As Europe moved into the mid-1950’s, much had been achieved towards greater unity and peace in Western Europe, although there had been set-backs for the proponents of European integration and the move towards the creation of a European supranational community.
The formation and functioning of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) had achieved mixed results. It had furthered co-operation and interaction between its member states on an inter-governmental level, although, like the COE, it was also not able to get supranationalism accepted and implemented. The realisation of this fact had led Jean_Monnet to abandon his efforts to achieve this goal through this body. Most importantly, the ECSC had promoted and facilitated an improvement in the Franco-German political and economic relationship. Inter-governmental co-operation and harmony was steadily improving. The economic benefits achieved by the ECSC were mixed since there were both successes and failures. The common market in coal, iron ore, scrap metal, iron and steel was established, working conditions across the entire industry were improved and loans were obtained for the industry from the USA. Other than that, in 1955, the situation in the Western European coal and steel industry was largely unchanged.
Monnet resigned from the ECSC High Authority in 1955 and then, in October 1955, he founded the “Action Committee for the United States of Europe“. The committee was made up of trade union leaders and the leaders of the Christian-Democrat, Liberal and Socialist political parties in the six member countries of the ECSC. The committee would function as a lobbying group that would bring pressure to bear directly on the governments and parliaments of the various countries. Monnet wanted to have a common front of political parties and trade unions to promote a supranational community by providing political backing for action in order to prevent European integration projects becoming bogged down in endless detailed discussions between technocrats.
The end of the Allied occupation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the transformation of the FRG into a fully sovereign state on 5 May 1955, was a major milestone in the peace efforts in Western Europe. The rapid expansion of the industrial and economic infrastructure in the FRG was the result of the considerable efforts and motivation of the German population who had a strong wish to rebuild their country and to re-integrate back into the European community. This economic progress was under-pinned by the benefits that the FRG received from the Marshall Plan and the OEEC. Konrad Adenauer, the FRG Chancellor, said the following in the Bundestag on 15 December 1954:
“European unity was a dream of a few people. It became a hope for many. Today it is a necessity for all of us. It is, ladies and gentlemen, necessary for our security, for our freedom, for our existence as a nation and as an intellectual and creative international community.“
In the speeches that Adenauer gave at that time, he indicated that the task of progressing with European integration was not finished and had to be continued.
“The first period of European integration has ended. Its purpose was to ensure that a war may never break out between the European people….The objective of the second period of European integration is to ensure that Europe and the European countries retain their value, relevance and their standing in the world.“
[Konrad Adenauer, in a press statement, 29 September 1956]
Robert_Schuman became the French Minister of Justice in 1955, a position he would hold for only ten months, and it would be his last post in the French government. After serving firstly as Prime Minister and then as Foreign Minister for many years, Schuman found himself increasingly marginalised in the French government, which had been slowly turning against the idea of a supranational integrated Europe. Even the presence and influence of well-respected government ministers such as Schuman and Pleven were, in the end, unable to reverse this change of direction. After he left the government, Schuman became the president of the “European Movement” a position he held from 1955 to 1961.
Paul-Henri Spaak had resigned from the ECSC Common Assembly in 1954 when he regained his former position as Belgium’s Foreign Minister and Vice Prime Minister after the Socialists were returned to power on 22 April 1954. As Belgium’s Foreign Minister, Spaak then returned to the ECSC as a member of the ECSC “Special Council”. From 1950 until 1955, Spaak also held the position of president of the “European Movement”.
The “Council of Europe” (COE) had found a niche where it could contribute to wider Western European co-operation and interaction on an inter-governmental level, although this body had not been able to contribute very much to the the acceptance and implementation of supranationalism.
The “Organization for European Economic Co-operation” (OEEC) was an organisation initially established with the short-term goal to supervise the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Europe. The longer term goal of the OEEC was to promote the achievement of a sound European economy through the economic co-operation of its members. Under this definition, the objectives of the OEEC were supposed to be limited only to the economic field, considered in all its aspects. As it transpired, in its role as an inter-governmental co-ordinating organisation, OEEC activities were gradually extended to other fields, beyond purely economic issues. One of these fields, in particular, was the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
As the 1950’s unfolded, nuclear power was to be another very important issue that became, understandably, the next topic of concern for Western European countries.
Before World War 2, many countries including France had already been involved in nuclear research. On the morning of 2 December 1942, at the University of Chicago, a group of scientists under the leadership of Enrico Fermi activated “Chicago Pile-1”. Fermi ordered the control rods to be withdrawn a few inches at a time during the next several hours. Finally, the nuclear reaction became self-sustaining and the world had entered the nuclear age. A few years later during the war, Dr. Bertrand Goldschmitt from France worked with the Anglo-Canadian team on the Manhattan Project in Montreal, studying the behavior of plutonium in solvents. He continued this work after returning to France after the war and developed the first practical solvent extraction process for separating and extracting plutonium.
Despite their growing interest in nuclear matters, most Western European countries were still very concerned about the use of nuclear technology being used to produce nuclear weapons. The nuclear arms race between the USA and the USSR was already gathering pace and then in November 1952, the USA detonated the first hydrogen bomb. With this development, the United States and the world had entered the thermonuclear age.
1953 was a turning point in East-West relations. Joseph Stalin, who had led the Soviet Union for almost 30 years, died in March and was succeeded by Nikita Khrushchev which seemed to herald a thaw in East-West relations, particularly with the formulation of the Soviet policy of peaceful co-existence. However, later that year, things were turned on their head when the USSR revealed that the Soviets had also developed a hydrogen bomb. Thus the United States lost its nuclear supremacy and with it the strong implied guarantee of Western security. Due to the large disparity in the sizes of the NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional military forces, NATO senior commanders had to acknowledge that the previous strategy of air force nuclear deterrence was no longer sufficient to be able to counter any potential military threat from the USSR. Therefore a completely new NATO strategy was formulated based on the deployment of “new weapons” by the ground forces. In reality, this meant the acceptance of the deployment and use of tactical nuclear weapons on the anticipated battlefield areas.
In addition, the NATO military planning had to take into account the failure to set up the European Defence Community (EDC). This was partly offset by the enlargement of NATO and the creation of the “Western European Union” military alliance in May 1955, that gave some assurance that positive moves were being made to counter-balance the increasing size of the Warsaw Pact military forces in Eastern Europe.
It was about at this time that many historians believe that the USA had to find ways to persuade their European allies to go along with this shift in NATO strategy. In order to achieve this aim, it was felt that the Western Europeans had to be reassured that the USA did not intend to provoke a nuclear war in Europe and that the USA was prepared to share nuclear technology for peaceful means. This is one of the motivations given (at least for Europe) why Eisenhower made his famous speech, “Atoms for Peace”.
On 8 December 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower presented his “Atoms for Peace” speech before the United Nations General Assembly.
“…..I therefore make the following proposals:
The Governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by elementary prudence, to begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency. We would expect that such an agency would be set up under the aegis of the United Nations.
The ratios of contributions, the procedures and other details would properly be within the scope of the “private conversations” I have referred to earlier.
The United States is prepared to undertake these explorations in good faith. Any partner of the United States acting in the same good faith will find the United States a not unreasonable or ungenerous associate.
Undoubtedly initial and early contributions to this plan would be small in quantity. However, the proposal has the great virtue that it can be undertaken without the irritations and mutual suspicions incident to any attempt to set up a completely acceptable system of world-wide inspection and control.
The Atomic Energy Agency could be made responsible for the impounding, storage, and protection of the contributed fissionable and other materials. The ingenuity of our scientists will provide special safe conditions under which such a bank of fissionable material can be made essentially immune to surprise seizure.
The more important responsibility of this Atomic Energy Agency would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world. Thus the contributing powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind.
The United States would be more than willing—it would be proud to take up with others “principally involved” the development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic energy would be expedited.
Of those “principally involved” the Soviet Union must, of course, be one.
I would be prepared to submit to the Congress of the United States, and with every expectation of approval, any such plan that would:
First—encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective peacetime uses of fissionable material, and with the certainty that they had all the material needed for the conduct of all experiments that were appropriate;
Second—begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world’s atomic stockpiles;
Third—allow all peoples of all nations to see that, in this enlightened age, the great powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West, are interested in human aspirations first, rather than in building up the armaments of war;
Fourth—open up a new channel for peaceful discussion, and initiate at least a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be solved in both private and public conversations, if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear, and is to make positive progress toward peace.
Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United States does not wish merely to present strength, but also the desire and the hope for peace.
The coming months will be fraught with fateful decisions. In this Assembly; in the capitals and military headquarters of the world; in the hearts of men everywhere, be they governors or governed, may they be the decisions which will lead this world out of fear and into peace.
To the making of these fateful decisions, the United States pledges before you—and therefore before the world—its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma—to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.”
Whatever were the real reasons behind the speech, it did initiate a number of things. Firstly, under the United Nations umbrella, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was set up in December 1953. Secondly, it encouraged the Western Europeans to co-ordinate and share their nuclear research on a regional basis and to accelerate their investigation into using nuclear energy as a new power source.
The French “Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique” (CEA) governmental agency had already been created by Charles de Gaulle on 18 October 1945 and its mandate was to conduct research into the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, including the production of plutonium and the design of nuclear reactors. Their first achievement was when the first French nuclear research reactor was able to sustain fission in 1948. By 1949, the French had started to extract small amounts of plutonium and, in 1950, planning commenced to build the first French nuclear power station. However, secretly, France was also working towards developing a nuclear bomb.
In 1954, the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN) was set up and then at the beginning of 1955, the European Atomic Energy Society (EANS) was established. The EANS sought to encourage the spread of the scientific and industrial applications of atomic energy, in particular by promoting scientific co-operation through exchanges involving engineers and researchers working on programmes relating to the strictly peaceful use of nuclear energy.
As the possibilities and potential of nuclear power was becoming apparent, scientists were claiming that nuclear power held the key to a cheap and inexhaustible supply of energy, once the technical problems of controlling the process had been resolved. These claims immediately caught the attention of the politicians, since by that time energy resources in Europe were becoming scarce. Therefore the Western European countries started to seriously consider the possibility that nuclear power would have to supplement the energy capacity available if they were going to boost their economic development.
The ECSC member countries had already been considering where nuclear power fitted into the overall structure of the energy sector, especially as it might impact upon the coal industry within the ECSC.
In February 1953, Johan Willem Beyen, the Dutch Foreign Minister, sent a letter to his counterparts in the ECSC member states in which he set out a framework for the establishment of general economic integration, rather than sector-based integration, with the aim of progressively developing a true common market in Europe. Various independent experts, international bodies and pro-European movements came forward with proposals for initially pooling the energy and transport sectors. However, numerous technical and economic problems arose before it became possible to bring any of these plans to fruition.
Then in April 1955, Beyen sent a memorandum to Spaak and Joseph Bech, the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, that suggested that another attempt be made to revive the European integration project. Spaak and Bech were immediately in favour of Beyen’s plan and therefore, on 18 May 1955, they jointly prepared and adopted another memorandum, the “Benelux Memorandum“, that laid out a plan for reviving the European integration project by extending the responsibilities of the ECSC into the areas of transport, energy and nuclear energy, as well as in the economic, social and financial fields. The Benelux Memorandum was sent to the FRG, France and Italy and the FRG and Italian governments, in turn, produced their own memoranda defining their positions where they differed in opinion to the Benelux countries. It was then agreed to discuss the three memoranda at their next ECSC Special Council conference.
On 1 June 1955, the Messina Conference took place, attended by the Foreign Ministers of the six ECSC member states. Bech chaired the conference and in attendance were Antoine Pinay from France, Walter Hallstein from the FRG, Spaak from Belgium, Beyen from the Netherlands and Gaetano Martino from Italy. Among other matters, René Mayer was appointed as the new President of the ECSC High Authority to replace Monnet who had resigned. The conference also adopted a resolution, which specified a number of objectives to be achieved to re-start the process of European integration. To implement these objectives, an inter-governmental committee of experts would be set up, with Spaak as chairman, to draft specific recommendations. The areas of transport, conventional energy and nuclear energy were to be examined, as well as the creation of a European common market.
What Beyen was proposing, regarding European conventional and nuclear energy resources and supply, was not something new. Already in December 1953, the OEEC had commissioned an investigation into the provision of on-going and adequate power supplies for Europe’s fast expanding economies. In particular, there was a growing interest of electric power being provided by nuclear energy. The OEEC were aware of the nuclear power intentions of the ECSC member countries and had also been closely following British developments in the nuclear field. Outside of the USA and excluding the USSR, Britain was the next most advanced country busy with the construction of a commercially viable nuclear powered power station. OEEC officials felt that the inclusion of Britain in any European nuclear power initiative was an important issue. In addition, there was considerable interest from some of the non-ECSC countries who wished to be involved in any nuclear power project.
As a result of a report on energy submitted to the OEEC in May 1955, the OEEC decided to investigate all aspects of how there could be economic and financial co-operation among the OEEC member countries regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear power. In July 1955, the “Commission on Energy” was formed to investigate all aspects of energy, with the exception of nuclear energy and, in addition, a Working Party (“Working Party No. 10 of the Council on Nuclear Energy“) was established to investigate the nuclear power issue and make recommendations for further possible actions.
The summary of the mandate of interest for the Working Party (WP 10) was as follows:
- Training of technicians
- Exchange of information and patents
- Research facilities
- Nuclear fuel procurement, treatment and reprocessing
- Joint construction of prototype and power reactors
- Legislation covering trade exchanges, safety and waste
So while the OEEC Working Party undertook its investigations and formulated its recommendations on nuclear power in Britain and Europe, the ECSC Inter-Governmental Committee (Spaak Committee) started its work with its first meeting on 9 July 1955.
The Spaak Committee was a steering committee that was made up by Spaak, the heads of delegation from the six ECSC member states and a representative from the United Kingdom. The actual work of the committee would be undertaken by special technical sub-committees made up of experts in their fields. The main focus would be on two topics, one being the creation of a common market and the other one concerning nuclear energy.
In the field of nuclear energy, the ECSC objective was to be the creation of a control and oversight body – the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). This was an idea being promoted by Monnet. It is not often understood that, although the stated objectives of Euratom were based on sound principles, it was only later realised that the Euratom concept was initially being used to achieve certain political objectives. Not least of these objectives was the need for the USA to use leverage to steer events in Europe in the direction that corresponded with USA foreign policy. In the field of nuclear power, Euratom was chosen to be the tool to provide such leverage (Euratom and US Foreign Policy) and this was the case up until the end of 1956.
On 6 September 1955, at the Noordwijk Conference, Spaak presented an interim report to the Foreign Ministers of the six ECSC member states. In general, the report was lacking in specific details and Spaak was forced to request an extension of time to enable the technical sub-committees to continue with their work. The implication was that differences between the parties were proving to be difficult to resolve.
In October 1955, the United Kingdom decided to leave the Spaak Committee as the UK opposed a customs union and did not want to submit its nuclear resources and research program to Euratom control (UK Position).
Finally, on 5 November 1955, the technical sub-committee on nuclear energy of the Spaak Committee published an interim report. Essentially it recommended that all activities concerning and involving the development and use of nuclear energy, for peaceful means, be controlled under a single European authority – Euratom. On the purely technical level most items were in common with the OEEC final WP10 report that was published on 15 December 1955.
Meanwhile, Monnet was doing his best to gain wider acceptance of the Euratom proposal, which he considered to be the priority over the common market issue (The new Monnet Plan). Then, on 18 January 1956 at its first meeting, the Action Committee for the United States of Europe (ACUSE) issued a declaration calling on the governments of the “Big Six” countries to create a new supranational community for the development of nuclear energy along similar lines to the make-up of the ECSC.
During 11 to 12 February 1956, at the Brussels Conference, Spaak gave a detailed update regarding the progress of the Spaak Committee. Surprisingly, there was general agreement on the recommendations and the progress that had been made regarding the common market, which was being conceived as a custom’s union rather than a free trade area, as well as concerning economic integration in the transport and energy sectors. Spaak announced that the final complete report would be available in a few months time.
On 29 February 1956, the OEEC took action on the recommendations contained in the WP10 report. A Special Committee for Nuclear Energy was formed (ad-hoc committee) to develop proposals on the function and make-up of an inter-governmental European nuclear agency, under the auspices of the OEEC, which resulted, on 18 July 1956, in the Steering Committee for Nuclear Energy to be set up. The Steering Committee was given the task of submitting final recommendations on the establishment of the agency.
From January 1956 onward and due largely to a change in government in France, the French who had first supported the Euratom concept and opposed a common market, now started to oppose Euratom and favour a common market, as long as a common agricultural policy was included as well. In contrast, the Germans were in favour of Euratom and a free trade based common market and the insistence that one treaty must be dependent on the existence of the other. As it transpired, over the next 18 months, objections and changes from the French side constantly placed the path to common agreement in jeopardy.
On a positive note, the first Western European nuclear reactor to produce electricity went on line in Britain in late 1956. By this stage, regarding the promise of an abundant and cheap source of energy, reality had begun to set in. Difficulties were being experienced in building satisfactory reactors, power costs were now looking to be three times higher than conventional power stations, there was differing opinions on the ideal choice of the type of nuclear fuel to be used, problems existed in resolving issues with reactor cooling and so on.
On 13 March 1956, Spaak made a speech to the Common Assembly of the ECSC in which he emphasised the importance of a common market based on a customs union between the six ECSC member states. In addition, he gave a detailed progress report on the work of the Spaak Committee and made a plea for all parties to co-operate together in the forthcoming negotiations to draft the treaties for the benefit of all participants.
On 21 April 1956, the completed Spaak Report was published and presented to the Foreign Ministers of the six ECSC member states. Discussions regarding the report and decisions about the next steps to be taken were scheduled to take place at the Venice conference one month later. Here are the detailed reports on the Common Market and Euratom.
During 29 to 30 May 1956, at the Venice Conference, the Spaak Report was accepted by the representatives of all six ECSC member states. After various reservations raised previously by France, in a surprise turnaround, the French now accepted the Spaak report as the basis for negotiations for both Euratom and the Common Market. It was decided that an Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and Euratom would be convened in June 1956.
The Intergovernmental Conference on Common Market & Euratom, headed by Spaak, commenced work on 26 June 1956 with the first session held in the Grand Salon of the Belgian Foreign Ministry in Brussels. The negotiations continued in Brussels and were expected to be able to complete their work within about 9 months. The purpose of the conference was to draft the Treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom). The conference based their work on the contents of the Spaak Report of the Spaak Committee and, in accordance with the decisions taken at the Venice Conference, to prepare the plans for the establishment of a common market and the establishment of a European Community for the peaceful use of atomic energy.
The French had by now begun to accept the original idea of a full common market, based on a customs union. The leaders of France’s agriculture industry and key French industrialists had also come out in favour of this proposal. But they demanded a price. If high social welfare standards were to be imposed on employers, as France had suggested in the Venice conference, they must be harmonised throughout the new “community”, to avoid the other five member states, especially the FRG, gaining a competitive advantage. Predictably, this was unacceptable to the Germans.
Ludwig Erhard played an important role in the West German postwar economic reforms and economic recovery (“Wirtschaftswunder,” or “economic miracle”), first as Director of Economics, from 1946 to 1949 and then as the FRG Minister of Economics from 1949 to 1963. He was opposed to the “customs union” common market concept and preferred the idea of a “free trade area” common market.
Adenauer was also in favour of Erhard’s free trade area solution and did not favour Monnet’s concept of a ‘‘United States of Europe”. On 5 October 1956, in an address to the FRG cabinet, Adenauer explained the dilemma facing them. Euratom would allow the FRG access to nuclear technology and resources necessary to obtain nuclear power stations. In addition he explained, Euratom would limit the development of nuclear weapons by France. But the only way to get Euratom was to agree to a “common market”, although that had to be based on Erhard’s version, namely, a free trade area.
During 20 to 21 October 1956, at the Paris Conference, Spaak gave a detailed update regarding the progress of the negotiations being held in the “Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and Euratom”. Unfortunately, on some issues, a deadlock had been reached with neither of the parties willing to compromise. There was still an impasse on the harmonisation of social policies and no progress was being made in this regard. If no agreement could be reached on the Common Market, then Euratom would not be set up either, since the creation of both was a prerequisite. The negotiations to finalise the formation of Euratom were further complicated because the provisions and scope of Euratom were ambiguous regarding the implications concerning the use of nuclear materials and technology for military use. This particularly concerned France who had plans to develop military nuclear weapons and the FRG who wanted strict control over any use of nuclear technology and materials for military purposes.
The Suez crisis in October to November 1956, which exposed the vulnerability of Europe regarding its energy supplies, also had an influence on the negotiations. In its aftermath, while the Canal remained blocked, oil in Western Europe was in short supply and petrol had to be rationed. This highlighted Europe’s dependence on Middle East oil and underlined the need for alternative sources of energy.
As 1957 got underway, there was suddenly an urgent and strong motivation to conclude the treaty negotiations.
Finally, during 19 to 20 February 1957, at the Paris Conference, the last remaining outstanding issues were resolved. Adenauer proposed that the control of nuclear fissile materials used in military programmes be excluded from the Euratom treaty. Therefore, this exclusion no longer precluded or hindered the existence of a French nuclear weapons programme. Although the other four ECSC countries were reluctant to accept this exclusion, nevertheless agreement with this amendment was obtained. Thus, the six ECSC member states had finally achieved consensus on the formation and function of Euratom. In addition, the contentious issue of social harmonisation became a mere trifle. Adenauer removed this previously insurmountable obstacle by agreeing “in principle” to the French demands.
On 25th March 1957, “The Treaties of Rome” were signed by the six ECSC member states (“Big Six”) and which established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).
On 4 May 1957, Louis Armand, Franz Etzel and Francesco Giordani (commonly referred to as “The Three Wise Men”) submitted their report entitled “A Target for Euratom” to the Foreign Ministers of the six ECSC member states. On November 16, 1956, “The Three Wise Men” had been instructed to investigate and report “on the amount of atomic energy which can be produced in the near future in the six countries, and the means to he employed for this purpose”.
From May to November 1957, the process of ratification took place in the parliaments of the respective six countries and finally, the treaties establishing the EEC and the EAEC (or Euratom) entered into force on 1 January 1958.
Spaak took up the position of the Secretary-General of NATO on 16 May 1957.
On 20 December 1957, as a result of the findings and recommendations of the OEEC Steering Committee for Nuclear Energy, the European Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA) was established to support the development of the production and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes among the OEEC member countries. All 17 OEEC countries were members of the agency and the USA was given associate membership status.
The initial work of the ENEA comprised the creation of joint undertakings: the Eurochemic Society for reprocessing irradiated fuels at Mol in Belgium, the Halden Boiling Heavy Water Reactor Project in Oslo, Norway and the Dragon High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor Project at Winfrith in the UK. Another important objective of the ENEA was the harmonisation of national research programmes, encouraging scientific and technical co-operation between member countries and the exchange of information and personnel. A third aim of the Agency was the development of uniform atomic regulations for Europe, especially in the fields of health, safety, liability and radio-active materials and lastly the study of economic aspects of nuclear energy and assessment of the place of nuclear power in Europe’s overall energy balance sheet. Apart from these primary objectives the ENEA was also involved in nuclear ship propulsion, security controls, nuclear data correlation and environmental radioactivity.
Finally, on 20 April 1972, the European Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA) changed its name to the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) after Japan became a member. Here is a very good account of the history of the NEA.