	Bahrain	Kuwait	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	UAE
Do you, personally, know anyone who would be able to give you advice about managing a business?					
Women	38%	48%	57%	48%	35%
Men	57%	58%	66%	62%	50%
Difference (ptc. pts.)	-19	-10	-9	-14	-15

March 2011-January 2012

GALLUP

Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/155204/Lack-Mentors-May-Hinder-Women-Entrepreneurship-GCC.aspx

While there exist numerous professional and mentoring networks in the Emirates for men and women, some of whom I mentioned above, most are non-political (reflecting the desire of the political leadership to keep a tight lid on a potentially politicizable civil society),[122] sector-specific, based at universities, and/or with participation by invitation only.[123]

REACH—the First Formal Cross-Sector Professional Mentoring Program for Women Professionals in the Emirates

This clear demand for a formal, professional mentoring program, especially by junior women professionals,[124] inspired the creation of REACH. REACH is a Dubai-based non-profit mentoring program that was founded by four Emirates-based senior women business executives, Farak Foustok, Pamela Chikhani, Jumana Abu Hannoud, and Racha Al Khawaja in Dubai in October 2013. None of the women are Emirati citizens yet all are from the MENA or Gulf region. It is a mentoring network for junior professional women in the private sector, education, and government with the goal to "produce a new generation of female leaders from the Middle East; confident, driven, knowledgeable, experienced, compassionate and inspiring," according to one of the founding members, Farah Foustok, CEO Middle East at Lazard Asset Management. [125] The REACH approach is based on the idea that "[w]omen's issues in the workforce are not only professional, they are often personal and you don't get mentored on that within the work environment, you need a safe haven to be able to talk about the issues that are hindering your career; that's what we want to be able to offer,"[126] said Racha Al Khawaja.

REACH is the first mentoring program in the United Arab Emirates that is cross-sector and cross-enter-prise, which means it is not limited to employees of the same company. It is a one-year mentoring program initially open to 30 junior women professionals per year—next year, it will be open to 50—with a minimum of three years of work experience. The first cohort of mentees is 70 percent Arab, of which 30 percent are from

122. Wanda Krause, *Women in Civil Society: The State, Islamism and Networks in the UAE* (New York: Palgrave, 2008).

123. Nicole Lopez Del Carril, "Mentorship is a Valuable Tool for Women in the UAE," *The National*, 12 March 2014, http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/mentorship-is-a-valuable-tool-for-ambitious-women-in-the-uae, accessed 23 March 2014.

124. Del Carril, 2014.

125. N.A., "Reaching Out to Women," *Zawya* 3 (2013), p. 28. http://www.cpifinancial.net/flipbooks/Zawya/2013/3/files/assets/basic-html/page28.html, accessed 29 June 2014.

126. N.A., "Reaching Out to Women," p. 28.

the Emirates. Mentors are both male and female volunteers from across the business community of Dubai. Mentors and mentees are required to meet on a regular basis but at least once every two months and develop a detailed mentorship plan listing expectations and deliverables by both sides. REACH is sponsored, among others, by ING Baring and Thomson Reuters and, from the end of this year onwards, will be supported by the World Bank as an official mentoring program in the UAE.

While it is obviously too early to assess the long-term effects of REACH, the fact that the REACH leadership team has had to increase the number of mentee spots to 30 (from 25) in its first year because of high demand, the enthusiastic volunteering for mentorship assignments, and the willingness of the World Bank to support REACH as a preferred mentorship partner are indicators of its huge potential and the need for more cross-sector women-centered mentoring initiatives.

Concluding Reflections

This working paper is part of a larger research project in which I seek to identify strategies of women's self-empowerment and different models of women's leadership in highly traditional societies of the Gulf States and South Central Asia. Against the backdrop of the lean in debate in the United States on how women professionals can and should advance their careers and have a satisfying personal life at the same time, the case of the United Arab Emirates, where women are highly educated but leave the work force in droves in their late twenties, was particularly intriguing. The brief case sketch showed, I trust, the ethnocentrism underlying Sandberg's recommendations and the inapplicability of her recommendations for women living and working in parts of the world where socio-cultural factors and not a lack of work ethic or will to lead are the paramount obstacles to women's professional success. In other words, I sought to add a global perspective to the lean in debate and suggest that in some—many, perhaps even most—parts of the world leaning in is not enough; attitudinal as well as socio-cultural patterns of disempowerment call for different empowerment strategies, such as networking and mentoring initiatives with REACH being one specific example, that allow women to realize their full potential.

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Ms-Underestimating Madam Chancellor:
Angela Merkel as a Case Study in Political Learning
by
Joyce Marie Mushaben

Having initially secured Germany's top national office in 2005, Chancellor Angela Merkel has compiled a long list of significant political "firsts," rendering her an exceptional leader, and a noteworthy female political role model. Not only does she stand out as the first postwar politician to have occupied a variety of top-level national offices (e.g., as a two-time Cabinet member under Helmut Kohl, and chief of the Christian Democratic Party) without completing the traditional German Ochsentour (the tedious, long march through lower level party offices, rendering one "fit" for national office). She has also guaranteed her place in history as the Federal Republic's first woman, first easterner, first physicist and the first pastor's daughter to direct the world's fifth largest economy. Dominating the European Union in ways never dared by her predecessors, she is also the only chancellor since 1949 to have successfully led her party to a "normal" victory (dominant CDU, junior partner FDP) after managing a Grand Coalition (CDU-SPD). In December 2013, she became the first chancellor ever to lead a second Grand Coalition since 1949.

Catapulted onto the national stage after unification in 1990, Merkel rapidly rose to the top of her party and also managed to stay there, despite challenges to her leadership that began before the CDU and SPD had even signed their Grand Coalition agreement.[127] Merkel's first government survived a full term; the chancellor's personal popularity then paved the way to a "normal" coalition victory in 2009. Over the next four years she headed a coalition including fellow conservatives (CDU/CSU) and an increasingly neo-liberal minority party (FDP). She began her second term with a solid Bundestag majority, reinforced by a comparable support base in the Bundesrat (representing state governments). This double-majority should have allowed her to pursue conservative priorities with few restraints, but Merkel soon found herself under attack inside and outside the Cabinet. Both her junior partner and certain CDU/CSU state-level bosses paradoxically accused her of "lacking leadership" and of being "too presidential-imperial."

Thus the research puzzle: How is it possible that a female politician who appeared to function so effectively within the Grand Coalition context came to be seen as "failing to lead" under a coalition of her own choosing, at least until the Fukushima Daiichi disaster and the Euro-crisis reinstated her popular support? Assessing any woman's ability to produce concrete policy change requires detailed knowledge of formal and informal governance processes at work in a specific national context. Most Merkel studies to date have analyzed her path to power but not the strategies she has used to push through controversial policy reforms since 2005. This study addresses specific institutional and contextual factors shaping the day-to-day opportunities and constraints facing female leaders in parliamentary systems.

Concentrating on dynamics within the "core executive," I challenge the idea that the "gendered disposition" of the executive branch is a constant;[128] a Grand Coalition by its very nature has afforded Merkel more opportunities to exercise effective leadership based on her unique socialization experiences than would a typical German coalition. I have also argued elsewhere that "Grand Coalition" configurations often require men to adopt purportedly "gendered" skills, such as listening, cooperating and mediating.[129] Third, I hold that while

127. Clay Clemens, "From the Outside In: Angela Merkel as Opposition Leader, 2000-2005," *German Politics & Society* 24/ 3 (2006), pp. 1-19; Mark R. Thompson and Ludmilla Lennartz, "The Making of Chancellor Merkel, " German Politics 15/1 (2006), pp. 99-110; Evelyn Roll, Die Erste. Angela Merkel's Weg zur Macht (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2005).

128. Claire Annesly and Francesca Gains, "The Core Executive: Gender , Power and Change," *Political Studies* 58 (2010), pp. 909-929.

129. Joyce Marie Mushaben, "Best of Times, Worst of Times: Angela Merkel, the Grand Coalition and 'Ma-

Merkel does not see herself as an active proponent of women's descriptive or substantive representation, she has used her Cabinet in ways that have effectively advanced both, demonstrating that one strategically positioned woman can "make a difference." Although she has modernized conservative policy paradigms in ways that appear to align her more closely with Social Democratic goals, my findings suggests that her pragmatic policy orientations owe more to her socialization experiences as an easterner and a physicist. Heading a second Grand Coalition as of 2013, Merkel is likely to deploy the same skills that rendered her successful from 2005 to 2009, but she will also find herself expected to lead in new ways, given Germany's dominant position among EU economies and its changing role on the global stage.

This essay offers an abbreviated version of a multi-year study of Angela Merkel's performance as a national leader under diverging "coalition" constraints. It begins with a brief sketch of leadership tactics attributed to Merkel's male predecessors prior to 2005, followed by a treatment of "soft skills" conventionally ascribed to female politicians. I illustrate the ways in which some skills acquired during her years atop a Grand Coalition helped her to steer the ship of state during her second term, although they triggered different responses among members of her CDU/CSU-FDP government. I then address factors driving a wedge between Merkel and her conservative/liberal camp, rooted again in her personal history, e.g., her use of the "scientific method" in defining policy problems, a well as her rejection of ideological rigor in favor of policy-pragmatism. I conclude with a summary of "Merkel's Fifteen Rules of Power," based on my observations of her performance dating back to the early 1990s, suggesting that the same rules will apply to her leadership under a second Grand Coalition through 2017.

Politics as Image or Action? Hard versus Soft Skills

Merkel's ability to navigate the ship of state between the Scylla of potential Social Democrat opposition and the Charybdis of Conservative Union hard-lining after 2005 led both *Forbes* and *Time Magazine* to rate her as "the world's most powerful woman" several years in a row. She has also had to endure less flattering labels since 2005, suggesting that (male) pundits still have trouble accepting this woman as the "real leader" of a very powerful country. The many nick-names applied to Merkel across established media outlets include but are not limited to: Joan of Arc, Father-Murderer, Angie, the Sleeper, the Sphinx, "Angela Ahnungslos" [Angela the Clueless], the Black Widow Spider, Maggie Merkel, the Trümmerfrau [Rubble Woman], the Iron Maiden, the Deutsche Queen, Angela Machiavelli, Alice in Wunderland [sic], Miss Tschörmänie, Madam Europe, the Harmony Chancellor, the Winter Queen, the Crisis-Chancellor, Mrs. Cool, the Alpha-Kanzlerin, the Power-Physicist, the Lost Leader and, of course, that all-time French favorite, Madame Non.[130]

 Feminist scholars too often presume that all women are "different" from men but neglect intra-group variation affecting both sexes. A leader's personal traits remain more or less constant, but changing contexts may require her to employ different skill sets to achieve specific policy goals. Merkel's training as a physicist, for example, caused her to support German reliance on nuclear energy prior to 2011 but also led her to jettison that strategy after the Fukushima Daiichi meltdown. Systemic factors (federalism) likewise remain constant, but different partisan configurations and shifting reform imperatives can also alter outcomes. Chancellor Merkel's two terms in office thus provide an ideal setting for disaggregating context-specific skills from those that are presumed to be inherently gendered.

A leader's need to convey a man of action image may not always correspond with real-world decision-making requirements, as Karl Rudolf Korte observes.[131] Assessing diverging political styles displayed by chancellors from 1949 through 2004, Korte's sample preceded Merkel's first term, limiting his review to traditional forms

jority Rule' in Germany," *Journal of Women, Politics and Policy* (forthcoming 2014).

130.   These monikers are found in sources ranging from *Der Spiegel*, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Bild-zeitung*, *die Tageszeitung* and *Die Zeit*, to foreign papers like *Le Monde*, *the Guardian*, and even the US-based *Newsweek*.

131.   Karl-Rudolf Korte, "Solutions for the Decision Dilemma: Political Styles of German Chancellors," *German Politics* 9/1 (2000), pp. 1-22.

of male leadership. Feminist scholars note that women are usually perceived to behave differently, due to persistent gender stereotypes, raising the question as to whether a Kanzlerin can utilize the same tactics observed among male politicians to convey the image of "real leadership."

Merkel has drawn on several mechanisms traditionally used by male chancellors to accrue power or to prevent a loss of control but has indeed encountered different responses than her predecessors. As described by Karl-Rudolf Korte, the first tactic entails efforts to centralize power, e.g., by expanding the role and day-to-day reach of the Chancellor's Executive Office (BKA). The second relies on "secret" or closed-circle governing, linked to informal governance.[132] This top-down approach allows the chancellor to offer incentives, deals or trade-offs that can be combined with "softer techniques," e.g., controlling the context for disseminating decisions. The third tactic invokes corporatist leadership, "looking for friends in new places" by bringing in additional stakeholders. A fourth finds the chancellor declaring a policy problem a "matter for the boss" (Chef-Sache), indicating to voters "that matters are serious now because the leader himself has to lend a hand to sort out the problem…." What matters "is not whether the chancellor actually has the last word" but whether or not he appears to exercise "ultimate control over the decision-making process."[133]

The next tactic on the list is presidentialization, or reflecting a "strong personalization of politics." A chancellor who opposes the preferences of other Cabinet members can project himself as the embodiment of change. A sixth approach calls for presenting government deliberations as an "open chancellorship." The ability to go public, to engage in direct communication through media-savvy appearances and text-messages has increased dramatically with new communication technologies, but so has the risk of backlash: every "misstatement" becomes immediate fodder for 24/7 pundits and bloggers; the trick is to use "spin" to "diffuse responsibility."[134] A seventh tool, clearly employed by Merkel, is to resort to the "charm" or escape of foreign policy: hosting fireside chats at five-star venues (Heiligendamm and Petersberg, for example) accords real and symbolic powers of persuasion. Finally, there is "idea management," now commonly known as discursive framing. All of Korte's concrete examples draw on the actions of men operating under normal coalition conditions.

Grand Coalition leaders do not have the luxury of "acting presidential"; instead they need to engage in softer strategies to inspire cooperation among adversarial party executives. Korte has more recently developed a list of Merkel-specific tools, which curiously focus more on image than on real power-management. They include: 1) pursuing the illusion of coherence among disputing parties; 2) centralizing power; 3) "governing by silence"; 4) network cultivation; 5) engaging in smart "tele-politics"; 6) "accentuating" core policies; 7) moderating by "leading the herd from behind"; 8) managing personnel by allocating responsibility based on technical expertise; 9) responding to public opinion via tactical shifts; and 10) recasting conflicts as an open dialogue or "discourse-coalition."[135] The latter became quite common after 2009; realizing that the personalities comprising her second coalition would rarely agree, Merkel presented them as willing to "tolerate" diverse perspectives. Curiously absent from Korte's list, applicable to both coalitions, is "the devil made me do it" argument, e.g. blaming the SPD for policies that made conservatives unhappy under the Grand Coalition, or making the European Union responsible for "daddy months" and anti-discrimination legislation after 2009.

We can juxtapose political styles and tactics deduced from four decades of male rule against seven "soft skills" attributed to women leaders, which Katja Glaesner sees as paving the way to Merkel's success.[136] Her list includes: first, the ability to communicate in clear terms that are easily comprehended by the general public,

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132. Wolfgang Rudzio, "Informelles regieren – Koalitionsmanagement der Regierung Merkel," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 16 (2008), pp. 11-17.

133. Korte, "Solutions…," pp. 12-13.

134.   Korte, "Solutions...," p. 19.

135. Karl Rudolf Korte, "Führung als Lernerfahrung: Schnittstelle-Management von Merkel II," presented at the German Studies Association meeting, Oakland, California, October 7-10, 2010.

136.   U.S. literature on women's leadership, rooted in winner-take-all Congressional politics, ignores the imperatives of parliamentary/multi-party governance. See Katja Glaesner, "Angela Merkel – mit 'Soft Skills' zum Erfolg?," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 50 (2009), pp. 28-34.

coupled with an ability to listen; second, using trust and discretion to generate an atmosphere of respect (e.g. Merkel's uncanny ability to mediate among world leaders, with the exception of Putin). A third factor is the promotion of loyalty and team spirit among her own advisors, which is supplemented by a fourth attribute: a demonstrated "willingness to learn," accompanied by a quick learning curve. A fifth trait, the ability to convey vision, long-term goals and a positive future image of society, contradicts frequent criticisms that Merkel lacks an "unshakeable philosophy," a "clear political line" or an exclusive world-view—her aversion to the latter flows from her GDR experiences. As a natural scientist, she prefers the "politics of small steps."

A sixth skill classified as soft is a capacity for motivating others to achieve more. Merkel claims to find her own work very exciting: "It's a joy to be able to achieve things… I carry out my work with passion," despite her alleged sphinx demeanor.[137] Compared to the public sniping witnessed between Gerhard Schröder and Oskar Lafontaine (both SPD) in the late 1990s, outdone only by the petulant outbursts of her own coalition partners, Guido Westerwelle (FDP) and Horst Seehofer (CSU), Merkel clearly possesses a seventh quality: emotional intelligence and the ability to empathize with others. Glaesner's final set of qualities—persistence, energy, drive, ambition and "bite"—suggests an alpha personality rarely ascribed to women, although all of these comprise significant elements of Merkel's character. Whether these are quintessentially feminine traits, or skills more accurately associated with "modern quality management" is open to discussion, particularly when we consider the special imperatives facing any leader of a Grand Coalition.

Grand Coalition: Management Through Mediation

At least four factors play a role in shaping the leadership tactics deployed by a national leader under normal coalition conditions: 1) individual socialization experiences; 2) the broader political-economic context; 3) the personality mix comprising the Cabinet; and 4) the specific nature of a policy problem.[138] Angela Merkel was born in the Protestant northern city of Hamburg in 1954, but her parents moved to the East shortly thereafter, where her life chances were defined by an ideological Cold War at worst. She joined the Free German Youth to counter her Lutheran "confirmation" and to secure her chance of studying physics in Leipzig, but remained apolitical until the Wall fell. Winning her first Bundestag seat in 1990, she was hand-picked by CDU patriarch Helmut Kohl to manage the Federal Ministry of Family, Women and Youth. Four years later she moved to the Environmental Ministry, sooner aligned with her professional credentials. By the time of unification, Germany had become a respected ally, a driving force of European integration, and a global economic player.

Representing the sparsely populated, economically underdeveloped North Sea district of Rügen/Stralsund/Grimmen (Mecklenburg), she compensated for her weak-state base by convening regional party conferences, allowing her to appeal directly to the rank and file – with surprising national success. She moved in quick succession through the party's top executive offices. Her courageous move to oust Chancellor Kohl and Wolfgang Schäuble in the wake of a party finance scandal bolstered her image as a clean, objective "outsider," setting the tone for her first campaign. She was also subjected to an "extreme make-over" prior to 2005 electioneering activities, which consisted of a new hairdo and more colorful wardrobe, soon to be replaced by work-clothes consisting of blazers, black slacks and pantsuits.[139]

Angela Merkel's leadership philosophy and many of the policy challenges she encountered during her first term

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137. Glaesner, "Angela Merkel…," p. 31.

138. While the first Grand Coalition leader, Kurt Georg Kiesinger (1966-1969) experienced radically different socialization processes, both faced big changes in the policy environment, shaping their behavioral options. Both undertook complicated federalism reforms, introduced "Stability and Growth Packages," and secured parliamentary approval for unpopular domestic security and anti-terrorist measures. See Harald Schmid,"Reform und Geschichte: Das Beispiel der ersten Großen Koalition 1966-1969," Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 20/3-4 (2010), pp. 291-325.

139. Her own Cabinet members engaged in sex-stereotyping: At the Gillamoos-Volksfest in the Bavarian town of Abensberg, Health Minister Philipp Rösler (FDP) joked: "Angela Merkel is also now available as a Barbie Doll... It costs 300 Euros. That is, the doll only cost 20 Euros. But the 40 pant-suits are really expen-

display an uncanny resemblance to those faced by her one and only Grand Coalition predecessor, Kiesinger.[140] This raises the possibility that a coalition consisting of two opposing parties requires the application of different skills to hold it together and ensure effective management than a dominant/junior partner model. Both Kiesinger and Merkel relied on their respective ability to communicate clearly and their willingness to listen.[141] Based on her GDR experiences, Merkel notes, "It is a great advantage…that one learned to keep quiet. That was a survival strategy. It still is."[142] Merkel is described as a non-charismatic speaker, a characterization clearly at odds with her popularity ratings ranging from 70% to 92%.

As a natural scientist, Merkel is detail-oriented yet plain-speaking, eschewing ideological arguments in favor of pragmatic, factual statements. Her preference for simple language, as opposed to obfuscatory polit-speak, was apparent in her speech at the CDU's party convention in Stuttgart, invoking the image of a Swabian housewife to explain the crux of the 2008 Wall Street meltdown: "She would have given us a few short but accurate words of wisdom, sounding like this: You can't live beyond your means for long periods. That is the core of the crisis."[143] Rivals complain that she refuses to commit to a particular policy until discussion ends. She nonetheless emerges as a dominant personality in face-to-face encounters, and knows how to apply her institutional powers as party chief.

Merkel has relied heavily on trust and discretion to generate an atmosphere of respect. Said to have lacked the "great men" of that earlier era (Willy Brandt, Herbert Wehner, and Franz Josef Strauss), [144] Merkel's first Cabinet included strong women like Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, Ulla Schmidt, Ursula von der Leyen and Annette Schavan. She nonetheless had to confront state leaders with powerful bases in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and North-Rhine Westphalia.[145] Assuming "accentuated mediator" and "consummate party manager" roles, she learned how to balance intra- and inter-party groups such that none became too strong, but no one felt excluded. Under constraints created by a Grand Coalition, this approach lends real strength: it avoids an imposition of the Chancellor's will while balancing the competing needs of two strong partners.

Chancellor Merkel likewise relies on informal management practices, e.g. meetings with party and parliamentary caucus chairs. Because coalition agreements lack the force of law, informal negotiations among elites can "grease the wheel" but also shut out other dominant lawmakers. Although pundits have long disparaged her advisory circle as "Girls' Camp," Merkel relies on expert work-groups to hammer out inter-party agreements; she then brings in caucus and party officers to negotiate over federalism, corporate taxation, health-care and labor market reforms, asylum-seeker rights and anti-terrorism measures, for instance.[146] Centralizing decisions via the Coalition Committee through 2007 excluded the Bundesrat, producing a negative united-front among minister-presidents who could only "ratify" decisions (to avoid the GC's collapse), for example in relation to the

sive." Focus On-line , 6. September 2010.

140.   For a detailed comparison , see Mushaben, "Best of times, Worst of Times…." Further, Karlheinz Niclauß, "Kiesinger und Merkel in der Großen Koalition," *Aus Politik und Zeitge-schichte* 16/2008: 3-11.

141. Karlheinz Niclauß, "Kiesinger und Merkel in der Großen Koalition," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 16 (2008), pp. 3-11.

142. Roll, *Die Erste*, p. 58.

143. Robin Mishra, ed., *Angela Merkel – Machtworte. Die Standpunkte der Kanzleri* (Freiburg/ Basel: Herder, 2010), pp. 55-56.

144.   Despite his tough-boss record in Baden-Württemberg, Kiesinger's modus operandi as Chancellor rendered him a "wandering reconciliation committee." Joachim Samuel Eichhorn, Durch alle Klippen hindurch zum Erfolg : die Regierungspraxis der ersten Großen Koalition (1966 - 1969), (München:Oldenbourg Verlag, 2009).

145. Only five women have secured powerful state Minister-Presidency posts since 1949: Heidi Simonis (SPD, 1993)', Christine Lieberknecht (CDU, 2009); Hannelore Kraft (SPD, 2010); Annegret Kramp-Karren-bauer (CDU, 2011); and Malu Dreyer (SPD, 2013).

146. Eva Krick, "Regieren mit Gipfeln – Expertengremien der großen Koalition," *Zeitschrift für Politikwissen-schaft* 20/2 (2010), pp. 233-265.

anti-discrimination law and new family leave policies originally drafted by the Red-Green government.

Merkel followed on the heels of a "commando" predecessor, Gerhard Schroeder, preordaining gender-stereo-typical charges of weakness at every turn. Despite the soft skills attributed to women, she was charged with lacking personal and emotional engagement with issues but her speeches tell a different story. Her tough-love approach to highly indebted Euro-zone countries notwithstanding, she called for a "humane market economy" and "justice based on achievement," hoping "to strengthen people's optimism"—while admitting that she has struggled to make hard decisions.

Merkel's early success at the helm of the Grand Coalition centered on playing the foreign policy card, a field in which she allegedly had little expertise; the fact that neither Gerhard Schröder, Joschka Fischer nor her post-2009 Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle, had prior experience in this domain evoked little comment. A strong pro-Atlanticist, Merkel took advantage of Germany's EU Council Presidency in 2007, quickly turning summit diplomacy into one of her specialties. The G-8 meeting at Heiligendamm was a very effective exercise in managing both image and content. Acquiring the moniker of Climate-Chancellor, she was valued as an honest mediator and international power broker.

Following the 2008 Wall Street meltdown in the USA, Merkel adhered to her "strategy of silence," not re-vealing her position until she had time to think through the economic ramifications of various bail-out and stimulus measures. The chancellor's "long, slow deliberation came under fire for being incapable of responding adroitly to political crises…." After she was accused of adopting a stimulus package that lacked a dominant "concept," she emerged as the lead actor on the European stage: while other Euro-zone countries are still struggling, Germany is enjoying an export and job boom.

In contrast to the first Grand Coalition, which lasted only three years and was followed by a major political realignment, Angela Merkel completed a productive four-year term, ensuring her re-election and a new CDU/CSU-FDP coalition in 2009. Despite her successful policy record, far-right politicians issued the so-called Berlin Declaration—a Manifesto against [her] Leftist Tendencies a few months later, lending credence to the German adage: "There are enemies, arch-enemies and, worst of all, party friends."[147] While Merkel's eastern upbringing has aligned her more closely with SPD positions on certain issues (e.g. integration policies, recon-ciliation of work and family), a Grand Coalition allows her to operate where she feels most comfortable: in the middle, free to choose pragmatic over ideological approaches. There is no doubt why Merkel welcomed and, in fact, campaigned in favor of a second Grand Coalition in 2013, following her negative experiences with the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition, to which we now turn.

The Not-so-Grand Coalition: Conservatives, Liberals and Their Discontents: 2009-2013

Assuming national leadership as an outsider under Grand Coalition constraints, Angela Merkel established a positive image based on her personal qualities: she is intelligent, analytical, willing to learn and equipped with power instincts, but she deliberately shields her private life. Enjoying "ostentatious female solidarity" among women media moguls and TV hosts, she uses even testy media appearances to project intellectual acumen, policy know-how and dry humor. Her love for new communication technologies conveys a sense of modernity rarely displayed by conservative party stalwarts: Short Message Service (SMS, or texting) in Germany is also known as "Short Merkel Service."

Campaigning as an outsider or attempting to retain power as an incumbent party front-runner are both pro-cesses requiring different skills, involving appeals to diverging core constituencies. Whereas a candidate has to address the identities, needs and wants of outsiders in the face of ever more independent voters, a chief execu-tive has to satisfy the egos, vested interests and policy preferences of party insiders. Murswieck is at least half right in asserting that as of the September 2009 elections, "Experiment Merkel [had come] to an end"; there-

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147. *Manifest gegen den Linkstrend*, on line at http:www.linkstrend-stop.de/index. php?id = manifest, down-loaded 1. July 2010.

after, the leadership qualities of "Merkel the Chancellor" would really be put to the test.[148] Figure X summarizes many of the lessons that she has taken with her into her third government, following the September 2013 elections.

Angela Merkel's "Fifteen Laws of Power"

1) Nothing succeeds like success, but remember that politics does not have to be particularly attractive or awe-inspiring in order to be successful. Eventually they will stop talking about your hair.

2) Avoid ideological thinking at any cost: The politics of small, pragmatic steps is often more successful than grand promises and sweeping reforms.

3) The two greatest virtues a politician can possess are self-discipline and the ability to keep quiet, especially when all of your rivals are busy "making statements."

4) You need to remain resolute, apply tactical skills, display a lot of patience and take advantage of lucky breaks in order to overcome a party full of egos [Remember: You are surrounded by "enemies, arch-enemies and party-friends"].

5) Always wait until you see the data before you decide on a solution, and do not be afraid to change your course when the data start pointing in a different direction. Trial and error is the only way that the human race has actually advanced.

6) Like any natural scientist would do, run through the entire experiment before you commit to a major decision. Consider your antagonists as particles operating in a constant energy field in which positively and negatively charged elements can change or combine with something else in an instant.

7) Make a plan, understand the legislative calendar and stick to it.

8) As a woman operating in a man's world, learn nonetheless to observe the constants, the patterns, the strengths and weaknesses driving male behavior. They will not do the same regarding your behavior, which will make it easier for you to keep a step ahead and to outmaneuver them.

9) Minimize your risks by studying the issue, doing the math and lining up the probabilities, but realize that you always need to anticipate unintended consequences and long-term effects.

10) Sometimes you need to walk a tightrope, but it helps to have a network of supportive women behind (or below) you.

11) Build bridges and create new stakeholders when you cannot secure the support of the old ones; remember that it may take all night. You can power-nap on "Air Force One."

12) Have the free-spirited soul of a pirate and be willing to go where other "angels" fear to tread, but never take more than your share of the booty or credit. Thanking others fosters loyalty.

13) When times are tough and/or voters feel down and out, re-invoke the German Aufstiegsmythos (better yet, the Rubble Woman myth) for inspiration and justification. By now most people don't remember who Ludwig Erhard was anyway. To add a regional touch, remind them of "their mothers," e.g. hardworking schwäbische Hausfrauen.

14) Guard your private feelings and personal life very carefully and only use them as reserves in difficult times, also known as the go-home-and-bake-Pflaumenkuchen (plumcake) strategy.

15) Having people constantly Ms-underestimate you is the best way to ensure that you will win. Think "tortoise and the hare," David and Goliath, and the "little engine that could." The Great Leap Forward was an absolute disaster; small steps have helped you to reach the top.

Throughout her second term, Merkel drew on skills carried over from the halcyon days of the Grand Coalition. Her rapid climb up the party-executive ladder had taught her to use personnel policy as a power resource, to compensate for her lack of a regional base. Pursuing centralization, she expanded Federal Chancellor office

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148. Axel Murswieck, "Angela Merkel als Regierungschefin und als Kanzler-Kandidatin," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 51/2009, p. 32.

functions to meet her own control needs: staffing choices rested on "expert" requirements rather than on party-political debts, challenging the Union's Old Boys. Relying on a small circle of advisors fosters loyalty, discretion, organizational skills and technical competence, ensuring internal political coordination and "quiet moderation." Acting as a "presidential chancellor" who represents the nation as a whole, she stands high above the fray, allowing factions to fight it out, then draws conclusions and compromises out of the surviving constructs and arguments. More often than not, her rivals knocked themselves out of the line-up.

Although the dominant party had more Cabinet posts at its disposal, Merkel's appointments were constrained this time by CDU/CSU hardliners who insisted on regional and "ideological" representation. Since 2009, all of her party rivals associated with the "Andes Pact" have been won over, bought off, lost elections, and/or fallen prey to scandal. Yet as of late 2010, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung was still predicting the end of Merkel's career, speculating that her "charismatic" CSU Defense Minister would become the next chancellor candidate. Within two months, the same Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg was forced to resign, following revelations that he had plagiarized his dissertation. As of this writing, no other rivals are on the horizon. The feuds among individual personalities comprising her "desired coalition," that is, between parties with a long history of shared CDU/CSU-FDP governance (57 out of 64 years), finally came to an end in September 2013, when voters expressed a clear demand for another Grand Coalition.

The main problem is not that Merkel lacks vision, passion or to the will to lead but rather that male hardliners, e.g. Bavaria's Horst Seehofer, oppose the direction in which she is taking them. The chancellor's effectiveness owes to her natural style of leadership, based on "small steps," mediation and consensus politics. Because outright opposition could end in occupational bans, expulsion or even prison sentences in the GDR, Merkel (and many eastern human rights activists) learned to eschew direct, confrontational behaviors often found among western politicians in the name of streitbare Demokratie (contestable democracy). It also derives from her experience as a physicist who knows how to "re-analyze and adapt" when an experiment does not go according to plan, a regular occurrence in the GDR.

Although she reveres freedom, Merkel has never viewed "the state" as inherently evil; indeed, even established CDU members are uncomfortable with the neo-liberal turbo-capitalism adopted by the FDP since unification. Her re-discovery of the social market economy of Adenauer and Erhard, coupled with her GDR-honed rejection of ideological absolutes made it easy for her to deal with the no-longer-socialist SPD. Although she has learned a lot about image politics since the early 1990s, this chancellor cares more about political realities than ideological frameworks. Her reluctance to embrace feminist labels and discourse has not prevented her from moving Germany in the direction of ever more gender-friendly policies, however; the latter include a dramatic expansion of child-care facilities to cover children younger than three; the extension of leave policies to fathers; and a 30% "quota" to increase the presence of women in corporate board rooms by 2016. In 2014 she named her former Labor Minister Ursula von der Leyen Germany's first female defense minister.

Conclusion: Institutional Context Still Matters

My detailed study of Merkel's first two terms leads me to conclude that factors unique to the Grand Coalition structure can override the impact of a leader's sex or socialization experiences, in that it requires the use of "soft skills" as a standard operating procedure. Increasing specialization within the social science disciplines sometimes has an unfortunate tendency to disconnect "feminist theorizing" about substantive representation from the real political constraints facing women who make it to the top of a power pyramid. One way to avoid reducing "gender studies" to evaluating women's behavior is to develop case studies regarding individual leaders, allowing researchers to identify contextual and institutional factors that impel women, or men, to exercise different types of leadership.

The effective application of "commando" versus "cooperative" skills depends heavily on the distribution of formal responsibilities, the level of decision-making, the policy domain, the availability of resources, as well as the larger political environment, e.g. the strength of inter- or intra-party opposition. "Soft skills" are a curious thing to attribute to a woman who has been labeled a "Man-Killer" and a "Father-Murderer" (for bringing

down Helmut Kohl in 1999). Designating a well-developed capacity for communication, cooperation and consensus as "soft" female skills is therefore wrong on two counts; first it essentializes qualities that not all women leaders possess (consider Margaret Thatcher). Secondly, it ignores the fact that men also employ such skills when circumstances require, as demonstrated elsewhere in my comparison of the first two Grand Coalitions. Gender factors matters, but sometimes the institutional, partisan or issue context matters even more. The exceptional nature of a core executive comprised of two opposing parties obliges men as well as women to draw on different skills than the normal conduct of majority-versus-opposition politics seen in many European parliaments.

While effective leadership does not lend itself easily to quantification, it is possible to "count" critical policy changes in terms of laws passed, investment subsidies granted, action programs initiated, documented CO_2 reductions, etc. Angela Merkel has contributed to a significant reconfiguration of many policy paradigms embraced by the Christian Democratic and Christian Social Union parties. She relies on the support of her female Cabinet ministers and conservative women voters but also draws SPD and Green women (e.g. Renate Künast) into her policy discussions. Though each policy domain merits a chapter of its own, the list of reforms tackled by Merkel includes family, education and immigration policies, active labor market mechanisms, research and technology, religious freedom, and management of the Euro-zone crisis. Other significant policy changes to date rest in complex, technical domains, such as healthcare, pension law, VAT/corporate taxation, federalism reform, and renewable energy initiatives.

At a minimum, Merkel's experiences as Germany's first female, first easterner and first physicist chancellor demonstrate the need for a reconceptualization of "leadership" grounded in a critical ability to "listen and learn." As Christian Wulff once said of Merkel: "The good shepherd leads the herd from behind; he [sic] does not lose a sheep but still the herd goes in the direction that he wants."[149] Having shepherded the European Union through the worst of its sovereign debt crisis, this chancellor has already chalked up her ninth designation by Forbes as "the world's most powerful woman" less than one year into her third term. Media pundits nevertheless predicted shorty after the latest elections that she would retire by 2014, at the ripe old age of 60. But Merkel has seen more than her share of miracles since 1989, lending her a refreshing faith in dialogue and democratic processes lost on traditional politicians. Given the formidable leadership skills and staying power she has displayed to date, critics' declarations regarding her imminent political demise are definitely premature.

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149. Mishra, Machtworte …, p.11.

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Moving a Mountain: Women Voters, Women Leaders, and the Male Breadwinner Model in Germany.
by
Angelika von Wahl

I. Work-Life Balance and the Conservative Welfare State

Recent works by women in positions of leadership, such as Sheryl Sandberg and Anne-Marie Slaughter, have encouraged us to ask the question, "Can women have it all?"[150] Beneath this question one almost always finds a profound tension between a desire for full-time employment and a responsibility to the family that many women experience in postindustrial societies.[151] This paper is interested in investigating political responses in Germany to the demand for a better balance of work-life issues. It lays out some observations as to how and why the gender inequality of the male breadwinner model, dominant in continental Europe, has been challenged and changed in recent years. It is an unlikely and unfinished story of policy change inside the conservative welfare state regime and illustrates that even nations traditionally opposed to accommodating reconciliation of employment and family care can move in the direction of reform when conditions are ripe. Important reasons for this shift towards the establishment of more robust reconciliation policies are, I have argued previously, grounded in the effects of electoral politics.[152] This paper focuses on the larger issue of electoral competition and its effects. Increasingly parties have to compete for the female vote through quotas and change as a result of the influx of female representatives, which then leads them to articulate more progressive policies appealing to even more women voters.

The case of Germany has often been described as an ideal-typical model of the male breadwinner model.[153] Scholars agree that this model has been averse to change for a long time and is strained due to outdated gender arrangements leading to suboptimal results, such as low female employment combined with a low fertility rate.[154] But parties were averse to changing direction for decades. Suddenly in 2005 several important policies were finally passed in the name of improving work-life balance: 1) the introduction of generous paid parental leave; 2) new 'daddy months'; 3) a massive expansion of childcare and the legal right to a spot in a crèche or other childcare facility for any child over one year of age; and 4) the new care allowance. What exactly prompted this shift towards a more equitable work-life balance, especially in a welfare state known for its conservative family policies?

In the face of the entrenched 'stay-at-home mother/housewife' and 'full-time male breadwinner' legacy, most of the recent reforms in Germany are being described by scholars as "paradigmatic"[155] and "path-shifting"[156].

150. This paper is based on a presentation at the Max Weber Chair Conference "Women in Leadership: Can Women have It All?" at New York University, April 2014.

151. Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Why Women Still Can't Have It All," *The Atlantic*, July/August 2012.

152. Angelika von Wahl, "From Family to Reconciliation Policy: How the Grand Coalition Reforms the German Welfare State," *German Politics and Society*, 26 (3), 2008, pp. 25-49.

153. Gosta Esping Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism,* Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990.

154. Gosta Esping Andersen, *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

155. Henninger, Annette, Christine Wimbauer, Rosine Dombrowski, Demography as a Push towards Gender Equality? Current Reforms of German Family Policy. In: Social Politics: National Studies in Gender, State & Society, 15(3), 2008, pp. 287-314.

156. Kimberly Morgan, "Path Shifting of the Welfare State: Electoral Competition and the Expansion of Work-Family Policies in Western Europe," *World Politics*, Vol. 65 (01), January 2013, pp. 73-115.

These policies are "path-shifting" because they represent a transition away from the core characteristics of the conservative welfare regime, which was described by Esping-Andersen and many other scholars as characterized by low decommodification, high stratification, and high familialism.[157] Here I focus specifically on familialism, a term that refers to the execution of care work inside the home that is unpaid, informal, and mostly performed by women. Familialism is a core characteristic of the male breadwinner model as practiced in West (and later, united) Germany. De-familialism is a shift in care work to the public realm, either to the state or the market, resulting in diminished caring responsibilities for families. What are the traditional assumptions that underpin the familialism inherent in the male breadwinner model? How do the current reforms diverge from these ideas? And can the findings help us ascertain whether or not 'women can have it all'?

Traditional familialism is based on assumptions about the gendered distributions of labor, living arrangements, social contracts and expectations. These assumptions can be summarized as follows:

> 1) Women do not have substantial careers and incomes, so interruptions of existing employment do not incur financial, human capital, social, or symbolic losses. Even if mothers are employed they only need minimal state benefits during their parental leave, because they are married to full-time employed husbands.

> 2) Childcare, especially in the early years, is the exclusive domain of mothers, who are more adept at caring for offspring. Fathers play the role of provider and head of the household.

> 3) Children are best cared for at home by their mothers. Families do not want or need to utilize public childcare facilities.

The effects of these assumptions are entrenched in state institutions and the labor market and have traditionally fostered low levels of women's employment, high rates of low paying part-time work, low involvement in care work by fathers, a severe lack of extended childcare infrastructure (especially in the former West Germany), and high poverty rates among single mothers. The current reform efforts in Germany indicate a vigorous shift away from these institutional legacies towards the dual goals of de-familialization and increased female employment (or, commodification and decommodification).

The new parental leave and childcare laws are intriguing both because they are expansive and unlikely considering the structure and institutional legacy of the conservative welfare state; thus these policies have captivated the attention of many scholars. Especially interesting is that prominent explanations in research on social welfare, such as "path-dependence" seen in institutional arguments and the assumed effect of austerity for retrenchment, are challenged by these reforms.[158] Institutional factors, austerity, but also the power of left-leaning governments do not provide a sufficient explanation for the recent expansion of reconciliation policies. Indeed they represent the growth of the welfare state and were undertaken under the government of Christian Democrats, the former stalwarts of the male breadwinner model before, during, and after the global recession. All of this requires explanation because the observed shift from a conservative to a more social democratic gender regime is for a number of reasons highly unlikely. The case of Germany therefore provides insights into when and how even deeply entrenched gender regimes change. The topic is relevant to other countries where feminists are searching for ways to "have it all" or at least "have some" of what women need as citizens and demand as voters.

II. The Reasons for Reform

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157. Esping Andersen, "Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism;" Angelika von Wahl, *Gleichstellungsregime, Berufliche Gleichstellung von Frauen in den USA und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Leske+Budrich: Opladen 1999.
158. Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," *American Political Science Review* 94(2), 2000, pp. 251-67. Also: Paul Pierson, "Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies," in: P. Pierson (ed.), *The New Politics of the Welfare State*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001, pp. 410-56.

What is causing this change to happen in Germany in the first place? What do the new work-life policies look like? And what is the role of female voters and leaders in these reforms? While there are various reasons for the reforms, this article focuses on the most important one, which is the desire of political parties to 'capture' women's votes. I propose here that the current changes cannot be understood without considering the behavior of political parties vis-à-vis the interests of female voters. Taking women's interests into account has led to increased descriptive and substantive representation of women and has translated into reform. In the last three decades women voters have reframed what political "interests" are in the first place. This has led to a shift in party programs and policymaking culminating in the reforms described here, which is to say that measures aimed at work-life reconciliation and de-familialization can occur even in arguably one of the unlikeliest cases for such reforms: Germany.

Until recently, work-life balance was not a topic in the halls of power. This makes sense because employment and care were thought of as unconnected and occurring in the separate spheres of public and private without much overlap. Due to the traditional separation of spheres of the male breadwinner model, the "reconciliation" between employment and care work would not only have been culturally unwelcome but politically suicidal, especially for Christian Democratic and conservative parties in Europe. Both cultural and political changes had to occur first so that parties would consider addressing the tension between unpaid care work and paid employment.

Political motivation for tackling this tension has to be understood as occurring against the backdrop of larger socio-economic changes in Germany. First, with the rise of women's access to higher education and paid employment, and with the emergence of the second women's movement in the 1960s, the solidly conservative and often Catholic female vote swung for the first time towards parties of the left and helped the Social Democrats with their first national win in the election of 1972. Second, stiff competition for these 'de-aligned' voters ensued among political parties and exactly a decade later parties began to introduce voluntary quotas to explicitly appeal to a new generation of educated and, often, employed women voters. These voluntary quotas diffused over time, from the left environmentalist Green Party to the moderately left Social Democrats and then to the Christian Democratic Union on the moderate right. The outcome produced a dramatic increase in women's representation in federal and state parliaments in West Germany (see chart 1). After German unification the socialist party – "The Left" – added the same mechanism and so did the Christian Social Union in 2013. Today five out of six parties in Germany adhere to voluntary quotas for female candidates. The quotas dramatically increased women's descriptive representation in parties to what could arguably be considered a "critical mass". This process of diffusion moved from left to right on the political spectrum: smaller left parties were the first to adopt gender quotas, which put electoral pressure on mainstream parties to their right.[159] In Germany women today hold around a third of the seats in the federal parliament. Importantly the strategy seems to have worked well for the CDU in regaining the majority of the female vote: since introducing voluntary quotas and proposing more progressive family policies in 2005, the Christian Democratic parties again garner the most female votes among all age groups (in 2005, 2009, and 2013 elections).[160]

159. Richard Matland and Donley Studlar, "The Contagion of Women Candidates in Single-Member Districts and Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Canada and Norway," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol 58 (3), Aug. 1996, pp. 707-33.
160. Karina Schorn and Brigitte Gisart, "Wahlverhalten bei der Bundestagswahl 2009 nach Geschlecht und Alter, Ergebnisse der repräsentativen Wahlstatistik," Statistisches Bundesamt 2010, p. 228.

Women's Representation in The Federal Parliament

Women in the German Parliament across Elections (%)

The long-term effect of the quota might have reached a plateau, however, due to the unusual institutional setting in Germany: the dual electoral system employed in the Federal Republic. Because West Germany's post-war political system inherited characteristics from the British and American 'first past the post' system, and combined them with the previously utilized proportional system of the Weimar Republic, the current electoral system became a mix of both. It has long been demonstrated that proportional systems are more amenable to the inclusion of women and minorities and Davidson-Schmich applies this insight to an analysis of the German quota system.[161] She shows that while women's representation rose in response to voluntary gender quotas in parties on the second proportional ballot, men fared disproportionally better in nominations in the first vote, where the single-member ballot is used. Basically there is hardly any contagion effect when we consider the candidates elected by a plurality vote in Germany and so one can expect that women's descriptive representation will stagnate at about a third of the seats.

Third, the voluntary quotas provided for the presence and influence of female leaders and "critical actors".[162] While female leaders neither exclusively nor at most times represent the interests of "women" – after all they represent many different constituents – research has shown that even Christian Democratic representatives dare to be quite supportive at crucial moments for gender equality.[163] In the competitive electoral environment female voters seem to respond positively to reforms proposed by a number of female leaders; therefore conservative parties are moving to the center-left on the issue of work-life balance.

The entry of women as carriers of new political interests, including women's concerns, has subsequently provided descriptive and to some degree substantive representation, which is reshaping core institutions of the welfare state and the labor market. In other words, women voters and leaders are beginning to move a mountain. However these new policies do not express unitary but complex, sometimes contradictory, sometimes complementary interests by parties and coalitions clamoring for voters. The reforms themselves are stratifying and are more representative of the interests of middle class German women and less so of working class, migrants, and other marginal groups.[164] In that sense the changes also shed light on potential hurdles and serious limitations

161. Louise Davidson-Schmich, "Gender Quota Compliance and Contagion in the 2009 Bundestag Election," *German Politics & Society,* Vol 28(3), Autumn 2010, pp. 133-55.

162. Sarah Childs and Mona Lena Krook, "Analysing Women's Substantive Representation: From Critical Mass to Critical Actors," *Government and Opposition*, Vol 44 (2), April 2009, pp 125-45.

163. Angelika von Wahl, "A 'Women's Revolution from Above'? Female Leadership, Intersectionality, and Public Policy under the Merkel Government." *German Politics*, 20 (3) September 2011, pp. 392-409.

164. Henninger, 2008.

to the substantive representation of women's interests in postindustrial states.

III. Women and Employment

At this point it is important to point out the rise of female full-time employment in Germany (chart 2) over the last decades, which has exacerbated the tension between employment and care.

Women Entering the Labor Market
(1975-2012)

Labor Force Participation Rate of Women in Germany (West)

The numbers show that only half of the women of employment age are working full-time, which would be expected in the conservative welfare state regime. The model predicts such relatively low numbers, but it needs to be mentioned that Germany also has the world's lowest birthrate. What is remarkable is that the increase in women's full-time employment seems to happen at nearly the identical time when women's numbers rise in parliament. However, due to the strength of the conservative welfare state model German women rank among the lowest in equal pay in Europe (just before Estonia), despite its wealth and booming economy, and constitute 60.5% the lowest income bracket (earning an hourly salary of less than 7.50 EUR).[165] At the opposite end of the pay and status scale, the percentage of women CEOs in the 200 largest German corporations stands at only 2.5%.[166] This outcome reflects the still dominant characteristics of the male breadwinner model, summarized by low decommodification, high stratification, and high familialism.

IV. Four Reforms and their Potential for Defamilialization

The following section provides a brief overview of reforms, three of which have moved Germany's conservative family policies in the direction of social-democratic traditions à la Scandinavia and one continuing the breadwinner model. The thrust of the four reforms implemented by the ruling parties in the last several years help us begin to assess the extent to which familialism has been undermined. The reforms are: the new parental leave policies (passed in 2005), the 'daddy months' for fathers (2005), the right to publicly financed child care (2008), and the care allowance (2012). It is important, however, not to overstate the immediate effects of these four policies on the conservative welfare state regime as a whole: while highly visible they cover only a small section of the 156 family-related programs currently in existence.[167]

This paper argues that the reforms have to be understood as the outcome of the electoral competition for female

165. Roman George, "Niedriglohn und Geschlecht im europaeischen Vergleich." WSI-Mitteilungen 64(10), 2011, pp. 548-555.
166. Elke Holst und Anne Busch, "Führungskräfte Monitor 2010," Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin 2010, p. 55.
168. In 2010 there were 156 different family-related social transfer payments and tax benefits in Germany with

votes expressed through the diffusion of voluntary quotas and leading to a rising number of female representatives who bring new interests to the table. The Christian Democratic parties, under the leadership of Chancellor Angela Merkel and her Minister of Family Affairs, Ursula von der Leyen, first in a grand coalition with the left-leaning Social Democrats and then with a center-right coalition, passed a slew of important reforms in the area of family policy that have undermined some core aspects of the male breadwinner model.

1) Parental Leave Benefit: This important policy passed in 2005 under the leadership of Ursula von der Leyen, the Minister of Family in Germany, and Chancellor Angela Merkel, both from the CDU, and reflects a shift away from familialism for middle class women. In 2005, the CDU-SPD coalition agreement promised to restructure the existing leave benefits with the goal of securing the livelihood of parents, promoting maternal employment, and fostering the participation of fathers.

The policy introduced a standard transfer payment in 2007 that replaces 67% of the previous net income for working parents (for those making between 1000 and 1200 EUR). A minimum benefit of 300 EUR and a maximum of 1800 EUR per month for up to 14 months allow parents to stay at home with appropriate financial support. This policy marks a clear departure from the previous era when parents (but in reality, primarily mothers) received a meager flat rate of 300 EUR in benefits per month for up to 24 months (Erziehungsgeld 1986-2006). The old policy incentivized either stay at home motherhood or not having a child and staying in the labor force, but it did not aim for a realistic work-life balance. While this policy made sense in the framework of the male breadwinner model, the low transfer payment became less and less attractive for women with mid- and high-levels of education and career development. Thus middle class women have benefitted substantially from this new Scandinavian-style policy. This is less the case for poor and migrant women if they are on social welfare or are unemployed. The unemployed and poor receive only a minimum rate through deductions from other benefits.

The new parental leave policy clashes with the first assumption of the male breadwinner model described in the introduction that holds that women require only minimum benefits since they are supported by their full-time employed husbands. The policy individualizes and defamilializes women's economic situations. It also respects their education and other human capital investments by shortening the time period in which the payment can be received and thus reduces career interruptions.

2) Daddy months: This benefit was also strongly supported by Ursula von der Leyen (CDU) and contains a time benefit and a transfer payment. It is part of the above parental leave bill but adds a new dimension, which is to specifically increase paternal involvement. With this benefit the "other parent", i.e. the father, has a right to take two 'daddy months' that are reserved for him. The increase in uptake of this benefit by fathers since the reform was passed has been remarkable: before only 3-5% of fathers took parental leave. Since the reform the numbers choosing this option have skyrocketed from 18% in 2007, to 21% in 2008, and to 24% in 2009.[168] Among younger fathers, i.e. those under 30 years old, about 50% take the daddy months. It should be noted however that fathers still do not rush to take advantage of the general parental leave to which they are as entitled as the mothers, but rather the reserved time. After the two months most return to work: 77% take a leave under the two months limit and only 12% take 3-7 months (as part of the parental leave). Nevertheless, if we compare this new behavior to the second assumption spelled out in the introduction then the change from a financially responsible but socially absent male breadwinner to a more involved father and caretaker is remarkable and represents a paradigmatic change in the social model.

3) Promotion of Child Care and Nurseries: The same female leaders who passed the 2005 family care policies also pushed for a new large family policy bill in 2008. It consisted of a dramatic broadening of access to child-

an overall budget of 125 billion Euros. See: Federal Ministry of Family, Seniors, Women and Youth; http://www.bmfsj.de/RedaktionBMFSFJ/Abteilung2/Pdf-Anlagen/familienbezogene-leistungen-tableau-2010.pdf (accessed June 9, 2014).

168. Statistisches Bundesamt, Pressekonferenz "Elterngeld – wer, wie lange und wieviel?" June 27, 2012, p. 2.https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressekonferenzen/2012/Elterngeld/begleitmaterial_PDF.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (accessed June 9, 2014).

care outside the home for small children from 1-2 years of age (Kinderförderungsgesetz). The law gave parents a legal right to childcare and represented a clear turning point in the German care model. The goal was to achieve a seamless transition from the newly established parental leave (either 12 months or 12 months plus two 'daddy months') to public childcare. To do so meant to provide space in nurseries for a third of all toddlers by 2013.

Defamilialization on such a large scale has practical implications: one of them is the need to add at least 750,000 more spots for toddlers in new facilities all across the country, but especially in former West Germany, where such public childcare options never existed. The demand for public childcare of toddlers assessed through surveys of parents tended even higher towards 780,000.[169] By now (2013/2014) about 810,000 places for toddlers are expected to be available and federal financing has increased to 5.4 billion EUR. The percentage of toddlers from this age group in nurseries has grown from 25.5% in 2011 to 27.6% in 2012 when 558,000 children under three years were taken care of in such facilities (ibid.). These numbers show a slowly increasing acceptance of opportunities for defamilialization among parents of very young children—a trend that was highly unlikely institutionally and must be traced back to the electoral politics reflecting the shifting preferences of female voters and leaders. Childcare and education is a legal matter of states and municipalities, not the federal level, so cultural, constitutional, and financial hurdles for the passage of this bill looked quite considerable with many veto-players involved. The law was nevertheless passed after promises of extensive federal funding. The budget for this reform has grown higher than any of the others because of the high cost involved in infrastructural changes. These changes were supported with over 2.15 billion EUR by the federal government until 2013.

The shift away from the male breadwinner model is also clearly illustrated by the fact that parents can claim a legal right to a place in a crèche for their toddler, a responsibility that municipalities providing the care are worried about. Until recently even suggesting such a policy would have been scorned not only in more traditional social circles, but also in society at-large because of one of the assumptions of the male breadwinner model: as stated earlier care was seen as best provided at home and by mothers themselves. This view seems to also be shifting in Germany.

Many female voters are streaming back to the CDU since 2005 supporting the notion that the new policies are working well for the ruling party. However, this bill also introduced a new and countervailing measure supported by a small group of conservatives that we will turn to next.

4) Care Allowance: The fourth and last reform can be distinguished from the other three: it is the only policy that contradicts the shift away from the male breadwinner model and is seen as a reassertion and continuation of the traditional division of labor and social roles between the sexes.

This new benefit subsidizes parents with children older than 15 months (12 months parental leave plus two 'daddy months') who do not want to utilize the extended availability of public childcare. Parents opting against public childcare will receive a monthly payment of 100 EUR for a maximum of 22 months starting August 2013 and will receive the benefit until children reach their third year. Beginning August 1, 2014 the care allowance will be 150 EUR but these funds will not be added to the support of those who are dependent on social welfare or long-term unemployment checks. Estimates as to how many parents will take up the care allowance hovered around 900,000. By June 2014 the uptake has been around 145,000: double the number from the first year but far below the expected results. The annual costs for the government are about 1.2 billion EUR; thus, it is less the costs than the symbolic signal that matters to conservatives who want to prove that the male breadwinner model is not dead.

The care allowance (Betreuungsgeld) was inserted into new childcare provisions described above (see reform 3) as the result of conservative pushback from the Bavarian Christian Democrats. This more conservative branch of the Christian Democrats disagreed with the shift away from the tenets of familialization, resulting in a hard fought bargain that includes a monthly allowance for stay at home mothers as the precondition for the exten-

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169. http://www.bmfsfj.de/BMFSFJ/Kinder-und-Jugend/kinderbetreuung.html (accessed June 9, 2014).

sion of public childcare to toddlers. The somewhat unconvincing argument offered by conservatives for the support of stay at home mothers was framed in terms of "freedom of choice" for parents and reflects back to the third characteristic of familialism described earlier, i.e. that families do not want to need public child care.

Modernizers among the governing alliance, especially the Christian Democrats and the smaller liberal coalition partner were arguing strongly against the new social policy. The Minister for Family, Ursula von der Leyen, who had orchestrated the three other reforms, was widely quoted as stating that the care allowance was a "catastrophic educational policy." But even the spectacular cooperation of female representatives across party lines could not prevail in parliament against the hard-edged veto player to the right who was looking to consolidate support among its traditional and rural voters. After much delay, political wrangling, deal making, public upstaging, and bitter debate the care allowance became law in 2013 and, while it did not turn the wheel of reform backwards, it clearly indicates the staying power of the male breadwinner model even in today's electoral context.

Moving A Mountain or Just Tunneling Through?

If women aim to "have it all" they need to resolve the continued tension between full-time employment and family responsibilities. We have seen that in the German case when women's votes were up for grabs, political parties began to court them. Subsequently, new representational procedures and social issues entered politics, leading to substantial reforms. Although this does not mean that a work-life balance has been achieved, the electoral competition over new issues and constituencies is healthy for democracies as it provides a voice for new interests and accommodates those who have not been heard. But what can others learn from the German case of path-shifting?

As unlikely as path-shifting is in general, core lessons from this case are tied to electoral competition over the female vote. Here the institutional make-up of the electoral system matters, because it produces crucial hurdles and political opportunities: as political scientists know, two-party systems provide less access for women and minorities than multi-party systems. The German system is a mix of plurality ('first past the post') and proportional systems. Competition for the female vote through the diffusion of voluntary quotas from the left to the right increased women's descriptive representation. The influx of female representatives and leaders prompted parties to broaden and shift their stances dramatically, weakening the male breadwinner model as a result. Therefore feminists must keep in mind that the articulation of women's interests and competition for their votes are at the core of the changes described here and will also be necessary in other contexts.

Passing a Scandinavian style parental leave with 'daddy months' and expanding public childcare to toddlers in every municipality would have been a third rail of politics in Germany until recently. Institutional and structural accounts of the male breadwinner model cannot explain these deep changes but they would have predicted the care allowance. Instead women's shifting preferences and the electoral competition for these de-aligned votes lay the groundwork for broad reform. Progressives in plurality and two party systems need to develop issue-oriented gender policies that appeal to female and young male voters because in such systems electoral competition will probably not be translated into voluntary quotas. They need to support women entering political parties in other ways if they want reforms. When women enter the halls of power as representatives, there is a possibility to change the terms of the debate. This will be crucial so that reforms for gender equality are not just tunneling through, but are actually moving mountains.

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Conference Speakers and Contributors.

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Carol Gilligan was named by *Time Magazine* in 1996 as one of the 25 most influential Americans. Harvard University Press describes her 1982 book *In a Different Voice* as "the little book that started a revolution." A member of the Harvard faculty for over 30 years, she initiated the Harvard Project on Women's Psychology and Girls' Development, publishing five books with her graduate students including *Meeting at the Crossroads*, a 1992 *NY Times* notable book of the year. Her 2002 book, *The Birth of Pleasure*, hailed by the *Times Literary Supplement* as "a thrilling new paradigm," reframed the conversation about gender as a conversation about democracy vs. patriarchy. She is currently University Professor of Applied Psychology and the Humanities at NYU, with appointments in the Steinhardt School, the law school, and the graduate school of arts and sciences. Her most recent book is *Joining the Resistance*.

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